This case arose from a failed asset purchase transaction between plaintiffs (specializing in chlorine dioxide technology) and Superior Plus Corp., governed by a letter of intent (LOI) that included binding provisions for a $1 million expense reimbursement fee (ERF) if the deal did not close within 45 days, unless due to Superior's material breach. After Superior pursued a separate transaction and demanded the ERF, plaintiffs sued for breach of contract and related claims, leading to a counterclaim by Sabre Holdco, LLC (which acquired rights under the LOI) for the unpaid fee. The Supreme Court denied summary judgment to both sides on the counterclaim, finding questions of fact as to whether Superior breached an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing during negotiations. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that evidence raised triable issues about Superior's conduct in the 45-day window that could have prevented plaintiffs from exercising termination rights, but that the LOI's terms did not forfeit the ERF upon termination absent a material breach.
The case involved an incarcerated individual who was charged with multiple prison disciplinary violations, including assaulting staff and possessing a weapon, after an incident in his cell. Following placement in the Special Housing Unit (SHU) for prehearing confinement, his tier III disciplinary hearing was not completed within the five-day period required by the HALT Act and related regulations. The petitioner sought to annul the resulting discipline in a CPLR article 78 proceeding, arguing that the hearing was untimely, but the Supreme Court dismissed the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the statutory time frames are directory rather than mandatory, so annulment requires a showing of substantial prejudice, and that the timeliness claim was unpreserved because it was not raised during the hearing when any issue could have been addressed or a record created.
The case involved Beeline.Com, Inc., a Florida company that matches clients with suppliers of temporary labor and manages related services through a proprietary vendor management system (VMS) software platform. The New York Department of Taxation and Finance audited the company and assessed sales tax on fees charged to clients for access to the VMS during 2010-2016, treating the access as taxable licenses to use prewritten computer software under Tax Law article 28. After the Tax Appeals Tribunal upheld the assessment, Beeline.Com petitioned the court to annul the determination, arguing that its primary business was providing nontaxable matching services and that any software use was incidental. The Appellate Division confirmed the Tribunal's ruling, finding it rationally supported by substantial evidence that the VMS license was the core taxable element of the transactions rather than an incidental service.
In People v. Parker, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of multiple crimes, including attempted aggravated assault on a police officer charged as a crime of terrorism, arising from his participation in a riot in Albany where he threw Molotov cocktails toward police officers during protests following George Floyd's murder. The Appellate Division vacated the terrorism conviction, finding insufficient evidence that the defendant's actions were intended to intimidate a civilian population or influence government policy as required by the statute. The court affirmed the other convictions but, in the interest of justice, reduced the sentences on the assault counts and directed that certain sentences run concurrently, resulting in a shorter aggregate term, based on the defendant's lack of prior criminal history and the nature of the conduct.
In People v. Parker, the defendant was convicted after a jury trial of multiple crimes, including attempted aggravated assault on a police officer charged as a crime of terrorism, arising from his participation in a riot in Albany where he threw Molotov cocktails toward police officers during protests following George Floyd's murder. The Appellate Division vacated the terrorism conviction, finding insufficient evidence that the defendant's actions were intended to intimidate a civilian population or influence government policy as required by the statute. The court affirmed the other convictions but, in the interest of justice, reduced the sentences on the assault counts and directed that certain sentences run concurrently, resulting in a shorter aggregate term, based on the defendant's lack of prior criminal history and the nature of the conduct.
In this case, tenant Keionzie Clements and others filed a CPLR article 78 petition against the New York Secretary of State after local code officials identified serious violations of the Uniform Fire Prevention and Building Code in their rental apartments, issued multiple orders to remedy to the landlord that went unaddressed, and ultimately ordered the tenants to vacate the unsafe premises. Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary to promulgate additional regulations establishing minimum standards for the inspection and enforcement of the Uniform Code by local officials, as allegedly required by Executive Law § 381. The Supreme Court granted the Secretary's motion to dismiss the petition. The Appellate Division affirmed, reasoning that the Secretary had already satisfied the statutory duty by promulgating 19 NYCRR part 1203, which addresses the administration and enforcement of the code, and that mandamus is unavailable to compel further discretionary regulatory actions.
The case involved petitioners, including environmental groups, challenging a declaratory ruling by the New York State Public Service Commission that a proposed transaction transferring ownership of a natural gas-fired cogeneration facility for use in cryptocurrency mining did not require further review under Public Service Law §§ 70 and 83, and that environmental concerns raised under the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act fell outside the proceeding's scope. Petitioners argued the PSC unlawfully failed to consider the transaction's impacts on emissions and disadvantaged communities as required by CLCPA §§ 7(2) and (3). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as not ripe for review due to a pending rehearing request. The Appellate Division reversed, concluding the ruling was reviewable, petitioners had standing because their members' proximity to the facility meant they would be differentially affected by increased emissions, and remitting for further proceedings on the merits.
This case involved petitioners, environmental groups including the Clean Air Coalition of Western New York and Sierra Club, challenging a declaratory ruling by the New York State Public Service Commission (PSC) that approved a transaction allowing a natural gas cogeneration facility to be used for cryptocurrency mining without further review under Public Service Law sections 70 and 83. The petitioners argued that the PSC failed to consider the environmental impacts and effects on disadvantaged communities as required by sections 7(2) and (3) of the Climate Leadership and Community Protection Act (CLCPA). The Supreme Court dismissed the petition as not ripe due to a pending rehearing request. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that a rehearing was not permitted under State Administrative Procedure Act section 204, making the ruling final and reviewable, and that the petitioners had standing based on the specific environmental injuries alleged to their members living near the facility.
In M.K. v. State of New York, the claimant, an incarcerated individual at Elmira Correctional Facility, sued the State for damages after correction officers conducted a strip frisk and placed him in an observation cell, alleging the officers humiliated him by repeating commands such as running fingers through his gums and spreading his buttocks in a degrading sequence. The Court of Claims found the State liable following a bifurcated trial on liability, and the Appellate Division affirmed the judgment. The court applied the doctrine of respondeat superior and held that the officers' actions, while demeaning, remained within the scope of employment because they were connected to the time, place, and authorized function of administering a strip frisk, even if performed perversely, and were foreseeable under DOCCS directives warning against degrading conduct. The decision distinguished this from clear departures like sexual assault that would fall outside employment scope.
The case involved a nursing home operator's challenge to a state audit and rate determination that disallowed Medicaid capital reimbursements tied to its 2012 loan and 2014 mortgage refinancing. Petitioner Atlanticare had refinanced its facility's original approved mortgage without notifying or obtaining approval from the Department of Health, leading OMIG to conclude no recognized mortgage existed after 2012 and to recalculate reimbursements using return-of-equity methodology instead of mortgage interest and amortization costs, resulting in an overpayment finding for 2013-2015. The Appellate Division confirmed the determination, holding that regulations required prior DOH approval for refinancing arrangements and that petitioner's objections either concerned rate methodology (requiring a different challenge process) or were not timely raised. The court also upheld disallowance of cable television costs as operating rather than capital expenses.
The case involved a residential health care facility challenging determinations by the Department of Health and the Office of Medicaid Inspector General that disallowed Medicaid capital reimbursements for mortgage-related expenses after the facility refinanced its property without obtaining required approvals. The facility had replaced its original approved mortgage with new loans in 2012 and 2014 that featured different terms, including a later maturity date, and the agency responded by converting reimbursements to a return-of-equity basis and recovering prior overpayments through an audit. The Appellate Division confirmed the agency's actions in full. It held that challenges to the underlying rate-setting methodology were not properly raised in this article 78 proceeding and that the audit disallowances were rational because the refinancing lacked the necessary approvals under governing regulations.