This case involved a second appeal in an action by Bankers' Savings & Loan Association to recover losses under a fidelity bond issued by American Surety Co. due to the dishonesty of the association's secretary. The initial reversal had held that the association failed to provide timely notice of loss as required by the bond terms. On remand, the association amended its pleadings to invoke a Nebraska statute providing that a breach of an insurance policy condition does not avoid liability unless the breach contributed to the loss, relying on a subsequent state supreme court decision interpreting the statute. The court affirmed the judgment for the association, deferring to the Nebraska court's construction of the state insurance statute and finding that the delayed notice did not prejudice the surety or contribute to the loss, while also addressing the application of the law-of-the-case doctrine after the prior mandate.
This case involved an injured plaintiff suing an automobile liability insurer to collect on a judgment obtained against the insured driver, after the insurer refused to pay claiming the insured breached the policy's cooperation clause by failing to provide information, respond to communications, or attend trial. The district court directed a verdict for the plaintiff, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court reasoned that the insured had substantially complied with the cooperation requirement, as there was no evidence of willful refusal or material prejudice to the defense, and the insurer had not acted in good faith by failing to cover the insured's expenses or pursue a genuine defense. The opinion emphasized that the injured party's rights under the policy were no greater than those of the insured, but here the conditions precedent were met. It also noted the policy's insolvency provision allowing direct action against the insurer when execution on the judgment was returned unsatisfied.
This case involved a contractor's suit against a drainage district for breach of contract damages arising from a forced suspension of ditch-digging work in 1921 when the district lacked funds to make required progress payments. After the district could not sell additional bonds, the plaintiff and other contractors entered into a new October 1921 agreement to resume work and accept payment under specified terms; the district later made final payment, which the plaintiff accepted. The lower court denied the delay damages claim but awarded compensation for extra work, and the Eighth Circuit affirmed on appeal. The court reasoned that the October 1921 collateral contract, read in light of the parties' conduct and the final payment marked as such, constituted a settlement that waived claims for delay damages.
The case involved the conviction of defendant Spalitto on counts charging him with operating a distillery to defraud the United States of taxes on distilled spirits, operating without a required bond, and possessing mash fit for distillation, all based on evidence from a 1928 raid on the second floor of a building he owned in Kansas City. The evidence was entirely circumstantial, showing a still and mash in a room sublet by his tenant, with the defendant present in his first-floor grocery store that had a barred rear door leading toward the upstairs. On appeal, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial judge's comments to the jury on the evidence crossed into improper advocacy for the government's case rather than permissible expression of opinion, thereby denying the defendant his right to a jury determination of the facts.
The case involved a negligence claim arising from a bus accident in which a passenger was injured when the vehicle, returning empty to St. Louis after breaking down, struck the plaintiff's car. Yelloway, Inc., which had contracted with Carl Schack to operate the bus on its routes between cities such as Kansas City and St. Louis, appealed a judgment holding it responsible for the driver's actions. The court affirmed the verdict, concluding that the driver was Yelloway's servant because the buses were used in its business and subject to its direction and control over schedules, passengers, and operations under the parties' agreement. The contract's provisions allotting routes exclusively to Schack's equipment until full, requiring Yelloway's approval of drivers and insurance, and allowing Yelloway to assign trips demonstrated sufficient control to establish vicarious liability, regardless of Schack's ownership of the bus or payment for repairs. A dissent argued that Schack was an independent contractor not subject to Yelloway's control over the manner of performance.
This case involved a suit by the Commercial Bank of Liberty against Concordia Fire Insurance Company to recover under a fire insurance policy with a standard mortgage clause after a dwelling owned by the bank's debtor was destroyed by fire. The insurer defended on grounds that the bank had failed to notify it of changes in ownership and occupancy that increased the hazard, as required by the policy, and that the mortgagor was a necessary party. The district court entered judgment for the bank for the amount due on the mortgage plus interest, penalty, and attorney fees for vexatious refusal to pay. The appellate court held that the bank was entitled to recover the principal amount and interest but that there was no substantial evidence to support the penalty and fees, reversing that portion of the judgment and directing a remittitur or new trial if the bank did not waive those amounts.