Ruth Bader Ginsburg

The case concerned whether the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office properly refused federal trademark registration for the term 'Booking.com' on the ground that it was a generic name for online hotel-reservation services. The Supreme Court held that a term formatted as 'generic.com' is ineligible for registration only if consumers actually perceive it as the name of a class of goods or services. The Court reasoned that eligibility under the Lanham Act turns on consumer perception of the term as a whole, and that adding '.com' to a generic word can convey source-identifying meaning because only one entity can use a given domain name. It rejected a proposed per se rule against such combinations, noting that existing doctrines like fair use and likelihood of confusion would prevent undue monopoly effects.

business & regulatory

This case involved Evelyn Sineneng-Smith, who was convicted under federal law for encouraging unauthorized aliens to reside in the U.S. for financial gain by filing futile labor certification applications. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals raised a new issue not presented by the parties—whether the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment—and held it to be so. The Supreme Court decided that the Ninth Circuit abused its discretion by departing from the party presentation principle, which requires courts to decide cases based on issues framed by the litigants rather than introducing new ones. The Court vacated the judgment and remanded for reconsideration of the case as shaped by the parties' arguments.

immigrationcriminal lawfree speech

The case concerned whether a party can appeal a U.S. Patent and Trademark Office decision to institute inter partes review of a patent when the petition was filed more than one year after the petitioner was sued for infringement, in violation of the time limit in 35 U.S.C. §315(b). The Supreme Court held that 35 U.S.C. §314(d) bars judicial review of the agency's application of that time bar. The core reasoning was that the statute makes the institution decision final and nonappealable, §315(b) directly governs whether review may be instituted, and allowing appeals would undermine the efficiency of the inter partes review process as explained in the Court's prior decision in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved whether courts could review a Patent Trial and Appeal Board decision that a petition for inter partes review of a patent was timely filed under 35 U.S.C. §315(b), despite the one-year limit after an infringement suit. The Supreme Court held that §314(d) makes the agency's application of the §315(b) time bar final and nonappealable. The Court reasoned that the review bar covers questions closely tied to the institution decision, as previously interpreted in Cuozzo, that §315(b) expressly governs institution, and that permitting such appeals would undermine Congress's goal of efficient cancellation of invalid patent claims. It rejected efforts to limit the bar to §314(a) determinations or to reframe the appeal as arising from the final written decision.

procedurefederal power

The case Shular v. United States concerned whether prior state convictions for cocaine-related offenses qualified as "serious drug offenses" under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence for felons in possession of firearms with at least three such prior convictions. The Supreme Court held that the ACCA's definition of a serious drug offense requires only that the state offense involve manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute a controlled substance, without needing to compare it to a generic version of the offense. The Court reasoned that the statutory language using "involving" refers directly to conduct rather than to named offenses, in contrast to the adjacent provision for violent felonies that uses "is" to list specific crimes like burglary. This interpretation was supported by the text, context, and the absence of common nomenclature in state drug laws at the time of enactment.

criminal lawguns

The case Monasky v. Taglieri involved a dispute under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction regarding whether a child born in Italy to an American mother and Italian father had been wrongfully removed from her country of habitual residence when the mother fled to the United States. The Supreme Court held that a child's habitual residence is determined by the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, rather than requiring an actual agreement between the parents or other categorical rules. The Court reasoned that this fact-driven inquiry, informed by the Convention's text and the practices of other signatory nations, focuses on where the child is at home, considering factors like parental intent and the child's acclimation as relevant but not dispositive. It affirmed the lower courts' determination that Italy was the child's habitual residence and that the child should be returned there.

family law

The case concerned whether a defendant's prior state convictions for cocaine-related offenses qualified as 'serious drug offenses' under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), which imposes a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence on felons in possession of a firearm who have at least three such convictions. The Supreme Court held that the ACCA definition of a 'serious drug offense'—a state offense 'involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance'—requires only that the state offense involve the specified conduct and does not call for matching the elements of a generic federal offense. The Court reasoned that the statutory text uses the word 'involving' and terms that describe conduct rather than naming specific crimes, in contrast to neighboring ACCA provisions that refer to offenses like burglary or arson and require a generic-offense analysis. The Court rejected arguments based on consistency across state laws or the rule of lenity, finding the text and context unambiguous after applying traditional interpretive tools.

criminal law

This case involved a dispute under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction over whether a child born in Italy to a U.S. citizen mother and Italian father had been wrongfully removed from her country of habitual residence when the mother fled to Ohio. The Supreme Court held that habitual residence is determined by the totality of the circumstances specific to the case, without any categorical requirement of an actual parental agreement, and that a district court's habitual-residence finding is reviewed on appeal only for clear error. The Court reasoned that the Convention's text, history, and purpose call for a fact-driven inquiry into where the child is at home, drawing on common sense and the approaches of other signatory nations, while noting that issues like domestic violence can be addressed in custody proceedings or under the Convention's grave-risk exception. It affirmed the Sixth Circuit's decision upholding the district court's determination that Italy was the child's habitual residence.

family lawprocedure

In Ritzen Group, Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, a creditor sued a debtor in state court for breach of a land-sale contract, after which the debtor filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, triggering an automatic stay of the state litigation under 11 U.S.C. §362(a). The bankruptcy court denied the creditor's motion for relief from the stay, the creditor filed a proof of claim that was later disallowed, and the reorganization plan was confirmed; only then did the creditor attempt to appeal the stay-relief denial. The Supreme Court held that a bankruptcy court's unreserved denial of relief from the automatic stay is a final, immediately appealable order under 28 U.S.C. §158(a), so the 14-day appeal period began when that order was entered. The Court reasoned that adjudication of a stay-relief motion constitutes a discrete proceeding separate from claim-resolution proceedings, consistent with its prior decision in Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, and that the order conclusively resolved the creditor's entitlement to the requested relief.

procedure

The case involved voters challenging Virginia's post-2010 census redistricting of 12 House of Delegates districts as racially gerrymandered under the Equal Protection Clause. A three-judge district court ruled that 11 districts were unconstitutional and ordered the state to adopt a new plan. After Virginia's Attorney General declined to appeal, the House of Delegates intervened and filed its own appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the House lacked standing either to represent the state's interests, which are exclusively assigned to the Attorney General under state law, or in its own right, as invalidation of the districts caused no cognizable institutional injury to the House as a legislative body.

electionscivil rightsfederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether an employee must file a formal charge with the EEOC alleging a specific type of discrimination before bringing a Title VII lawsuit in federal court, and whether that requirement limits the court's jurisdiction. Lois Davis sued Fort Bend County for religion-based discrimination after informally noting the claim on an intake questionnaire rather than amending her original EEOC charge, which had focused on sexual harassment and retaliation. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, but the Fifth Circuit reversed, holding the filing rule was not jurisdictional. The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that Title VII's charge-filing requirement is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule that can be forfeited if not timely raised by the defendant. The Court reasoned that the requirement appears in provisions separate from the statute's jurisdictional grants and resembles other procedural steps that courts must enforce only when properly asserted.

civil rightsprocedurelabor & employment

The case involved a dispute between Fourth Estate Public Benefit Corporation, a news organization, and Wall-Street.com, LLC, over alleged copyright infringement of news articles after the termination of a licensing agreement. Fourth Estate had applied for copyright registration but had not yet received approval from the Copyright Office when it filed suit. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the complaint, holding that under 17 U.S.C. §411(a), a copyright owner may not commence an infringement action until the Copyright Office has registered the copyright claim. The Court reasoned that the statutory text requires action by the Register of Copyrights, distinguishing between the filing of an application and the actual registration, and that this interpretation aligns with other provisions of the Copyright Act, such as those allowing preregistration in limited cases.

procedure

The case BNSF Railway Co. v. Loos concerned whether damages awarded to a railroad employee under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for lost wages due to an on-the-job injury qualify as taxable "compensation" under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA). The Supreme Court held that such payments are indeed taxable compensation under the RRTA. The Court's reasoning drew on the statutory definitions of "compensation" mirroring those in Social Security laws, and precedents holding that backpay and similar payments for time lost due to employer actions count as wages or compensation. It rejected narrower interpretations limiting compensation to active service only, noting specific exclusions in the RRTA that imply other lost-time payments are taxable.

taxeslabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case involved whether an award of damages under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for wages lost due to a workplace injury counts as taxable “compensation” under the Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA). The Supreme Court held that such payments are taxable compensation, reversing the lower courts’ refusal to allow withholding for the employee’s share of RRTA taxes. The Court reasoned that the RRTA’s definition of compensation as money remuneration for services rendered parallels the Social Security Act’s definition of wages, and prior precedents establish that wages include backpay or lost-time pay stemming from the employer-employee relationship even when the employee is absent from active work. It concluded that FELA damages for lost wages fit this definition because they compensate for time the employee would have worked but for the railroad’s negligence.

taxeslabor & employmenttorts & liability

The case concerned whether a railroad must withhold Railroad Retirement Tax Act (RRTA) taxes from a Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) damages award compensating an employee for wages lost due to an on-the-job injury. After a jury awarded Michael Loos $30,000 in lost wages, BNSF sought to offset $3,765 for Loos’s share of RRTA taxes, but the district court and Eighth Circuit held that such damages are not taxable compensation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that payments for working time lost because of an employer’s negligence qualify as “compensation” under the RRTA. The Court reasoned that the RRTA’s definition of compensation parallels the Social Security Act’s definition of wages, and precedents such as Social Security Board v. Nierotko establish that remuneration for time lost due to an employer’s wrong counts as taxable wages or compensation when it arises from the employment relationship.

taxeslabor & employment

In Timbs v. Indiana, Tyson Timbs pleaded guilty to drug-related offenses, after which Indiana sought civil forfeiture of his $42,000 Land Rover SUV that had been used to transport heroin. The trial court denied the forfeiture as grossly disproportionate under the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause, but the Indiana Supreme Court held that the Clause applies only to federal action and not to the states. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the Excessive Fines Clause is incorporated against the states under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The Court reasoned that protection against excessive fines is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition, tracing from Magna Carta through state constitutions, and is therefore fundamental to ordered liberty.

criminal lawcivil rights

The case involved two firefighters laid off by the Mount Lemmon Fire District who sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), alleging age discrimination in their termination. The Fire District sought dismissal, arguing it was too small to qualify as an employer under the ADEA's definition requiring twenty or more employees. The Supreme Court held that the ADEA applies to states and their political subdivisions without any numerosity limitation. The Court reasoned that the statute's definitional provision in 29 U.S.C. §630(b) uses the phrase "also means" to add separate categories for states and political subdivisions, pairing them with agents that carry no size threshold, and that this structure aligns with the Fair Labor Standards Act rather than Title VII.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerned an application to the U.S. Supreme Court to vacate a stay issued by the Eighth Circuit of a district court injunction that had blocked North Dakota's requirement for voter identification showing a residential address. The Supreme Court denied the application to vacate the stay, with Justice Kavanaugh not participating, thereby leaving the Eighth Circuit's order in place for the upcoming election. Justice Ginsburg dissented, joined by Justice Kagan, contending that the last-minute shift in ID rules after they had been in effect for the primary created a high risk of voter confusion and disenfranchisement for tens of thousands of residents lacking qualifying identification, and that this risk outweighed any disruption from vacating the stay.

electionscivil rights

The case involved U.S. purchasers suing Chinese vitamin C manufacturers for alleged price-fixing and output restrictions on exports to the United States, in violation of the Sherman Act, with the defendants asserting that Chinese law compelled their conduct. The district court declined to treat the Chinese Ministry of Commerce's statements as conclusive, allowed the case to proceed to trial, and entered judgment on a jury verdict for the plaintiffs. The Second Circuit reversed, ruling that federal courts must defer to a foreign government's reasonable interpretation of its own laws. The Supreme Court held that under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 44.1, courts must give respectful consideration to a foreign government's submissions but are not bound to accept them as conclusive, instead weighing factors such as clarity, consistency, and context alongside other relevant materials.

business & regulatoryprocedurefederal power

This case concerned whether the statute of limitations is tolled for successive class actions under the rule established in American Pipe. The Supreme Court held that American Pipe tolling applies only to individual claims, not to new class actions filed after class certification is denied in prior cases. The Court reasoned that principles of efficiency and judicial economy, along with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the PSLRA, favor early resolution of class claims rather than allowing repeated filings that could indefinitely extend limitations periods. Respondent Resh's class action was therefore time-barred.

procedurebusiness & regulatory