Melissa Simmons appealed the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her application for disability benefits, claiming she was disabled due to multiple sclerosis. The ALJ had determined that her condition did not meet or equal the criteria in the Listing of Impairments and that she retained the residual functional capacity to perform other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. The court affirmed the Commissioner's decision, holding that the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence in the record. The court concluded it lacked authority to overturn the decision where such evidence existed.
The case involves George W. O’Dell’s appeal of the Social Security Commissioner’s denial of disability insurance benefits based on a 1990 back injury sustained while working as a car salesman. O’Dell challenged the determination that he remained capable of performing sedentary work without restriction during the period he was insured. The court reviewed medical records from the relevant timeframe, including evaluations noting only lower back strain without objective evidence of severe impairment and evidence of O’Dell’s activities, and found that substantial evidence supported the Commissioner’s conclusion that O’Dell was not disabled as of his date last insured. The court therefore affirmed the Commissioner’s decision denying benefits.
The case concerned whether three New Hampshire statutes regulating the use and disposal of construction and demolition (C&D) debris—redefining the material, banning combustion of its wood component except for limited incidental burning at pre-2006 municipal facilities, and excluding it from renewable biomass fuel definitions—violated the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state producers or excessively burdening interstate commerce. Plaintiffs, a national recycling association and a Massachusetts company selling C&D-derived fuel, sued state environmental officials, alleging the laws favored in-state virgin timber producers in the biomass fuel market. On the state's motion for summary judgment, the court held that the statutes had no discriminatory purpose, as they addressed uniform public health and environmental concerns about burning C&D materials from any source, and assumed without deciding that the products competed in the same market but found no evidence of discriminatory effect or undue burden on interstate commerce.
This case is a class action ERISA lawsuit brought by participants in Tyco-sponsored retirement plans against the company, its parent, plan administrators, and former officers and directors. The claims allege breach of fiduciary duty in Count I through material misstatements about Tyco's financial condition and the risks of the Tyco Stock Fund, and in Count II through negligence in designating that fund as an investment option. On plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, the court addressed defendants' affirmative defense under ERISA section 404(c), which shields fiduciaries from certain claims when participants exercise control over their accounts. The court granted the motion in part, ruling that the defense is unavailable for claims challenging a fiduciary's designation of investment options. It reasoned that such designation decisions are fiduciary acts, and under Department of Labor regulations and preamble, resulting losses are not the direct and necessary result of any participant's exercise of control.
This case arose from a June 2007 school-wide search for illegal drugs at Contoocook Valley Regional High School, during which drug-sniffing dogs examined students' belongings and the student body was temporarily relocated outdoors. Parents of three students sued the school district, board, principal, town, and police chief, claiming the search violated the students' rights under the Fourth Amendment and the New Hampshire Constitution and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court denied the plaintiffs' motion and granted the defendants' motions as to the federal constitutional claim, holding that the dog sniffs of belongings did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment; it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state constitutional claim and remanded that count to state court.
In this case, Raynald Pinet, a lawful permanent resident and U.S. military veteran, sued the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services after it denied his application for naturalization based on his 2003 conviction for using a communication facility to facilitate a cocaine transaction. The court addressed whether this conviction barred Pinet from meeting the statutory good moral character requirement for citizenship under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The court granted summary judgment to the government, holding that the conviction qualified as an aggravated felony, which permanently precludes a finding of good moral character regardless of when it occurred or the timing rules in the military naturalization regulation. The decision rested on the plain language of 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8), which disqualifies anyone who has ever been convicted of an aggravated felony, combined with the requirement that good moral character must exist while a naturalization application is pending.