Righthaven LLC sued Leland Wolf for copyright infringement of a photograph originally published by the Denver Post, after the copyright was assigned to Righthaven solely for the purpose of enforcement. The court converted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction into a summary judgment motion due to the intertwined nature of jurisdiction and the merits under federal copyright law. It held that Righthaven lacked standing because a bare assignment of the right to sue, without transfer of copyright ownership or exclusive rights, does not confer authority to bring an infringement action under the 1976 Copyright Act and its constitutional foundations. Summary judgment was granted to the defendant, and Righthaven was ordered to pay costs and reasonable attorney fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505.
The case involved plaintiff George Barrie, a former contract employee at a nuclear weapons facility, who sought wage-loss benefits under Part E of the Energy Employee Occupational Illness Compensation Program Act after claiming that toxin exposure caused medical conditions preventing him from working. The Department of Labor denied the claim, and Barrie filed a federal lawsuit seeking review 61 days after the agency's final decision on reconsideration. The court granted the Department's motion to dismiss, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the 60-day statutory deadline for filing a petition for review was jurisdictional under Supreme Court precedent and could not be extended by equitable tolling or by Barrie's later request to reopen the claim, which did not affect the finality date established by regulation.
This case concerned the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's 2008 decision to delist the Preble’s Meadow Jumping Mouse as threatened in the Wyoming portion of its range, while keeping it listed in Colorado, based solely on a 2007 Solicitor's opinion interpreting the Endangered Species Act phrase 'in danger of extinction throughout all or a significant portion of its range.' Petitioners challenged the delisting, the Colorado listing status, and the underlying statutory interpretation as inconsistent with the ESA. After other district courts rejected the Solicitor's interpretation and the Solicitor withdrew it, the agency moved for remand and vacatur of the 2008 decision to allow reconsideration. The court granted the motion, finding that vacatur was equitable because the decision rested entirely on the withdrawn interpretation, the agency sought voluntary reconsideration, and intervenors did not show sufficient hardship or procedural barriers to justify denial.
The case involved the Colorado Department of Human Services, as the state licensing agency under the Randolph-Sheppard Act, filing suit on behalf of a blind vendor to challenge the U.S. Air Force's award of a food services contract at the Air Force Academy to another bidder. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo of its expiring contract while exhausting the Act's required administrative arbitration remedies. The court denied the injunction and granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. It reasoned that judicial review under the Act is unavailable until administrative remedies are exhausted and that the plaintiff had not shown irreparable harm sufficient to support injunctive relief via the All Writs Act.
This case consists of consolidated putative class actions brought by wire transfer customers against Western Union, alleging that the company failed to notify them when transfers went unclaimed, held the funds in interest-bearing accounts for extended periods, and retained the accrued interest for itself after eventually returning the principal under state unclaimed property laws. Plaintiffs asserted claims for conversion, unjust enrichment, and consumer fraud. The court denied Western Union's motion to dismiss the conversion and unjust enrichment claims, concluding that the complaints met the minimal notice pleading standards of Rule 8 and plausibly alleged that Western Union wrongfully exercised dominion over and benefited from interest that belonged to the customers. The fraud claims were held in abeyance pending oral argument, while choice-of-law and other issues were deemed inappropriate for resolution at the pleading stage.
The case involved a challenge by Common Cause of Colorado and other organizations to Colorado's '20-day Rule' under C.R.S. § 1-2-509(3), which cancels new voter registrations if the confirmation mail is returned undeliverable within 20 days. Plaintiffs argued this violated the National Voter Registration Act's provisions on removing registrants from voter lists. The court decided in favor of the Secretary of State, granting summary judgment, reasoning that the rule applies to confirming initial eligibility of applicants rather than removing already registered voters based on change of residence, thus not conflicting with NVRA § 8(d).