This case involves the EEOC suing Kaplan Higher Education Corporation under Title VII §§706 and 707, alleging a nationwide pattern or practice of race discrimination against black job applicants and employees through the use of credit history checks as a hiring and discharge criterion that had a disparate impact and was not job-related. The defendant moved to partially dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing that claims based on employment decisions made more than 300 days before the underlying charge (before May 2, 2008) were time-barred. The court granted the motion, holding that the filing deadline in §706(e)(1) applies to EEOC pattern-or-practice suits under §707 because §707(e) incorporates §706 procedures, that the continuing violations doctrine does not apply to these discrete acts, and that recovery is therefore limited to timely claims.
This case is a personal injury and wrongful death lawsuit brought by Lisa Alleman against trucking company YRC and its driver Robert Trella after her husband Ronald died in a collision with Trella's tractor-trailer on an icy Interstate 90 in Ohio. The plaintiff alleged negligence per se, negligent hiring and supervision by YRC, negligent vehicle maintenance, punitive damages, loss of consortium, pre-impact terror, and wrongful death. The court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the claims for negligent hiring/supervision, negligent maintenance, punitive damages, and pre-impact terror. It reasoned that the evidence did not establish conscious wrongdoing or a conscious disregard for safety by the driver or company, as Trella had adjusted his speed, the roads appeared treated until the accident, and no facts showed the required level of awareness of a high probability of substantial harm. The decision applied the summary judgment standard under which no genuine issues of material fact existed on those counts.
The case involves a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Michael Horton, who was convicted after trial of murder and improperly handling a firearm in a motor vehicle, and who pled guilty to having a weapon while under disability, resulting in a 25-years-to-life sentence. The district court accepted the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant the petition in part, holding that the state trial court's refusal to instruct the jury on self-defense deprived Horton of due process. The court reasoned that the right to present a complete defense, as recognized in California v. Trombetta and Sixth Circuit precedent, requires a self-defense instruction when supported by sufficient evidence, and here the evidence included testimony that the victim struck Horton with a bottle before he fired. The petition was granted as to the trial convictions, remanding for a new trial on those charges, but denied as to the guilty-plea conviction.
This case is a civil rights action brought by plaintiffs Montgomery Ward, Jamie Sutton, and Daisy Ward against Cuyahoga County and Sergeant Michael Sparks, alleging excessive force and related claims stemming from the SWAT team's execution of a high-risk drug search warrant at Ward's apartment on February 5, 2008. Plaintiffs claimed Sparks used unreasonable force when he shot Ward during the entry and that the County failed to properly train its officers. The court granted the County's motion for summary judgment in full and granted Sparks's motion in part, dismissing claims for unreasonable search and seizure as well as some state-law claims, but denied summary judgment on the core excessive force claim against Sparks. The core reasoning applied the Fourth Amendment reasonableness standard and qualified immunity analysis to the officer's actions, found insufficient evidence of a municipal custom or policy of inadequate training, and addressed state-law immunities under Ohio law.
In this case, plaintiff Shayne Bailey sued the City of Broadview Heights and its mayor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a due process violation because Mayor Alai, who holds executive and administrative powers, presided over the city's Mayor's Court and accepted Bailey's no contest plea to a minor misdemeanor traffic citation. The facts were undisputed, and the court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court denied the plaintiff's motion and granted the defendants' motion, holding that no due process violation occurred. The core reasoning was that Ohio Traffic Rule 9 expressly permits mayors to accept guilty or no contest pleas regardless of their executive roles, as guilt is not contested in such proceedings, distinguishing this situation from the Sixth Circuit's decision in DePiero v. City of Macedonia which addressed different circumstances.
This case involved a firefighter who sued the City of Bay Village and its mayor after receiving a suspension for statements made at a public city council meeting criticizing the elimination of the city's dive team following a child's drowning death. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and denied the plaintiff's motion on his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights. The court reasoned that the plaintiff's statements were not protected because they involved recklessly or intentionally false assertions that the absence of the dive team caused the death, as no divers entered the water at the scene, and that the discipline therefore did not amount to a constitutional violation; alternatively, the mayor was entitled to qualified immunity.
