This case involves a motion for recusal filed by defendant Paul Bilzerian in a long-running Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement action stemming from his prior criminal convictions for securities violations. The court denied the motion as both meritless and moot after the case had already been reassigned to another judge. The judge explained that his senior status and planned retirement had led him to retain the case temporarily to avoid disruption, particularly given Bilzerian's ongoing civil contempt incarceration, and that he had taken steps such as facilitating a smooth transfer and making recommendations favorable to Bilzerian regarding his detention conditions. The opinion rejected any claim of bias, noting that the judge's actions demonstrated fairness and that a random reassignment earlier would have harmed all parties by delaying proceedings.
This case involves a remand from the D.C. Circuit directing the district court to determine whether defense counsel specifically objected during an off-the-record instructions conference to the use of "strong belief" (rather than "firmly convinced") in the reasonable doubt jury instruction given at trial. The district court found, based on its clear recollection of events and review of the record in this and related cases, that counsel made only a general request for the Redbook instruction without stating a distinct objection or grounds regarding the "strong belief" phrasing as required by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 30. The opinion also recounts the judge's adoption of the Federal Judicial Center Pattern Instructions for reasonable doubt, notes outcomes in similar appeals (three affirmances and four reversals), and corrects certain factual representations in prior appellate decisions about objections made in informal conferences.
This case involves a long-running class action lawsuit by former residents of Forest Haven against the District of Columbia regarding compliance with court orders for habilitation services, protection from harm, and related supports for individuals with mental retardation and developmental disabilities. After the district court imposed contempt fines for noncompliance and the Court of Appeals reversed most of those fines, the parties negotiated a 2001 Plan for Compliance and Conclusion, a Consent Order, and a Settlement Agreement. These documents establish measurable outcome standards, tasks with timelines, quality assurance mechanisms, budget processes, and an independent Quality Trust for ongoing monitoring and advocacy. The court approves the agreements as a blueprint for achieving compliance, developing post-termination safeguards, and enabling phased withdrawal of judicial oversight.
The case involved a law firm and its partners who had a group life insurance policy with North American Life Assurance Company that was transferred to Canada Life following a merger; plaintiffs alleged that Canada Life made misrepresentations about maintaining the same coverage terms, including automatic renewal and retiree eligibility, but the new policy allowed cancellation and excluded retirees, leading to eight counts including breach of contract, fraud, and misrepresentation under state law. The court granted Canada Life's motion to dismiss all claims, concluding that they were preempted by ERISA as the policy constituted an employee benefit plan. The core reasoning was that ERISA broadly preempts state-law claims relating to such plans, though plaintiffs were granted leave to amend the complaint to pursue federal ERISA claims instead.
In Gowens v. Dyncorp, the plaintiff, hired by DynCorp as an aircraft mechanic in Germany under a federal contract, sued the company over denial of per diem pay (due to his wife's military status), his subsequent assignment to distant work sites, and alleged constructive discharge after his complaints. He asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and constructive discharge. The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia granted DynCorp's motion to dismiss the complaint in full. The court held that it lacked personal jurisdiction because all relevant events occurred in Germany with no sufficient ties to the District of Columbia under either the long-arm or general jurisdiction statutes. The court further noted that the employment was at-will under the contract, which would bar the substantive claims under D.C. law, and that the fraud allegations were insufficient.
This case concerned the Orphan Drug Act's seven-year marketing exclusivity for drugs treating rare diseases like Kaposi’s sarcoma. Baker Norton sought approval for its paclitaxel-based drug Paxene after the FDA had already approved Bristol-Myers Squibb’s similar Taxol for the same use and granted it exclusivity; the FDA denied Paxene approval because the drugs shared the same active moiety under 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(13)(i), even though they differed in inactive ingredients and manufacturing. Baker Norton challenged the FDA’s interpretation of “drug” in 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a) as exceeding statutory authority. The court granted summary judgment to the FDA and BMS, holding that the term “drug” is ambiguous and that the agency’s regulation—treating drugs as the same unless clinically superior—is a permissible construction entitled to deference.
