The case involved a union member, Wilson Lockridge, who sued his union in Idaho state court after the union suspended him for late dues payment and caused his discharge from employment under a valid union security clause in the collective bargaining agreement. The Idaho courts awarded Lockridge damages on the ground that the union had breached obligations in its constitution and bylaws by treating him as suspended when he was merely not in good standing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the National Labor Relations Act preempts state court jurisdiction over claims involving conduct that is arguably protected or prohibited by the Act. The core reasoning, building on San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, was that the federal labor law scheme and the NLRB's centralized authority require uniform national administration and necessarily displace traditional state court processes in this area.
The case involved Paul Cohen, who was convicted under California Penal Code § 415 for disturbing the peace through offensive conduct after wearing a jacket displaying the words "Fuck the Draft" in a Los Angeles courthouse corridor. The state courts upheld the conviction on the ground that the words were likely to provoke a violent reaction from others. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the conviction rested solely on the content of Cohen's speech rather than any separately identifiable conduct or incitement to violence. The Court reasoned that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect such expression in the absence of a showing that it was intended to incite disobedience or disruption, and that the statute as applied did not justify punishing the message conveyed.
The case concerned a long-running dispute between the Chicago and North Western Railway and the United Transportation Union over work rules, including the number of brakemen required on trains. After the parties had exhausted the Railway Labor Act's negotiation and mediation procedures, the railroad sued in federal court to enjoin a threatened strike, alleging that the union had violated its duty under § 2 First of the Act to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements. The district court and court of appeals ruled that § 2 First was merely a policy statement, nonjusticiable by courts, and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to issue strike injunctions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that § 2 First imposes a legally enforceable obligation on carriers and unions and that the Norris-LaGuardia Act does not bar judicial enforcement through injunctions, as this duty is central to the Railway Labor Act's purpose of preventing interruptions to commerce.
The case involved two petitioners convicted of first-degree murder in state courts and sentenced to death under statutes that gave juries absolute discretion to decide between life imprisonment and death, without any specific standards. In one case the penalty decision occurred in a separate proceeding after the guilt trial, while in the other the jury decided both guilt and punishment in a single trial and verdict. The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the questions of whether unguided jury discretion in imposing the death penalty violated the Constitution and whether combining the guilt and penalty determinations in one proceeding was permissible. The Court held that neither practice infringed the petitioners' constitutional rights and affirmed both convictions. Its reasoning centered on the conclusion that the Due Process Clause does not require states to provide juries with governing standards for the life-or-death choice or to separate the guilt and sentencing phases.
This case involved the U.S. government's attempt to forfeit $8,674 in cash that had been seized from Donald Angelini, who had been convicted of failing to register as a gambler and pay related taxes under federal law. After the Supreme Court ruled in Marchetti v. United States and Grosso v. United States that such convictions could violate the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, the Court of Appeals held that Angelini could assert this privilege in the forfeiture proceeding, leading to the return of the money. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision, reasoning that forfeiture proceedings under 26 U.S.C. § 7302 are criminal in nature for Fifth Amendment purposes, making them equivalent to imposing a criminal fine based on the owner's wrongful conduct. The Court rejected the government's distinction that the owner's guilt was irrelevant, noting that the forfeiture still depends on a finding of illegal use tied to the owner's actions.
The case involved petitioner Whiteley, who was convicted in Wyoming state court of breaking and entering and being an habitual criminal after evidence was seized during a search incident to his arrest. Whiteley challenged the constitutionality of the arrest warrant and the search under the Fourth Amendment, arguing that the warrant lacked probable cause. The Supreme Court held that the arrest was invalid because the complaint supporting the warrant contained only a bare conclusion without sufficient facts for a magistrate to independently determine probable cause, and the radio bulletin relied upon by the arresting officer did not supply additional information to establish probable cause. As a result, the evidence obtained from the search was inadmissible, and the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals affirming the denial of habeas relief.