The case involves plaintiffs, who claim to be heirs of Margaret Kainer, a Jewish woman whose art collection including a Degas painting was looted by Nazis in 1935, suing Christie's and others for facilitating sales of the work without their involvement and seeking its return or damages. Nine years earlier, the trial court stayed the New York action against Christie's under CPLR 327 pending European court resolution of whether plaintiffs are lawful heirs. The Appellate Division reversed the denial of plaintiffs' motion to vacate the stay, ruling that the action should proceed because the European proceedings have not resolved the heirship issue, no resolution appears imminent, and public policy plus fundamental fairness favor moving forward on claims arising from World War II and Holocaust-era plunder. The court remanded for further proceedings while noting Christie's could seek a new stay if circumstances change.
The case involved New York City Police Department sergeants who took promotional civil service examinations in 2023 and were later accused by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) of violating test-site rules by accessing and using their cell phones after completing the exam but before a unified dismissal time. DCAS determined that the petitioners violated Civil Service Law provisions and examination regulations, resulting in their exams not being scored and a five-year bar from future civil service exams. The petitioners brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul these determinations, which the Supreme Court denied while granting the respondents' cross-motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the administrative determinations were irrational because they rested on ambiguous, uncodified test-taking rules about cell phone use, and it vacated the determinations while remanding for further proceedings.
The case involved New York City Police Department sergeants who took promotional civil service examinations in 2023 and were later accused by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) of violating test-site rules by accessing and using their cell phones after completing the exam but before a unified dismissal time. DCAS determined that the petitioners violated Civil Service Law provisions and examination regulations, resulting in their exams not being scored and a five-year bar from future civil service exams. The petitioners brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul these determinations, which the Supreme Court denied while granting the respondents' cross-motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the administrative determinations were irrational because they rested on ambiguous, uncodified test-taking rules about cell phone use, and it vacated the determinations while remanding for further proceedings.
The case involved New York City Police Department sergeants who took promotional civil service examinations in 2023 and were later accused by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) of violating test-site rules by accessing and using their cell phones after completing the exam but before a unified dismissal time. DCAS determined that the petitioners violated Civil Service Law provisions and examination regulations, resulting in their exams not being scored and a five-year bar from future civil service exams. The petitioners brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul these determinations, which the Supreme Court denied while granting the respondents' cross-motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the administrative determinations were irrational because they rested on ambiguous, uncodified test-taking rules about cell phone use, and it vacated the determinations while remanding for further proceedings.
The case involved New York City Police Department sergeants who took promotional civil service examinations in 2023 and were later accused by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) of violating test-site rules by accessing and using their cell phones after completing the exam but before a unified dismissal time. DCAS determined that the petitioners violated Civil Service Law provisions and examination regulations, resulting in their exams not being scored and a five-year bar from future civil service exams. The petitioners brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul these determinations, which the Supreme Court denied while granting the respondents' cross-motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the administrative determinations were irrational because they rested on ambiguous, uncodified test-taking rules about cell phone use, and it vacated the determinations while remanding for further proceedings.
The case involved New York City Police Department sergeants who took promotional civil service examinations in 2023 and were later accused by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS) of violating test-site rules by accessing and using their cell phones after completing the exam but before a unified dismissal time. DCAS determined that the petitioners violated Civil Service Law provisions and examination regulations, resulting in their exams not being scored and a five-year bar from future civil service exams. The petitioners brought a CPLR article 78 proceeding to annul these determinations, which the Supreme Court denied while granting the respondents' cross-motion to dismiss. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the administrative determinations were irrational because they rested on ambiguous, uncodified test-taking rules about cell phone use, and it vacated the determinations while remanding for further proceedings.
In Knight v. Family Energy Inc., plaintiffs sued an energy services company in a putative class action alleging deceptive and unauthorized pricing practices under their residential energy supply agreement, in violation of General Business Law §§ 349 and 349-d as well as contract and unjust enrichment theories. The defendant moved to compel arbitration of the individual claims, dismiss the class claims, and stay the action, relying on an arbitration provision it claimed was incorporated by reference in the contract signed by one plaintiff. The Appellate Division affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion, holding that the defendant failed to show the plaintiffs had consented to arbitration. The court reasoned that the agreement's incorporation clause referred only to the four terms printed on the reverse side of the single signature page provided to the plaintiffs, none of which mentioned arbitration or dispute resolution, and there was no evidence that additional terms were supplied or agreed to.
The case involved a challenge by the New York Taxi Workers Alliance and two individual drivers to a Street Hail Livery pilot program implemented by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, which petitioners claimed violated a local law by affecting competition with yellow taxicabs. The lower court denied the Article 78 petition and dismissed the proceeding for lack of standing. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that petitioners have standing to proceed. The court reasoned that the petitioners demonstrated an injury in fact from economic competition that falls within the zone of interests protected by the local law at issue.
The case involved a challenge by the New York Taxi Workers Alliance and two individual drivers to a Street Hail Livery pilot program implemented by the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission, which petitioners claimed violated a local law by affecting competition with yellow taxicabs. The lower court denied the Article 78 petition and dismissed the proceeding for lack of standing. On appeal, the Appellate Division held that petitioners have standing to proceed. The court reasoned that the petitioners demonstrated an injury in fact from economic competition that falls within the zone of interests protected by the local law at issue.
The case involved petitions by individuals and the New York City Council challenging Mayor Eric Adams's refusal to implement four 2023 local laws reforming the city's rental assistance programs for homeless individuals, including changes to the Family Homelessness and Eviction Prevention Supplement. The lower court denied the petitions, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the local laws were not preempted by the New York State Social Services Law or its regulations. The court reasoned that while the state supervises social services districts and sets baseline rules for public assistance like shelter supplements under 18 NYCRR 352.3, local governments retain authority to propose and enact supplemental programs subject to state review, creating no direct conflict. The decision directed the mayor to submit the laws to the state Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance for assessment and implementation.
The case involved petitions by individuals and the New York City Council challenging Mayor Eric Adams's refusal to implement four 2023 local laws reforming the city's rental assistance programs for homeless individuals, including changes to the Family Homelessness and Eviction Prevention Supplement. The lower court denied the petitions, but the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the local laws were not preempted by the New York State Social Services Law or its regulations. The court reasoned that while the state supervises social services districts and sets baseline rules for public assistance like shelter supplements under 18 NYCRR 352.3, local governments retain authority to propose and enact supplemental programs subject to state review, creating no direct conflict. The decision directed the mayor to submit the laws to the state Office of Temporary and Disability Assistance for assessment and implementation.
In this case, defendant David Trulove appealed his 2017 conviction in Bronx County Supreme Court after pleading guilty to attempted criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree, for which he received five years of probation. The Appellate Division reviewed challenges to an appeal waiver and the validity of a search warrant that authorized police to search a specific bedroom at 955 Bruckner Boulevard based on a confidential informant's description. The court found the appeal waiver invalid due to deficiencies in the colloquy and determined that the warrant's description of the premises lacked the particularity required by the Federal and New York State Constitutions, as evidence showed mismatches in apartment markings and layout. It therefore reversed the judgment, vacated the plea, granted suppression of the recovered firearm and ammunition, and remanded for further proceedings.
This case involved plaintiffs' efforts to enforce a 2018 money judgment of nearly $4.9 million against defendant Isaac Sutton, stemming from a 2006 investment dispute and settlement, by serving a restraining notice on Sutton's disability insurer to collect monthly payments. After an earlier appellate ruling limited the restraint to 10% of the payments under CPLR 5231 (with a $400 exemption), Sutton sought restitution of funds already collected and held in escrow, while plaintiffs cross-moved for an installment payment order under CPLR 5226 to require higher payments. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of partial restitution to Sutton and denial of the cross-motion, holding that both issues require a hearing because restitution under CPLR 5015(d) is discretionary and an installment order may invade the usual 90% income exemption based on the debtor's ability to pay without undue hardship. The court remanded for further proceedings on these points.
This case involved plaintiffs' efforts to enforce a 2018 money judgment of nearly $4.9 million against defendant Isaac Sutton, stemming from a 2006 investment dispute and settlement, by serving a restraining notice on Sutton's disability insurer to collect monthly payments. After an earlier appellate ruling limited the restraint to 10% of the payments under CPLR 5231 (with a $400 exemption), Sutton sought restitution of funds already collected and held in escrow, while plaintiffs cross-moved for an installment payment order under CPLR 5226 to require higher payments. The Appellate Division reversed the trial court's grant of partial restitution to Sutton and denial of the cross-motion, holding that both issues require a hearing because restitution under CPLR 5015(d) is discretionary and an installment order may invade the usual 90% income exemption based on the debtor's ability to pay without undue hardship. The court remanded for further proceedings on these points.
In this case, residential occupants of a Manhattan loft unit who had guaranteed a commercial lease brought an action against their landlord seeking a Yellowstone injunction to toll the cure period after receiving a default notice alleging unauthorized uses of the premises, improper garbage disposal, and unapproved construction. The Supreme Court denied the motion after striking the temporary restraining order clause from the proposed order to show cause, allowing the cure period to expire and the lease to terminate. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the tenants had made a timely application for relief before the cure period ended, demonstrated a desire and ability to cure any defaults, and were entitled to the injunction to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the underlying disputes, including those involving the Loft Law. The court directed that the injunctive relief be granted nunc pro tunc as of the date the motion was filed.
In this case, residential occupants of a Manhattan loft unit who had guaranteed a commercial lease brought an action against their landlord seeking a Yellowstone injunction to toll the cure period after receiving a default notice alleging unauthorized uses of the premises, improper garbage disposal, and unapproved construction. The Supreme Court denied the motion after striking the temporary restraining order clause from the proposed order to show cause, allowing the cure period to expire and the lease to terminate. The Appellate Division reversed, holding that the tenants had made a timely application for relief before the cure period ended, demonstrated a desire and ability to cure any defaults, and were entitled to the injunction to preserve the status quo pending resolution of the underlying disputes, including those involving the Loft Law. The court directed that the injunctive relief be granted nunc pro tunc as of the date the motion was filed.
This case involves a personal injury action brought under the Child Victims Act's revival provision, in which plaintiff alleges that between 1975 and 1977, as a 12-year-old, he was sexually abused on four occasions by a deacon who coached the defendant church's youth basketball team. Plaintiff asserted claims including negligent supervision, hiring, and retention, as well as intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and sexual battery. The trial court granted the church's pre-answer motion to dismiss the IIED and battery claims, finding the IIED claim duplicative of the negligence claims. The Appellate Division modified the order to reinstate the IIED claim, holding that pleading negligence causes of action based on the same facts does not bar an IIED claim at the pleading stage and that the allegations of the church's conduct satisfied the extreme-and-outrageous-conduct requirement under New York precedent.
This case involves a medical malpractice lawsuit brought by Terrell Holder against healthcare providers at Montefiore Health System for injuries allegedly sustained during treatment in March 2020 at the start of the COVID-19 pandemic. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming immunity from liability under the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act (former Public Health Law § 3082) and a related Executive Order. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed that decision. The court held that the defendants failed to make the necessary evidentiary showing to establish entitlement to dismissal based on the affirmative defense of immunity under CPLR 3211(a)(7), as their evidence did not conclusively demonstrate that the immunity applied to the specific acts or omissions alleged.
This case involves a medical malpractice claim brought by plaintiff Terrell Holder against a hospital, two doctors, and a nurse for alleged negligent care during the early days of the COVID-19 pandemic in March 2020. The defendants moved to dismiss under CPLR 3211(a)(7), arguing they were entitled to immunity from civil liability under former Public Health Law § 3082 (the Emergency or Disaster Treatment Protection Act) and a related Executive Order. The Supreme Court denied the motion, and the Appellate Division affirmed that denial. The court reasoned that the defendants failed to make the required conclusive evidentiary showing of entitlement to the statutory immunity defense at the pleading stage, particularly given the factual disputes over whether their actions qualified for protection and the limited discovery conducted. The decision focuses on the procedural standards for dismissing claims based on affirmative defenses like immunity rather than resolving the underlying malpractice allegations.
The case involved a dispute over a contract for the construction of a power plant in Massachusetts, where plaintiff Iberdrola Energy Projects was hired by a special-purpose entity (Footprint) controlled by defendants Oaktree Capital Management and related parties. After project delays, cost overruns, and Footprint's termination of the contract and draw on a $140 million letter of credit, plaintiff sued the defendants for breach of contract, tortious interference, fraud, and related claims, alleging they improperly influenced the termination and draw. The trial court dismissed the amended complaint, and the Appellate Division affirmed the dismissal, holding that the contract's nonrecourse provision barred most claims against the non-party defendants as affiliates or officers of Footprint, and that the fraud claim was not pleaded with sufficient particularity under New York law. The court modified the judgment to dismiss without prejudice rather than with prejudice, noting that the provision was enforceable as an exculpatory clause and applied to both contractual and certain tort claims. Appeals from the underlying dismissal orders were dismissed as subsumed in the appeal from the final judgment.