Cornelia Groefsema Kennedy

This case involves multidistrict litigation over product liability claims related to the antibiotic Cleocin, transferred to the court for pretrial proceedings. After the parties stipulated to remand the individual actions back to their original courts, the plaintiffs sought clarification and modification of the remand order to limit post-remand discovery on common issues and a protective order against further depositions of their experts. The court denied the motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to issue further orders once the cases were remanded, as the remand effected a change of venue transferring authority to the transferor courts.

proceduretorts & liability

This case was a libel action brought by plaintiff Schultz against Newsweek and the Detroit News over articles describing him as an "underworld figure" or similar in connection with the investigation into Jimmy Hoffa's disappearance. The court granted defendants' motions for summary judgment. Under Michigan law, the publications were protected by a qualified privilege applicable to matters of public interest, which required plaintiff to prove actual malice by the defendants. The court concluded that the record contained no evidence creating a triable issue of malice, as the circumstances cited by plaintiff were equally consistent with good-faith reporting, making summary judgment appropriate as a matter of law.

free speechtorts & liability

The plaintiff, a licensed dentist and member of the defendant professional associations, sued for breach of fiduciary duty after being denied diplomate certification in endodontics despite meeting written requirements, alleging that the oral examinations were arbitrarily short, irrelevant, and lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard. In this diversity action, the court applied Michigan law and ruled on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court found that private professional associations with monopoly power over certification must follow their bylaws and act rationally and fairly, but determined that oral exams in general, the lack of specific notice of deficiencies, and the use of grandfather clauses raised no triable issues; however, material facts remained disputed regarding the length and content of the plaintiff's specific exams, so summary judgment was granted in part and denied in part.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryhealthcare

Plaintiff Parets sued Eaton Corp. alleging national origin discrimination under Michigan law and breach of an employment contract after his South American position was eliminated, claiming he was not given the promised initial role or a U.S. reassignment. The federal court, sitting in diversity, applied Michigan choice-of-law rules and determined that claims for wrongful termination under Michigan statutes, the state constitution, or common law failed to state a claim under either Michigan or Ohio law. The court therefore granted dismissal of the termination-related claims but denied dismissal of the remaining breach-of-contract allegations concerning the original position and reassignment promises, as well as the claim that national-origin discrimination prevented other employment. Factual disputes about the employer entity and contract terms were left for further proceedings.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Marshall v. American Motors Corp., the Secretary of Labor sued the company alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act through discharges, demotions, failures to promote, and other adverse actions against employees. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment on issues including the adequacy of conciliation efforts, compliance with state deferral requirements, and the application of statutes of limitations. It held that the Secretary's two-year series of meetings and communications met the ADEA's conciliation mandate under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d), struck the defendant's defense based on failure to defer to the state agency, and applied the limitations period to bar some claims while noting that demotion and promotion claims require further factual development due to possible continuing violations. The reasoning emphasized substantial compliance with procedural prerequisites and the plain language of the limitations statute without requiring an adjudicative-style negotiation process.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved the National Labor Relations Board petitioning the court for interim injunctive relief under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act against Mayco Plastics, Inc., alleging that the company committed unfair labor practices to prevent unionization by the United Automobile Workers. The parties stipulated that Mayco engaged in activities such as questioning employees about union support, issuing threats, discharging employees, and granting benefits to influence the election, which the union lost. The court granted the NLRB's request for injunctive relief, including an order requiring Mayco to bargain in good faith with the union pending final Board proceedings. The core reasoning was that such relief was just and proper to preserve the pre-unfair-labor-practice status quo and effectuate national labor policy, despite defenses like delay and voluntary compliance, given the likelihood of eventual success on the merits and the need to counteract the effects of the practices.

labor & employment

The case involved defendants indicted on multiple counts of RICO conspiracy and substantive violations, along with mail fraud, stemming from alleged kickback schemes in which laboratories paid doctors for referring Medicare and Medicaid patient specimens for testing. Defendants sought rehearing of a prior denial of their motion to dismiss, arguing based on United States v. Porter that the payments did not qualify as illegal kickbacks under 42 U.S.C. § 1396h(b)(1) because they were not returns to the original payer. The court denied the motion for rehearing, holding that the term kickback encompasses payments made to induce referrals and is not limited to refunds to the initial source of funds. It further rejected Porter's narrow view, citing broader dictionary, statutory, and case law definitions, and concluded that the indictment adequately alleged interference with government functions and provided fair notice under due process standards.

criminal lawhealthcare

In Consumers Power Co. v. Costle, a gas and electric utility sued the EPA Administrator seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act, claiming entitlement to compensation for costs of replacing gas mains displaced by federally funded sewage projects in Michigan cities. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing and failed to state a claim. The core reasoning was that the Relocation Act applies only where real property has been acquired by a government entity using federal funds, but the utility retained its right to maintain pipes in public streets without any such acquisition occurring. The court further noted that the Act creates no new enforceable property rights and that the claim was not ripe because administrative remedies had not been exhausted.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

Huron Valley Hospital, Inc., a non-profit formed to construct a new 153-bed hospital in Michigan, applied for a state Certificate of Need and federal Capital Expenditure Review approval but was denied after recommendations from regional and state health planning agencies. It then sued multiple defendants, including state agencies, local hospitals, and planning bodies, alleging a conspiracy to exclude it from the hospital services market in violation of federal antitrust laws and seeking treble damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory judgment. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the challenged conduct occurred within a state regulatory process protected by the Parker state-action and Noerr petitioning doctrines, and that the Sherman Act does not remedy all tortious or unfair competitive conduct but is limited to preserving free competition, which was not implicated here.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

This case involved a union's lawsuit against Bechtel Power Corporation for allegedly breaching a collective bargaining agreement by refusing to arbitrate a grievance over the company's failure to contribute to an industry steward fund. The court had previously addressed issues of timeliness and settlement but ultimately considered the merits on cross-motions for summary judgment. The court held that the fund violated 29 U.S.C. § 186(a) because the steward functioned as a representative of the union rather than qualifying under any statutory exceptions for employer payments, such as those for employee compensation or approved trust funds under § 186(c). It further determined that the grievance had been effectively settled by union officials' concurrence with the company's position. Accordingly, the court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's, concluding that requiring payments would be unlawful.

labor & employmentcriminal law

This case involved the United States suing Donald Cripps and his company for obtaining HUD repair contracts through bribery, collusion with Area Management Brokers, and price inflation during 1971-1972, seeking damages under the False Claims Act and common-law fraud theories. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on the remaining 72 contracts after statute-of-limitations rulings, finding no material factual disputes based on Cripps's guilty plea, trial transcript admissions, HUD affidavits, and documentary evidence establishing the fraudulent scheme. It also dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for unpaid winterizing work, holding the contracts unenforceable because they arose from conflicts of interest and violations of HUD guidelines. The ruling rested on the absence of any triable issues after reviewing the full record, including the National Housing Act framework and applicable limitations periods.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a Michigan resident plaintiff injured in a 1977 auto accident who sued the New Jersey-based insurer of the vehicle under Michigan's No-Fault Insurance Act for unpaid medical expenses, alleging willful nonpayment. The insurer removed the suit to federal court on diversity grounds, but the court ordered remand to Wayne County Circuit Court. The core reasoning was that the direct action proviso to 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) applied because the no-fault statute permits suit directly against the liability insurer without joining the insured as a defendant, and imputing the Michigan insured's citizenship to the insurer eliminated complete diversity, leaving the federal court without jurisdiction.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves two consolidated actions brought by the U.S. Attorney General against the Ferndale School District, its officials, and Michigan state defendants under the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of 1974 and Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The complaints alleged that the district constructed, operated, and maintained the Grant Elementary School to segregate black students and assigned black faculty on the basis of race, creating a dual education system. After reviewing evidence on school construction, attendance boundaries, faculty assignments, and historical operations, the court found that student segregation at Grant resulted from de facto causes but that faculty segregation was de jure, ordering the district to remedy the latter. The court denied the request to recover federal revenue-sharing funds used for a nondiscriminatory retirement program.

civil rights

This case involves a removed diversity action alleging age discrimination under state law, where the plaintiff sought remand due to deficiencies in the defendant's removal petition regarding its principal place of business. The court denied the motion to remand and granted the defendant leave to amend its petition. The reasoning relied on Sixth Circuit precedent holding that amendment should be permitted where diversity jurisdiction actually exists and the defendant is willing to amend, as the defect here was not fatal and could be inferred from the petition's allegations, consistent with policies favoring amendment under 28 U.S.C. § 1653 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15.

procedurefederal power

In Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., a former employee sued her employer after being terminated in 1972, alleging age and sex discrimination under federal statutes including the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Fair Labor Standards Act, as well as state laws and constitutional provisions, plus common-law claims for breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court addressed the defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the statute of limitations began running on the termination date with no continuing violation and that many claims lacked a legal basis. It granted the motion in part by dismissing claims under the ADEA, 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), the Michigan Constitution and Fair Employment Practices Act, the Fourteenth Amendment, breach of contract, wrongful discharge, and related provisions, while taking the emotional distress claim under advisement and allowing amendment of wage claims. The core reasoning centered on the absence of timely administrative filings or a viable continuing-violation theory tied to the 1972 events, along with Michigan law's limits on at-will employment exceptions.

labor & employmentcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case concerned plaintiff Jessie Schroeder's age discrimination claim under Michigan's Fair Employment Practices Act (FEPA), which the court had previously dismissed for her failure to file a timely complaint with the Civil Rights Commission within ninety days of the alleged discrimination in 1972. After the FEPA was repealed and replaced by the Michigan Civil Rights Act effective March 31, 1977, which permits aggrieved persons to commence actions directly in circuit court, Schroeder moved for rehearing and argued for retroactive application of the new law. The court granted the motion for rehearing, holding that the new act's procedural revisions apply retroactively to pending cases because it is remedial legislation and the defendant had notice of the claims, so the failure to file with the Commission no longer bars the claim. The court denied the request to certify the retroactivity question to the Michigan Supreme Court.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case involves a plaintiff's claim against her employer for intentional infliction of emotional distress arising from alleged sex and age discrimination. The court considered whether the Workers’ Disability Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy for such injuries, precluding a separate civil lawsuit. Relying on Michigan precedent, including Stimson v. Bell Telephone Co., the court determined that mental and physical disabilities resulting from workplace discrimination fall within the scope of the Act. Therefore, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the emotional distress claim, holding that the plaintiff's remedies are limited to those available under workers' compensation law.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

This case involves a civil False Claims Act suit by the United States alleging that defendants conspired to defraud the government through collusive and inflated bids on FHA-insured home repair contracts, with the original complaint listing 47 properties as overt acts. The government moved to amend the complaint to add 42 new properties uncovered through discovery responses, delete certain counts, and make minor language changes. The court granted the motion in part, allowing the non-substantive amendments and addition of new acts not barred by limitations, but denied relation back for the additional overt acts. It held that each fraudulent act gives rise to a separate cause of action under the False Claims Act, so the statute of limitations (six years from each voucher's submission to HUD) runs independently and new acts do not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c) to the original filing date; defendants may strike time-barred claims via affirmative defense.

criminal lawprocedurebusiness & regulatory

In Owens v. Benson, petitioner Ransom Dean Owens, who had pleaded guilty to armed bank robbery and received an 18-year sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 4205(b)(2), filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (treated as such rather than a habeas petition) claiming his plea was induced by unfulfilled promises of a shorter sentence from his attorney and the prosecutor, that his presentence report contained inaccuracies, and that his grand jury was improperly constituted. The court denied the motion in full. It reasoned that the detailed plea colloquy, in which Owens and the prosecutor explicitly confirmed no promises existed beyond the 18-year maximum and that sentencing was up to the court, created a strong presumption against his later contradictory allegations under Blackledge v. Allison. The presentence report claim was rejected as previously litigated, and the grand jury claim was dismissed as untimely under 28 U.S.C. § 1867(a).

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved multiple defendants in a federal gambling investigation who moved to suppress conversations intercepted by an electronic surveillance device planted in defendant Zalmanowski’s automobile under a court order issued to the FBI. The defendants argued that the order was overly broad for failing to specify time, place, or manner of entry, that Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act did not authorize or was unconstitutional if it permitted unlawful implantation of the device, and that the surveillance failed to minimize intrusions. The court denied the motion to suppress, distinguishing precedent that suppressed evidence from a bug in a business establishment on the grounds that an automobile involves lesser privacy interests and makes limiting the time or manner of entry impractical due to its mobility. The court also ruled that several defendants lacked standing to challenge the orders and found no procedural or statutory violations in obtaining or executing the authorization.

criminal lawprocedure