Anthony McLeod Kennedy

The case South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc. concerned whether South Dakota could require out-of-state online retailers without a physical presence in the state to collect and remit sales taxes on purchases by state residents. The Supreme Court held that the physical presence rule established in earlier cases like Quill Corp. v. North Dakota was incorrect and overruled those precedents, allowing states to impose such tax collection obligations on sellers meeting certain economic thresholds. The Court's reasoning was that the rule was not required by the Commerce Clause's substantial nexus test under Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, as due process allows taxation based on economic contacts, and the rule had become outdated in the era of e-commerce, leading to unfair competition and significant state revenue losses.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved Fane Lozman, who alleged that the City of Riviera Beach arrested him during a city council meeting in retaliation for his prior protected speech criticizing city officials and filing an open-meetings lawsuit. Lozman sued under 42 U.S.C. §1983 claiming the arrest violated the First Amendment, though he conceded probable cause existed for the arrest based on his refusal to stop speaking. The district court instructed the jury that Lozman needed to show the officer lacked probable cause and acted with retaliatory animus, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a verdict for the City on the ground that probable cause defeated such a claim. The Supreme Court held that the existence of probable cause does not categorically bar a First Amendment retaliation claim in these circumstances, where the arrest was allegedly taken pursuant to an official municipal policy of retaliation, distinguishing it from typical individual-officer arrest cases governed by precedents like Hartman v. Moore. The Court reasoned that applying the Mt. Healthy but-for causation test was appropriate here without the usual concerns about chilling law enforcement discretion.

free speechcivil rights

The case involved a Colorado bakery owner who refused to create a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple due to his religious beliefs opposing same-sex marriage, leading to a complaint under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission ruled against the baker, finding a violation, and this was upheld by state courts. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Commission's handling of the case violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The core reasoning was that the Commission demonstrated hostility toward the baker's religious beliefs through disparaging comments by commissioners and inconsistent treatment compared to other cases involving offensive messages.

religious libertycivil rightsfree speechbusiness & regulatory

In Hughes v. United States, the Supreme Court considered whether a defendant who pleaded guilty under a binding Type-C plea agreement could obtain a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2) after the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowered the applicable Guidelines range. The Court held that eligibility exists if the Guidelines range served as part of the framework the district court used when imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement. The decision resolved conflicting lower-court approaches stemming from Freeman v. United States by emphasizing that the Guidelines remain central to federal sentencing calculations and discretion, even in the context of plea agreements that stipulate a specific sentence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a Colorado bakery owner who refused to create a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple based on his religious beliefs opposing same-sex marriage, though he offered to sell other baked goods. The couple filed a complaint under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act, leading the Colorado Civil Rights Commission and courts to rule that the refusal constituted unlawful discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission's handling of the case violated the Free Exercise Clause. The core reasoning was that the Commission demonstrated impermissible hostility toward the owner's religious beliefs through disparaging comments by commissioners and inconsistent treatment of similar cases involving objections to anti-gay messages, failing to apply the law in a neutral manner toward religion.

free speechreligious libertycivil rights

The case involved a Colorado bakery owner who refused to create a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple due to his religious beliefs against same-sex marriage, leading to a complaint under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission and lower courts ruled against the baker, finding a violation of the law. The Supreme Court decided that the Commission's handling of the case violated the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. The core reasoning was that the Commission demonstrated hostility toward the baker's religious views through derogatory comments by commissioners and inconsistent treatment compared to other bakers who refused to make cakes with anti-gay messages.

religious libertycivil rights

The case concerned whether defendants sentenced under a binding Type-C plea agreement pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) are eligible for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2) when the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowers the applicable Guidelines range. The Supreme Court held that a sentence imposed under such an agreement is 'based on' the Guidelines range if that range was part of the framework the district court relied on when imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement. The Court reasoned that district courts are required to calculate and consider the Guidelines range in every case as the foundation for sentencing decisions, and that this approach promotes uniformity without creating unwarranted disparities. The decision resolved a split among lower courts stemming from the fragmented opinions in Freeman v. United States.

criminal law

The case involved a Colorado bakery owner who refused to create a custom wedding cake for a same-sex couple based on his religious beliefs opposing same-sex marriage, leading the couple to file a complaint under the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations. The Colorado Civil Rights Commission and state courts ruled against the baker, rejecting his claims that the requirement violated his free speech and free exercise rights under the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Commission's handling of the case violated the Free Exercise Clause due to evidence of hostility toward the baker's sincere religious beliefs, including disparaging comments by commissioners and inconsistent treatment compared to similar cases involving objections to anti-gay messages. The Court emphasized that while states may protect gay persons from discrimination in commercial settings, such laws must be applied neutrally with respect to religion. The decision did not resolve the broader free speech or free exercise issues presented.

religious libertycivil rightsfree speech

The case concerned whether a defendant sentenced under a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement stipulating a specific term of imprisonment could obtain a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(2) after the Sentencing Commission retroactively lowered the applicable Guidelines range. The Supreme Court held that such a sentence is “based on” the Guidelines range, and thus eligible for reduction, if the range was part of the framework the district court relied on when imposing the sentence or accepting the agreement. The Court reasoned that district courts are required to calculate and consider the Guidelines range in every sentencing, making it the foundation for the exercise of discretion, and that this approach promotes uniformity without regard to the form of the plea agreement. The decision resolved a circuit split stemming from the fractured opinion in Freeman v. United States and remanded for further proceedings consistent with that standard.

criminal law

In Byrd v. United States, the case concerned whether Terrence Byrd, an unlisted driver in lawful possession of a rental car, had a reasonable expectation of privacy allowing him to challenge a police search that uncovered drugs and other evidence. The Supreme Court held that the mere fact a driver is not named on the rental agreement does not defeat an otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court reasoned that Fourth Amendment privacy interests draw from property concepts such as lawful possession, control, and the right to exclude others, as established in cases like Rakas v. Illinois and Jones v. United States, and rejected both an overly restrictive view that unauthorized drivers always lack privacy rights and an unqualified rule based solely on possession. The lower courts' denial of Byrd's suppression motion was vacated and remanded for further proceedings.

criminal lawprocedure

In Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, victims or representatives of victims of terrorist acts committed abroad sued a Jordanian bank with a New York branch under the Alien Tort Statute, alleging the bank facilitated the attacks by clearing dollar transactions and laundering money for entities linked to Hamas. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the claims against the foreign corporation. The decision rested on the ATS being strictly jurisdictional without creating private causes of action, prior precedent in Kiobel and Sosa limiting extraterritorial application and raising separation-of-powers and foreign-relations concerns, and the judiciary's reluctance to extend judicially created rights of action against foreign corporations without congressional authorization.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case involved foreign plaintiffs suing a Jordanian bank under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) for allegedly using its New York branch to facilitate terrorist financing and money laundering that contributed to injuries and deaths abroad. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the claims. It held that foreign corporations may not be sued as defendants under the ATS. The core reasoning was that the ATS is strictly jurisdictional and does not itself create causes of action; extending liability to foreign corporations would raise serious separation-of-powers and foreign-relations concerns best left to Congress, consistent with the presumption against extraterritoriality and judicial reluctance to create new private rights of action.

civil rightsfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involved suits under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) by foreign plaintiffs alleging that Arab Bank, a Jordanian corporation with a New York branch, facilitated terrorist acts abroad by processing transactions that benefited terrorists. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' dismissal of the claims against the foreign corporation. The Court reasoned that the ATS is strictly jurisdictional and does not itself create private rights of action, that courts should be cautious about extending judicially created liability especially to corporations, and that such suits raise serious separation-of-powers and foreign-relations concerns best left to Congress.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a large public pension fund that purchased securities in Lehman Brothers offerings and later filed its own individual complaint under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, alleging material misstatements in the registration statements, after opting out of a timely filed class action. The Supreme Court held that the suit was untimely because it was filed more than three years after the securities were offered to the public. The core reasoning was that the three-year limit in the second sentence of Section 13 is a statute of repose that runs from the defendant's last culpable act (the offering) and is not subject to equitable tolling or American Pipe class-action tolling, as shown by its absolute language, structure alongside a one-year discovery rule, and purpose of providing defendants with finality after a fixed period.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Murr v. Wisconsin, petitioners owned two adjacent lots along the St. Croix River that were subject to state and local regulations protecting the river; these rules generally barred separate sale or development of substandard adjacent lots under common ownership unless each had at least one acre suitable for development, with a grandfather clause for lots separately owned before 1976. After the lots came under petitioners' common ownership, they sought variances to sell one lot separately, which were denied, leading to a lawsuit claiming the regulations effected a regulatory taking of one lot under the Fifth Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the two lots must be treated as a single parcel for the takings analysis and that no taking occurred. The Court reasoned that identifying the relevant property unit requires considering factors including the physical characteristics of the lots, their treatment under state and local law (such as the merger rules), and their value, which together supported viewing them as one unit whose owners retained substantial economic use and value.

propertyenvironmentbusiness & regulatory

Weaver v. Massachusetts concerned a criminal trial in which the courtroom was closed to the public, including the defendant's family, during two days of jury selection due to space constraints, violating the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial. Defense counsel did not object at trial or on direct appeal, and the defendant was convicted of murder. Years later, he sought a new trial arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to raise the closure issue. The Supreme Court held that when a public-trial violation is raised for the first time in an ineffective-assistance claim rather than on direct review, the defendant must demonstrate prejudice to obtain relief. The core reasoning was that although public-trial errors are structural, they do not invariably produce fundamental unfairness, and the Strickland prejudice standard applies in this procedural posture to balance the interests at stake.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved six men of Arab or South Asian descent detained after the September 11 attacks on suspicion of terrorism links, who sued federal officials including the Attorney General and FBI Director for alleged punitive and discriminatory detention conditions under an implied Bivens cause of action. The Supreme Court held that Bivens remedies should not be extended to this context involving high-ranking executive officials and national security matters. The reasoning centered on separation of powers principles, the disfavored status of expanding Bivens actions, and the presence of special factors like congressional inaction and potential interference with executive functions.

civil rightscriminal lawfederal power

The case involved a North Carolina statute making it a felony for registered sex offenders to access commercial social networking websites that allow minors to become members. Petitioner was convicted for posting on Facebook, and lower courts split on whether the law violated the First Amendment. The Supreme Court held that the statute impermissibly restricted lawful speech. The Court reasoned that even assuming the law was content-neutral and subject to intermediate scrutiny, it was not narrowly tailored to the state's interest in protecting children, as it broadly barred access to principal modern platforms for speech, information, and public discourse.

free speechcriminal law

The case involved a Colorado jury convicting Peña-Rodriguez of harassment and unlawful sexual contact. After the verdict, two jurors reported that another juror had made anti-Hispanic biased statements during deliberations against the defendant and his alibi witness. The trial court and Colorado appellate courts denied a motion for a new trial, applying Colorado Rule of Evidence 606(b) which generally bars juror testimony about statements made during deliberations to impeach the verdict. The U.S. Supreme Court held that where a juror makes a clear statement showing reliance on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires an exception to the no-impeachment rule so that the trial court may consider the evidence of bias.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

In Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, voters challenged Virginia's post-2010 redistricting plan for 12 state legislative districts that set a minimum 55% black voting-age population target in each, alleging racial gerrymandering in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The district court upheld the plan for 11 districts on the ground that race was not shown to predominate absent a conflict with traditional redistricting criteria and upheld the twelfth district (District 75) as narrowly tailored to comply with Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act. The Supreme Court held that the district court applied an incorrect legal standard by requiring proof of such a conflict to establish racial predominance, because race can predominate even when traditional criteria are respected, and that direct or circumstantial evidence of the legislature's actual considerations controls. The Court therefore vacated the judgment as to the 11 districts and remanded for reapplication of the proper predominance test, while affirming the finding that race predominated in District 75 but remanding for further consideration of narrow tailoring.

electionscivil rights