This case concerns Silco, Inc.'s suit for a refund of 1972 federal corporate income taxes based on a net capital loss carryback from its 1975 sale of LTV preferred stock. Silco purchased the shares after the dividend record date but before the ex-dividend date, received the dividends via due bills from the sellers, claimed a dividends-received deduction under IRC §243, and sold the stock shortly thereafter at a loss. The court denied the refund, holding that Silco failed to satisfy the minimum holding-period requirements of IRC §246(c) for the preferred dividends (particularly the 90-day rule for dividends in arrears exceeding 366 days), which prevented allowance of the deduction and the resulting capital loss treatment.
Celia Lage, an Hispanic female EEOC employee, sued her supervisors and other agency officials alleging retaliation and discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16) after she testified in a coworker's employment discrimination suit, along with a common law assault claim based on verbal abuse and physical intimidation by her supervisor. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, holding that only the head of the agency (Clarence Thomas, in his official capacity) is a proper defendant under § 717, so all other individual defendants were dismissed from the Title VII claim. It further ruled that the assault claim could not be joined in federal court because Title VII provides the exclusive remedy for federal employment discrimination claims, preempting pendent state tort claims under Brown v. General Services Administration, but dismissed the assault claim without prejudice to refiling in state court. The court also struck Lage's jury demand, as there is no right to a jury trial under Title VII.
In this case, Freddie Fuddruckers, Inc. sought a preliminary injunction against Ridgeline, Inc. (doing business as Purdy’s) to stop the use of a similar restaurant trade dress featuring elements like exposed butcher shops, bakeries, condiment islands, white tile, checkerboard flooring, and neon signs. The court granted the injunction after finding that Fuddruckers’ overall design was non-functional, had acquired secondary meaning identifying it with the source, and that Purdy’s had intentionally copied it after visiting Fuddruckers locations, creating a likelihood of consumer confusion. The decision rested on conclusions that Fuddruckers showed irreparable harm, a substantial likelihood of success on trade dress infringement and unfair competition claims, that the balance of harms favored Fuddruckers, and that the public interest supported preventing confusion.
The case involved a civil antitrust action by the United States against American Airlines and its CEO Robert Crandall under Section 4 of the Sherman Act, seeking to enjoin alleged violations of Section 2. The complaint alleged that Crandall attempted to monopolize airline passenger service out of Dallas/Fort Worth by suggesting in a recorded phone call that Braniff Airways raise its fares, with American promising to follow, though Braniff's CEO refused to discuss pricing. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. It reasoned that the alleged conduct amounted only to a rebuked solicitation without any agreement, which cannot support a claim for attempted joint monopolization under Section 2, and that price-fixing claims of this type require a plurality of actors and proof of a conspiracy under Section 1 rather than an attempt under Section 2.
This case arose from a 1979 lawsuit by D. Vinson Marley against Drexel Burnham Lambert and others over an agreement for commodities futures contracts, asserting claims under the federal Commodity Exchange Act and pendent state claims under the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). After the court ordered all claims to arbitration under the parties' agreement, the arbitration dismissed Marley's claims, and the defendants sought confirmation of the award while Marley moved to amend the arbitration order. The court denied the motion to amend and granted confirmation of the award, holding that the federal Arbitration Act preempts the DTPA's non-waiver provision under the Supremacy Clause because the state rule conflicts with the federal statute's policy of enforcing arbitration agreements in interstate commerce.
This case involves the United States seeking to enforce Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 against Baylor University Medical Center to investigate complaints that the hospital failed to provide effective services for hearing-impaired patients. Baylor, which receives Medicare and Medicaid reimbursements placed in its general operating fund, refused to allow the investigation, arguing that such payments do not constitute federal financial assistance and that it is therefore not subject to the statute. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, holding that Medicare and Medicaid payments qualify as federal financial assistance, that Baylor is a recipient, and that Section 504 applies on a program-specific basis to the hospital's in-patient and emergency room services benefited by those funds. The core reasoning was that the statute's coverage extends to any program or activity receiving such assistance, permitting HHS to investigate compliance regardless of whether the complainant is a direct beneficiary of Medicare or Medicaid.