In Haluska v. RAF Financial Corp., a Georgia resident employed as a securities broker by a Colorado-based broker-dealer sued in state court for unpaid commissions, violations of Georgia’s Minimum Wage Law, tortious interference, and attorney fees after his termination for unauthorized trading. The defendant removed the case to federal court and sought to stay proceedings and compel arbitration in Denver under clauses in the employment agreement and Form U-4, while the plaintiff moved to remand the wage claim. The court granted the stay pending arbitration, denied the motion to compel arbitration specifically in Denver, and denied remand, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act mandates enforcement of the arbitration agreements and preempts conflicting state requirements for a judicial forum. The reasoning relied on Supreme Court precedents such as Gilmer, Perry, and Southland Corp. v. Keating establishing the FAA’s strong federal policy favoring arbitration in employment contexts and its preemptive effect under the Supremacy Clause.
This case involved a personal injury lawsuit filed by Georgia residents against two corporate defendants in Georgia state court. The defendants attempted to remove the case to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction more than thirty days after the first defendant was served. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that the thirty-day removal period under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) began running when the first defendant received service and that all defendants must timely join in or consent to removal within that window. The court reasoned that removal statutes must be strictly construed in favor of state court jurisdiction and that the initial pleading provided sufficient information for the defendants to ascertain removability.
This case concerned an attorney's challenge to a Georgia statute (O.C.G.A. § 35-1-9) that criminalized inspecting or copying certain public law enforcement records for the purpose of commercial solicitation using victims' or other individuals' names and addresses. After the Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's prior dismissal of the First Amendment claim and remanded for reconsideration, the court granted the plaintiff's motion for a permanent injunction and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss. The core reasoning was that the statute restricts non-misleading commercial speech protected by the First Amendment, fails to directly advance substantial government interests such as privacy or crime prevention in a narrowly tailored way, and improperly distinguishes between commercial users and the media.
The case involves a commercial property owner near Atlanta's airport alleging that frequent low-altitude overflights cause noise, vibrations, and pollution amounting to an uncompensated taking under the Fifth Amendment and Georgia Constitution, as well as inverse condemnation, nuisance, and trespass under state law; the owner also claimed equal protection violations because the city's noise abatement program buys only residential properties. The court granted in part and denied in part the city's motion for judgment on the pleadings or summary judgment, dismissing the federal takings claim, the equal protection claims, requests for punitive damages, and the inverse condemnation claim based on a physical taking, while denying summary judgment on the inverse condemnation claim based on nuisance, the common-law nuisance claim, and the trespass claim. The court allowed the city to refile a motion addressing the remaining nuisance and trespass counts. Core reasoning centered on application of Rule 12(c) and Rule 56 standards to the pleadings and record, finding no genuine issue supporting a new or compensable physical appropriation or equal protection violation but leaving open factual questions on continuing nuisance and trespass effects.
This case involved a dispute over whether a contract was formed for the sale of approximately 4 acres of land in Georgia at a public auction. The plaintiff claimed that their high bid was accepted when the auctioneer's hammer fell, seeking specific performance or damages from the defendant, Resolution Trust Corp. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The core reasoning was that the auction was conducted "with reserve," allowing the seller to reject bids even after the hammer fell, and the defendant had rejected the plaintiff's bid.
This case involves a former research technician suing his employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, claiming his 1991 termination during a reduction-in-force was motivated by age rather than the poorer performance evaluations cited by the company. The court addressed the plaintiff's motion to quash an amended deposition notice for a witness and the defendant's motion for summary judgment. It denied the motion to quash, permitting the defendant to re-depose the witness to address an incomplete transcript from the original session, but limited the scope to the prior lines of questioning. The court denied the summary judgment motion without prejudice, finding that the defendant had not properly applied the burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims or adequately identified the absence of genuine issues of material fact in the record.