Robert Joseph Kelleher

This case involves a trademark infringement lawsuit filed by K-Swiss Inc. against USA Aisiqi Shoes Inc. and related defendants, alleging that the defendants were selling counterfeit athletic shoes copying K-Swiss's protected "five stripe," "toe box," and "shield device" designs. The court granted K-Swiss's application for a preliminary injunction after finding that K-Swiss demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, including valid and protectable trademarks that are non-functional and a likelihood of consumer confusion from the defendants' products. The reasoning centered on the presumption of validity from trademark registrations, evidence that the designs are not essential to shoe function, and the potential for irreparable harm in trademark cases.

business & regulatory

The case involved plaintiffs Thomas and Julia Ennis suing Allstate Insurance over the adjustment of their claim for property damage from the 1994 Northridge earthquake, including Allstate's retention of Shadowbrook for investigation and repairs, leading to claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, and civil RICO violations. Allstate moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs could not establish a prima facie case for any claim. The court granted the motion after reviewing the evidence and arguments, finding no genuine issue of material fact under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 standards that would allow the claims to proceed to trial.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

The case involves 32 Allstate insurance policyholders who sued Allstate and several non-diverse defendants in California state court, alleging intentional misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing related to insurance claims. Allstate removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds, arguing that the non-diverse defendants were fraudulently joined because the claims against them were time-barred. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion to remand, holding that the fraud claims against the non-diverse defendants were barred by the three-year statute of limitations, were not revived by California Code of Civil Procedure Section 340.9, and thus their joinder was fraudulent, establishing diversity jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned whether eBay qualified for protection under the DMCA's safe harbor provisions against claims of secondary copyright infringement arising from third-party sales of allegedly pirated DVDs of the documentary 'Manson' on its auction website. Plaintiff Hendrickson, the copyright owner, sent eBay a cease-and-desist letter but refused to provide specific item numbers, join the VeRO program, or submit a sworn notice identifying infringing listings as required by the statute. The court granted eBay's motion for summary judgment, holding that the company was entitled to DMCA immunity because the plaintiff's communications did not constitute adequate notification under 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) and eBay had no duty to act without such notice. The ruling applied to multiple consolidated cases and rejected arguments that eBay's voluntary searches or other actions disqualified it from the safe harbor.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Campanelli v. Allstate Insurance, homeowners William and Terry Noah sued Allstate after their 1994 Northridge earthquake claim, alleging fraud, negligence, misrepresentation, bad faith, and breach of contract due to unlicensed engineers and ghostwritten reports that led to undervalued settlements. Allstate moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were barred by the one-year limitations period in the policy and California Insurance Code Section 2071. The court granted the motion, finding the Noahs' claims time-barred as the policy required suit within one year of the loss and Allstate had repeatedly notified them of this deadline. The court also rejected reliance on Senate Bill 1899, which revives certain expired Northridge claims effective January 1, 2001, because a grant of summary judgment constitutes a final adjudication on the merits before the bill's effective date.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved a dispute over whether Image Online Design, Inc. held common law service mark rights in the term '.web' for domain name registry and registration services, which it alleged were being infringed by the CORE Association and its president through their own use of the term in similar internet services. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all claims of false designation of origin and unfair competition. It reasoned that '.web' is merely descriptive of web-related domain services rather than distinctive, that the plaintiff's activities were those of a domain name registrar without evidence of secondary meaning or other protectable uses, and that no triable issue existed regarding enforceable trademark rights.

business & regulatoryproperty

In this case, homeowners George and Mary Lou Giakoumakis sued Allstate Insurance after the 1994 Northridge earthquake, alleging that Allstate and its contractors used unlicensed engineers and ghostwritten reports, causing them to receive inadequate settlements on their property damage claims. The plaintiffs brought claims for RICO violations, negligence, negligent and intentional misrepresentation, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of contract. Allstate moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were barred by the one-year limitations period in the insurance policy and California law. The court granted the motion, holding that the contractual and statutory one-year bar applied to all claims, and that under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, California's one-year limit reverse-preempted the federal four-year RICO statute of limitations.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

In Campanelli v. Allstate Ins. Co., homeowners James and Pat House sued Allstate Insurance after the 1994 Northridge earthquake, claiming that Allstate and its contractors used unlicensed engineers and fraudulent practices to under-adjust their property damage claims, resulting in lower settlements. The plaintiffs asserted claims including RICO violations, negligence, misrepresentation, breach of contract, and breach of the covenant of good faith. Allstate moved for summary judgment, arguing that the suit was barred by the one-year limitations period in the insurance policy and California law, which began running when Allstate closed the claims in 1995. The court granted summary judgment, holding that the claims were time-barred as the action was filed in 1998, well beyond the contractual and statutory deadline, and distinguishing it from pending related cases involving later-discovered damages.

propertyproceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiff Katherine Walter, doing business as Pearl Beach, suing Mattel for false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, common law unfair competition, and California statutory unfair competition, claiming that Mattel's 1997 'Pearl Beach Barbie' dolls misappropriated her established trade name and pearl & shell logo. After consolidating the preliminary injunction hearing with a trial on the merits and hearing the plaintiff's evidence, the court granted Mattel's motion for judgment on partial findings under Fed.R.Civ.P. 52(c). The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to show a likelihood of reverse confusion under the Sleekcraft factors, as only the strength of her mark weighed in her favor while proximity of goods, marketing channels, intent, actual confusion, and other factors did not, with insufficient evidence that Mattel had notice of her marks or that consumers would be confused about the source.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerns the allocation of liability for cleanup costs at the McColl Superfund Site in California, which contains acid sludge waste generated during World War II production of aviation gasoline by Shell, Union, ARCO, and Texaco under government contracts. The court had previously granted summary judgment finding both the United States and the oil companies liable as CERCLA arrangers under 42 U.S.C. § 9607. What remains is a determination under 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) of the percentage of response costs allocable to each side, with the court exercising broad discretion to select and apply equitable factors. The core reasoning is that the contracts were silent on waste disposal, wartime government controls over the petroleum industry were extensive, production served a paramount national goal with no party at fault, and allocation must therefore rest on equitable considerations arising from those unique circumstances rather than traditional notions of culpability.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case arose from a 1990 oil spill off the California coast by the vessel American Trader, leading to a class action lawsuit alleging violations of state harbor laws, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act, and general maritime law against BP entities and other defendants. The BP entities reached a settlement with class plaintiffs contingent on a court finding of good faith under California Code of Civil Procedure sections 877 and 877.6, which would bar contribution and indemnity claims by non-settling defendants. The court denied the motion to apply California settlement rules, holding that federal maritime law governs settlements and contribution bars when federal claims remain against non-settling parties. The reasoning centered on the conflict between state procedures and federal law, the mixed nature of the claims, and the lack of any prior ruling or party reliance that would require applying state rules.

proceduretorts & liabilityenvironment

This case is a patent infringement suit in which plaintiffs Huang and Pioneer Pacific alleged that defendants Auto-Shade and Ruimi infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,024,262 on a compact foldable automobile sunshade. After the PTO reexamined the patent, canceled original claims 1-14, and issued new claims 15-28, the defendant argued that the new claims impermissibly broadened the patent's scope. In a Markman hearing, the court construed disputed claim terms—such as "adjacent," "substantially continuously deformable," and "mounted in an open configuration"—according to their ordinary meaning in the patent context and held that the reexamined claims did not enlarge the original scope under 35 U.S.C. § 305. The court reasoned that a claim is broadened only if it encompasses subject matter that would not have infringed the original patent, and it found the new claims remained within the original boundaries while providing the legal meanings to guide the subsequent trial.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a wrongful termination lawsuit brought by Robert Schultz against his former employer Spraylat Corporation, alleging that he was fired due to his inability to fly from a sinus condition, in violation of California's Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), along with claims for breach of express, implied, and oral contracts, breach of the covenant of good faith, and a Labor Code violation related to relocation expenses. The court granted Spraylat's motion for summary judgment on all claims. It reasoned that Schultz's condition did not qualify as a protected physical disability under FEHA because it did not limit a major life activity, that no written or implied contract restricted at-will termination or required cause, that Spraylat's stated reason for termination was not shown to be pretextual, and that all moving expense obligations under the written contract had been fulfilled with no enforceable oral promise to the contrary.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involves a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition challenging his convictions for multiple sexual offenses following a mistrial in his first trial, during which he represented himself. The petitioner raised seven claims, including denial of a transcript from the first trial, improper shackling, denial of advisory counsel, due process violations from jury instructions on unanimity, erroneous consecutive sentencing, uneven application of state law, and cumulative error. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the petition with prejudice after finding that the transcript claim failed because the petitioner repeatedly refused offered continuances to obtain it, that several other claims were procedurally defaulted or lacked merit under federal constitutional standards, and that sentencing and related issues were either moot or did not violate due process. The court determined no constitutional violations occurred that would warrant relief.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves the U.S. and California governments seeking recovery of response costs under CERCLA section 107(a) for cleanup of acid sludge hazardous waste at the McColl Site in Fullerton, California, which originated from the defendant oil companies' wartime production of aviation fuel. The oil companies are sued as successors to generators and arrangers who contracted for disposal of the waste in unlined sumps at the site, while McAuley is sued as an owner or operator of part of the site. The court granted the governments' motion for partial summary judgment on liability, holding the defendants responsible under CERCLA's strict liability standard for response costs. The core reasoning was that the oil companies volitionally arranged for the disposal despite some government oversight during World War II, making them liable parties, with the court also ordering bifurcation of counterclaims from the cost recovery phase.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved the Animal Lovers Volunteer Association suing the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Navy, and Department of Defense over their trapping of red foxes at the Seal Beach National Wildlife Refuge to protect endangered birds such as the California least tern and light-footed clapper rail. After the court required and upheld an Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA, the remaining claims alleged that the trapping plan violated the National Wildlife Refuge System Administration Act by allowing incompatible uses and constituted an abuse of discretion under the Administrative Procedure Act. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on those claims, finding no material facts in dispute and that the agency's actions complied with applicable law. The core reasoning was that judicial review under the APA is narrow, limited to the administrative record, and requires upholding agency decisions supported by substantial evidence and a rational connection to the facts unless they are arbitrary, capricious, or clearly erroneous.

environmentfederal powerprocedure

The case involved consolidated claims by various plaintiffs, including non-fishermen businesses, against oil companies, vessel operators, and the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Liability Fund arising from an oil spill, seeking damages under the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act (TAPAA) and general maritime law. The court considered multiple defense motions for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), which turned on whether TAPAA displaced the judge-made admiralty rule from Robins Dry Dock barring recovery of economic losses absent physical injury to person or property. The opinion examined TAPAA's statutory scheme creating strict liability claims up to $100 million with subrogation rights and supplemental remedies under other federal or state law, while noting that the oil spill satisfied maritime jurisdiction requirements and that general maritime law applied. The court indicated it would resolve the common legal issues before ruling on each motion individually.

environmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involves plaintiffs seeking to recover benefits under a cancer insurance policy issued to their decedent, with claims for breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and violation of California Insurance Code section 790.03 after the policy was assumed by defendant MGLIC. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, ruling that the cancer policy was not an ERISA plan and thus did not preempt the state-law claims. It reached this conclusion because the policy was separately administered by a different insurer with no employer involvement, distinguishing it from the employer's general ERISA plan under Shaw v. Delta Air Lines and failing to meet the statutory definition of an employee welfare benefit plan under 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1). The court denied MGLIC's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims, finding material facts in dispute regarding bad faith, punitive damages, and fraud based on evidence of improper claim handling and potential imputed misrepresentations. The case was removed from state court under diversity jurisdiction and proceeded on these state-law theories.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a lawsuit by Animal Lovers Volunteer Association against federal agencies including the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service over their plan to trap red foxes at the Seal Beach National Wildlife Refuge to protect endangered bird species. Plaintiffs challenged the adequacy of the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) prepared under the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), alleging violations of NEPA and its regulations. The court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on the first two causes of action. The court found that the EIS adequately discussed opposing viewpoints, reasonable alternatives, and relevant issues, and that the agency had taken a hard look at environmental consequences as required by NEPA to foster informed decision-making and public participation.

environment

This case involved a dispute over unpaid fuel bunkers supplied to the vessel M/V Ocean Confidence under a contract between North End Oil and an agent for a sub-charterer. The court dismissed the in rem action against the vessel for lack of jurisdiction after determining that English law governed due to the contract's forum selection clause. Under English law, specifically the Supreme Court Act of 1981, no maritime lien or right to arrest the vessel existed because the liable party was not the owner or demise charterer at the relevant time. The court therefore quashed the arrest warrant and released the substitute security.

procedurebusiness & regulatory