In this case, plaintiff Select Comfort Corporation, a maker of air beds, sued competitor Sleep Better Store, LLC for violations of federal trademark and false advertising laws as well as several Minnesota consumer protection statutes, alleging misleading website comparisons, false claims about product origins and warranties, and improper sales tactics. The court addressed Sleep Better's motion to dismiss five of the claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), applying the heightened pleading standards of Rule 9(b) for fraud-based allegations. It granted the motion in part by dismissing the claims under the Minnesota Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, Unlawful Trade Practices Act, and Consumer Fraud Act, reasoning that those claims, brought pursuant to the state's private attorney general statute, failed to sufficiently allege a public benefit. The court denied the motion as to the Lanham Act and Minnesota False Statement in Advertisement Act claims, finding that the supporting allegations, including those made on information and belief, met the particularity requirements.
Elaine Humphrey sued Prudential Insurance Company of America under ERISA to recover long-term disability benefits under a plan sponsored by her former employer, KPMG, and also claimed breach of fiduciary duty after Prudential terminated her benefits. The district court granted Prudential's motion for summary judgment. Because the plan gave Prudential discretion to interpret its terms and determine eligibility, the court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard and upheld the denial as reasonable in light of the medical evidence in the administrative record, including opinions from Prudential's reviewing physicians. The court rejected Humphrey's arguments about procedural irregularities, additional evidence outside the record, and the fiduciary-duty claim.
This case involved claims by individual voters, election judges, and nonprofit organizations challenging Minnesota Statutes section 211B.11, subdivision 1, which bans the wearing or display of political buttons, badges, insignia, and campaign materials at or within 100 feet of polling places on primary or election day. Plaintiffs alleged that the statute and related enforcement policies by county elections managers and the secretary of state were facially unconstitutional and violated rights to free speech, association, voting, equal protection, and due process under the U.S. and Minnesota constitutions, particularly as applied to items like Tea Party apparel and "Please ID Me" buttons. The court granted defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss the amended complaint. It reasoned that polling places constitute nonpublic forums where content-based speech restrictions are valid if reasonable and viewpoint-neutral, the statute is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, and the policies did not prevent voting or violate due process.
In Zortman v. J.C. Christensen & Associates, Inc., the plaintiff sued a debt collector under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act after the collector left voicemail messages on her home and cell phones that disclosed her consumer debt, which her children overheard. The defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the FDCPA requires a debt collector to purposefully or deliberately disclose debt information to a third party. The court denied the motion, holding that the complaint stated a plausible claim under 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b), which prohibits communicating debt information to third parties without consent. The court reasoned that the voicemails were left on systems that did not identify possible listeners, allowing the inference that the collector had reason to anticipate third-party access, and that the statute does not require deliberate intent to disclose to third parties.
In this case, plaintiff Collin Myrlie sued Countrywide Bank and Countrywide Home Loans after the bank foreclosed on his Dakota County, Minnesota property in November 2008, alleging that the defendants had promised but failed to complete a loan modification agreement in 2008 despite repeated assurances. Myrlie asserted claims for promissory estoppel and negligence, seeking damages for lost profits, increased costs, loss of remedies, and punitive damages. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation after de novo review, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court found no clear and definite promise to support estoppel, no legal duty owed by the bank to modify the loan under negligence principles, no evidence that the lack of modification proximately caused the foreclosure (which was permitted under the original loan terms due to missed payments), and no substantiated damages. The punitive damages claim was also rejected as improperly pleaded under Minnesota statute.
The case involves insurance companies suing chiropractic clinics, a massage therapy provider, a marketing entity, and associated individuals, alleging a scheme involving illegal solicitation of no-fault auto insurance claimants, submission of claims for unrendered or unnecessary services, kickbacks, and nondisclosure of financial interests. Plaintiffs asserted eleven counts including RICO violations, RICO conspiracy, multiple fraud claims, unjust enrichment, anti-kickback violations, and corporate practice of medicine issues. On defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part after accepting the pleaded facts as true and applying the plausibility standard from Twombly and Iqbal, finding some claims like certain RICO counts insufficiently pleaded regarding enterprise structure and predicate acts while allowing others to proceed.
