The case concerns Amusement Industry's lawsuit against multiple defendants, including Midland Avenue Associates, Stephen Stern, Mark Stern, and others, alleging that $13 million deposited into escrow for a potential real estate investment in eleven shopping centers was misappropriated without consent through unauthorized transfers to accounts controlled by the defendants. The plaintiff asserted claims including constructive fraudulent conveyance, aiding and abetting fraudulent conveyance, and aiding and abetting fraud. The district court overruled objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation on motions to dismiss the amended complaint. It granted the motions in part by dismissing counts for constructive fraudulent conveyance, aiding and abetting fraudulent conveyance with intent to defraud, and aiding and abetting fraud against Stephen Stern, as well as dismissing all claims against Joshua Shapiro and Joseph Neiderman and certain aiding and abetting claims against other defendants, while denying dismissal of the remaining claims. The core reasoning emphasized that well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as true on a motion to dismiss and that the complaint lacked sufficient allegations to support the dismissed claims against the specified parties.
This case arose after BH S & B Holdings LLC filed for bankruptcy, when the creditors' committee sued various investors, parent companies, and officers alleging they caused the company's failure through gross negligence or self-interested actions via claims of piercing the corporate veil, breach of fiduciary duty, and equitable recharacterization or subordination of a loan. The bankruptcy court dismissed nearly all claims with prejudice. On appeal by the Chapter 7 trustee, the district court affirmed the dismissal in full. The court agreed with the bankruptcy court's conclusion that the complaint did not adequately plead a breach of fiduciary duty by failing to overcome the business judgment rule or plausibly allege intentional disloyalty or bad faith, and it found no abuse of discretion in dismissing with prejudice.
This case involves Chevron seeking a declaration that a multibillion-dollar Ecuadorian judgment against it for alleged environmental damage is unenforceable in the US, along with related injunctive relief. The LAP Representatives moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Chevron is judicially estopped from challenging the impartiality of Ecuadorian tribunals or their jurisdiction based on statements made by Texaco in the earlier Aguinda litigation. The court rejected the estoppel claims, finding that Chevron was never a party to Aguinda, the relevant statements concerned a merger that did not occur as described and were not adopted by the prior court, and statements by counsel acting for Texaco could not bind Chevron without a basis to disregard corporate separateness.
This case arose from the 2008 collapse of Lehman Brothers and involves claims by pension funds, companies, and individual investors who purchased over $31 billion in Lehman debt and equity securities under a 2006 shelf registration and related offering materials. Plaintiffs sued former officers, directors, auditors (Ernst & Young), and underwriters under Sections 11, 12, and 15 of the Securities Act of 1933 and Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, alleging materially false or misleading statements and omissions concerning Lehman's Repo 105 transactions, net leverage ratios, risk management policies, liquidity, concentrations of credit risk, and accounting practices. The court addressed motions to dismiss by applying standards for pleading falsity, scienter, loss causation, timeliness, statutory standing, and affirmative defenses, examining whether the alleged misstatements violated GAAP or GAAS and whether facts supporting defenses appeared on the face of the pleadings.
The case involved a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by Michael Dede to vacate his conviction for conspiracy to distribute heroin, claiming ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel. The court denied the motion, finding all claims without merit. Counsel's decisions, such as not challenging certain testimony or stipulating to evidence, were reasonable tactical choices presumed sound under Strickland v. Washington. The alleged inconsistencies in witness testimony did not amount to perjury requiring correction, and no prejudice to the outcome was shown.
The case involved defendant Datta, who was charged in the Southern District of New York with two counts of conspiracy to commit money laundering based on alleged use of his business to launder drug proceeds and a related sting operation, with events spanning New York, Texas, and other states. Datta moved under Fed. R. Crim. P. 21(b) to transfer the case to the Southern District of Texas for convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. The court denied the motion after weighing the Platt factors, finding that while some considerations such as the location of events and the defendant's business and family favored Texas, others—including the electronic availability of documents, the location of defense counsel in New York, the existing trial schedule in New York, relative expenses, and the general rule favoring retention in the original district—did not justify transfer.
