Peoples Electric Cooperative sued Western Farmers Electric Cooperative, alleging breach of fiduciary duty among other claims, stemming from WFEC's implementation of a two-tier rate structure that increased rates for non-extending members like PEC to secure additional federal loans for power generation. The court granted WFEC's motion to dismiss the fiduciary duty claim. The decision was based on the absence of controlling Oklahoma authority recognizing a fiduciary duty owed by a generation and transmission cooperative to its member distribution cooperatives in these circumstances, distinguishing it from duties owed by trustees to ratepayers, and analogizing to corporate law where no such duty exists between the entity and shareholders.
In Tucker v. Oliver, appellant Stephanie Tucker challenged a bankruptcy court ruling that a debt for attorneys' fees owed to her by appellees Karen and Mark Oliver was dischargeable in bankruptcy. The debt stemmed from an Oklahoma state court judgment in favor of Tucker in a proceeding where the Olivers, as grandparents, unsuccessfully sought visitation rights with Tucker's child. The district court reviewed the matter de novo and affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision, holding that the debt did not qualify as a non-dischargeable "domestic support obligation" under 11 U.S.C. § 101(14A) because Tucker, as the former daughter-in-law, was not among the statutorily specified persons to whom such an obligation must be owed. The court rejected arguments to extend the statute based on precedents like Jones v. Jones and Miller v. Gentry, noting those cases involved custody disputes between parents rather than grandparent visitation claims and did not override the plain statutory language defining who must be owed the debt.
This case is a class action filed in Oklahoma state court by local residents against companies that operated a zinc smelter, along with related entities, asserting state-law claims of nuisance, trespass, strict liability, and unjust enrichment arising from alleged property contamination. The defendants removed the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, CERCLA, and the federal officer removal statute, prompting the plaintiffs to seek remand for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court examined each asserted ground for federal jurisdiction in turn, concluding that the state-law claims did not satisfy the requirements for removal under CAFA, did not present a substantial federal question under CERCLA, and did not involve private parties acting under a federal officer for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). Accordingly, the court granted the motion to remand the case to state court.
In this case, a state prisoner filed a pro se federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his convictions for kidnapping, armed robbery, and larceny after a blind guilty plea, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to suppress his confession and investigate, as well as violations of the Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause. The court adopted the magistrate judge's proposed findings and recommendations after de novo review of objections, denying relief on all claims. On the ineffective assistance claims, the court found no prejudice under Strickland v. Washington and Hill v. Lockhart because ample other evidence existed and the petitioner likely would have pled guilty regardless. On the double jeopardy claims, the court held that the offenses were separate crimes under Oklahoma law involving distinct victims or elements, so no constitutional violation occurred.
Plaintiff Shawna Melton sued her former employer Farmers Insurance alleging wrongful discrimination and retaliation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, and Oklahoma public policy, along with a breach of contract claim, after her termination for excessive absenteeism. Farmers moved for summary judgment, arguing she was not discriminated or retaliated against and was fired due to attendance issues. The court granted the motion, concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact and that the defendant was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Core reasoning included that the plaintiff's absences were properly counted as chargeable under company policy, her requests to work from home were denied because she was not herself disabled, she failed to show pretext in the termination decision, and she was not treated differently from similarly situated employees.
The case involved the United States seeking to enforce two IRS administrative summonses directed at Kenneth B. Rinehart personally and as president of Unta Bent Inc. to obtain books, records, and testimony related to the tax liabilities of Rinehart and the corporation for tax year 2003. Rinehart objected on grounds that the IRS was acting in bad faith and that compelled production or testimony would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in light of pending state criminal charges. The court concluded that the government had met its burden under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 by showing the summonses sought relevant information not already in its possession, followed proper procedures, and were issued in good faith without evidence of harassment or improper coordination with state authorities, and therefore ordered enforcement of the summonses subject to further proceedings on the self-incrimination claims.