Judge, District Court, D. South Carolina · Born 1959 · Florence, SC
Deerfield Plantation Phase II-B Property Owners Ass'n v. United States Army Corps of Engineers
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2011-07-12 · cited 4×
This case involves a property owners association challenging the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdictional determination under the Clean Water Act that only 0.37 acres (and associated linear feet) of waters on a former golf course property in South Carolina qualify as 'waters of the United States' subject to federal regulation, while additional ponds and channels do not. After an initial determination and voluntary remand, the Corps issued a superseding 2010 jurisdictional determination, leading to cross-motions for summary judgment. The court upheld the Corps' determination, concluding that it reasonably applied the regulatory definitions and significant nexus test using qualitative evidence, properly relied on its own experts rather than conflicting consultant opinions, and did not act arbitrarily or capriciously.
environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory
Way v. Astrue
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2011-04-27 · cited 6×
Eugene Way filed suit under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his Disability Insurance Benefits application, in which he alleged disability from cervical degenerative disc disease beginning March 17, 2005. The ALJ found Way not disabled after determining he retained the residual functional capacity for the full range of sedentary work, and the Appeals Council denied review. The magistrate judge recommended reversal and remand because the ALJ had ordered a new consultative examination, received a timely request for a supplemental hearing from Way's counsel after sending the report, yet issued an unfavorable decision without holding the hearing or addressing additional evidence. The district court adopted the recommendation and remanded the case pursuant to sentence four of § 405(g) so that Way could respond to the report and the ALJ could issue a new decision discussing the evidence.
federal powerprocedure
Campbell v. Hartford Life & Accident Insurance
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2011-02-01 · cited 1×
This ERISA case involved a former Mohawk Carpet employee who sought continued long-term disability benefits under her employer's plan, which was insured and administered by Hartford Life & Accident Insurance. After initially approving benefits under the plan's 'Your Occupation' definition, Hartford denied further benefits once the 'Any Occupation' standard took effect, and upheld that denial on appeal. The court applied an abuse-of-discretion standard of review because the plan granted Hartford discretionary authority to interpret terms and decide claims. It examined the medical records, physician assessments, and vocational evidence in the administrative record and concluded that Hartford did not abuse its discretion, as the evidence supported a finding that the plaintiff could perform other sedentary occupations meeting the plan's earnings threshold.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory
Moss v. City of Abbeville
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2010-07-15 · cited 9×
This case involves a City of Abbeville employee who was hired in 1979, took twelve weeks of FMLA leave in 2007 for hip surgery followed by an additional fourteen weeks under the city's extension policy, and was terminated on the day he returned to work in March 2008. The plaintiff sued alleging FMLA retaliation as well as breach of contract and promissory estoppel arising from the employee handbook's leave provisions. The magistrate judge recommended granting summary judgment to the City on the contract and estoppel claims but denying it on the FMLA claim. The district court conducted a de novo review of the objections, applied the McDonnell Douglas framework, and denied summary judgment on the FMLA retaliation claim after finding genuine issues of material fact on causation (supported by temporal proximity) and pretext, while granting summary judgment on the other claims.
labor & employment
Washington v. Commissioner of Social Security
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2009-09-21 · cited 3×
The case involved Michelle S. Washington seeking judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her claims for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, based on alleged disability from depression, vision problems, and mental retardation. The district court applied the substantial evidence standard to evaluate the ALJ's findings regarding the plaintiff's residual functional capacity, listing analysis, and combined impairments. The court determined that the ALJ had not properly accounted for the plaintiff's visual acuity limitations, requiring reversal and remand, while deeming any shortcomings in the listing analysis or combined effects evaluation to be harmless errors. Although portions of the hearing transcript were missing, the court found remand unnecessary on that basis alone since the visual acuity issue already warranted further proceedings.
healthcareprocedurefederal power
Johnson v. MICHELIN NORTH AMERICA
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2009-09-11 · cited 2×
This case involved a disabled former employee of Michelin who continued to accrue service credit under the company's defined benefit retirement plan (MRP) after ceasing active work in 1999 and who sought to enroll in the company's defined contribution plan (MRAP) during a 2007 election window to obtain a lump-sum distribution of benefits. The plaintiff asserted claims for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), breach of fiduciary duty under § 502(a)(3), and attorneys' fees after the plan administrator denied enrollment on the ground that only active employees were eligible. The court held that the administrator's interpretation of the plan terms was reasonable under the abuse-of-discretion standard of review, that the fiduciary-duty claim was unavailable because an adequate remedy existed under the benefits claim, and that neither party had shown entitlement to fees. It therefore denied the plaintiff's motion for judgment, granted the defendant's cross-motion, and dismissed the case with prejudice.
labor & employment
Latham v. Matthews
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2009-09-04 · cited 5×
This case involves a consolidated class action lawsuit brought by investors against Signalife, Inc., a medical device company, and several of its officers and directors, alleging violations of Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 10b-5. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendants made false public statements about the sales, marketability, and production readiness of heart-monitoring products like the Fidelity 100 during a four-year class period, despite knowing these products were not functional and generated no revenue, while certain defendants profited from stock transactions. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the complaint failed to meet the heightened pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and that some claims were time-barred. The court granted the motions in part and denied them in part, finding that the complaint sufficiently alleged material misstatements, scienter, and loss causation for certain claims and defendants under a core operations theory and corrective disclosure framework, but dismissing others for insufficient particularity or other deficiencies.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Monsanto Co. v. Strickland
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2009-02-09 · cited 1×
This case is a patent infringement action brought by Monsanto against defendant Strickland concerning unauthorized use of Roundup Ready soybean seeds protected by U.S. Patent No. 5,352,605. Liability was previously established due to the defendant's failure to object to a magistrate's report, and the court held a bench hearing on damages after the parties waived a jury trial. The court made findings of fact based on evidence including seed purchases, field sampling, and ELISA/DNA testing that confirmed the defendant's 2005 crop used saved patented seeds in violation of license terms. Applying the Georgia-Pacific factors to expert testimony, the court concluded a reasonable royalty higher than the per-unit seed cost was appropriate and awarded damages on that basis.
business & regulatoryproperty
George v. Duke Energy Retirement Cash Balance Plan
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2008-06-02 · cited 16×
This case concerns a class action lawsuit by participants in the Duke Energy Retirement Cash Balance Plan alleging that Duke's 1997 conversion from a traditional defined-benefit pension to a cash-balance plan violated ERISA (29 U.S.C. § 1054) and the ADEA by reducing older employees' rate of benefit accrual, creating a "wear-away" effect, and miscalculating lump-sum distributions and opening account balances. Plaintiffs asserted six counts, including age-based discrimination in interest credits, disparate-treatment and disparate-impact claims, and failure to pay proper benefits under 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1). The district court addressed pending motions for judgment on the pleadings, partial summary judgment, and amendment of the scheduling order and complaint, analyzing administrative exhaustion requirements, the "greater-of" formula used to protect accrued benefits, and the Rule 16 good-cause standard for late amendments; it deferred class certification to a later order.
labor & employmentprocedure
Graves v. Horry-Georgetown Technical College
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2007-09-28 · cited 3×
This case involves a former employee of Horry-Georgetown Technical College who resigned in 2005 after alleging harassment by a new supervisor and claiming she was coerced into leaving without proper information about the impact on her retirement benefits under the TERI program. The plaintiff brought federal claims under the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act (OWBPA) for lack of informed consent in her resignation and under the Equal Pay Act for alleged sex-based wage disparities, along with a state-law claim for constructive discharge. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation to grant summary judgment to the defendant on the OWBPA and Equal Pay Act claims, finding no genuine issues of material fact supporting coercion, age discrimination, or sex-based pay differences after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. The court then declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claim and remanded it to South Carolina state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
labor & employmentcivil rights
Aiken County v. Bodman
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2007-06-22
Aiken County sued the Department of Energy and its Secretary, alleging violations of 50 U.S.C. § 2566 in connection with delays in constructing a MOX plutonium fuel facility at the Savannah River Site; the county claimed the statute required the Secretary to suspend shipments of defense plutonium until the agency certified that production deadlines could be met, and sought declaratory and injunctive relief to that effect. The DOE moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case without prejudice, holding that no final agency action existed for review and that the dispute was not ripe because no shipments were occurring or planned, funding for the facility remained uncertain, and any ruling would constitute an advisory opinion.
environmentfederal powerprocedure
Atlantic Floor Services, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2004-09-07 · cited 7×
In this diversity case, South Carolina-based Atlantic Floor Services sued Wal-Mart for breach of six service contracts to clean Wal-Mart stores, seeking payment due upon termination; Wal-Mart had ended the contracts after an INS investigation detained some of Atlantic's workers. Wal-Mart moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1), (3), and (6), citing a forum-selection clause designating Arkansas as the exclusive forum. The court granted dismissal, holding the clause valid and enforceable under federal law because it was not induced by fraud or overreaching, would not deprive Atlantic of its day in court, would not apply fundamentally unfair law, and did not violate South Carolina public policy. The court therefore enforced the clause by dismissing the action rather than transferring it under § 1404(a).
business & regulatoryprocedure