The case arose from a mortgage fraud scheme in which a Prajna employee tricked Texas Capital Bank into wiring over $3 million in nonexistent loan funds to First American Title as escrow agent; the employee then induced First American Title to redirect six of the wires to Prajna, while later wires went to a fraudulent Venture Title account the bank opened at National City Bank. Texas Capital and its insurers sued First American Title for breach of contract and related duties, seeking recovery of the losses. On cross-motions for partial summary judgment, the court denied both sides' requests as to the initial six wires but granted First American Title's motion regarding the $1.3 million National City wires, dismissing those claims with prejudice. The court reasoned that even assuming a breach of duty, the causal link between First American Title's conduct and the later National City transfers was too attenuated to establish legal causation under Kentucky law.
business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability
In Wilson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the plaintiff sued his insurer claiming bad faith and delayed payment of $50,000 in uninsured motorist benefits under Kentucky statutes after a 2009 accident with an uninsured driver that left him with medical bills partly covered by Medicare. The core dispute was whether State Farm acted improperly by waiting roughly two months to pay the policy limits until it could confirm the exact Medicare lien amount, after the plaintiff rejected proposals to name Medicare as a payee or escrow the funds. The court granted summary judgment to State Farm and denied the plaintiff's motion, dismissing the case with prejudice. It reasoned that State Farm had a reasonable basis to delay under the bad-faith standard from Wittmer v. Jones because federal Medicare regulations made the insurer potentially liable for the lien, mere delay alone does not establish bad faith, and the insurer's conduct was not outrageous.
William Webb sued Humana Inc. and Humana Insurance Co. under Kentucky law for disability discrimination in the forms of disparate treatment, failure to accommodate, and retaliation, as well as wrongful discharge and intentional infliction of emotional distress, stemming from his termination after absences related to Multiple Myeloma cancer treatment. Defendants moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion on all claims, finding that Webb failed to establish a prima facie case under the pre-ADAAA ADA standards because he could not show he was substantially limited in a major life activity or a qualified individual, and that his proposed accommodations like additional leave were not reasonable or requested properly. The court noted the analytic difficulty that Webb's absences were both a consequence of his alleged disability and the stated reason for his termination.
Shamrock Marketing sued Bridgestone Bandag alleging that Bandag's Q-Fund program, which credits franchisees for purchases of precured tread rubber and requires use of those credits on Bandag curing envelopes and accessories, created an unlawful tying arrangement violating Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. Bandag moved to dismiss on grounds including lack of standing, failure to allege an actual tying arrangement, and flawed relevant market definitions. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing counts that failed to adequately plead market power for per se liability or relied on improper market definitions while allowing claims to proceed under rule-of-reason analysis where sufficient allegations of economic power in the tying market were made.
In Davis v. Global Client Solutions, LLC, a Kentucky couple sued debt settlement providers GHS, Global Client Solutions, and Rocky Mountain Bank & Trust, alleging violations of Kentucky's Debt Adjusting and Consumer Protection statutes plus civil conspiracy after the providers collected fees but made no payments to creditors. The defendants moved to compel arbitration under agreements the plaintiffs had signed as part of the program. The court denied the motions, holding that the arbitration clauses were substantively unconscionable under Kentucky contract law because they restricted available remedies to actual and direct damages and permitted the defendants to select the arbitrator without the plaintiffs' consent.
The case concerned whether TracFone Wireless, a provider of prepaid mobile phone service sold mainly through retailers, must collect Kentucky's monthly CMRS 911 emergency service fees from customers under a 1998 statute and its later amendments. The original statute required providers to collect the fee as part of normal monthly billing, a process that does not apply to prepaid customers who buy minutes in advance without ongoing accounts or bills. The court interpreted the 2005 and 2006 amendments as expanding permissible collection methods to accommodate prepaid providers while preserving the requirement to remit the fees to the CMRS Board. It concluded that TracFone must collect and remit the charges, as the statutory changes created feasible options and TracFone had not shown actual impossibility of compliance.