This case involved a chancery receiver for a Delaware corporation seeking to recover dividends paid by its directors, which were alleged to violate sections 34 and 35 of the Delaware General Corporation Law by being declared and paid when the corporation's capital was impaired. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the court lacked jurisdiction and the complaint failed to state a claim. The trial court granted the motion, and the appellate court affirmed, holding that the Delaware statute creates a liability enforceable exclusively by creditors in the event of insolvency, rather than by the corporation itself, and that an ordinary chancery receiver lacks authority to pursue claims belonging solely to creditors. The court further reasoned that the statute was not merely declaratory of common law and that the receiver's appointment order did not grant expanded powers to sue on behalf of creditors.
The case involved a beneficiary's suit against an insurer to recover double indemnity under a life insurance policy for the insured's 1931 gunshot death, which the insurer defended as suicide within the first two policy years, limiting recovery to premiums paid. The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff after a jury verdict, but the appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the effect of equally consistent evidence and on the presumption against suicide, as the burden remained on the plaintiff to prove accidental death while the insurer bore the burden on its affirmative suicide defense; it also affirmed exclusion of the coroner's certificate under Minnesota law.
This case involved a borrower suing a national bank (later in receivership) to recover twice the amount of interest paid on a $55,000 loan under federal banking statutes (12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86) and Nebraska's 10% maximum interest rate, alleging usury. The district court found that interest payments became usurious starting November 25, 1930, and awarded the plaintiff double the total interest paid over the loan period ($23,199.94). On appeal, the Eighth Circuit held that the findings and pleadings limited recovery to only the usurious payments made after that date (totaling $2,183.70), as earlier payments were not shown to be usurious from the loan's inception and the statute permits recovery of twice the excess interest paid. The court remanded with instructions to enter judgment for $4,367.40, twice the post-1930 usurious amount. The decision rested on the trial court's specific findings of fact regarding when usury began, the timing of payments, and the two-year limitation period implicit in the federal usury recovery provision.
The case concerned appellants Conley, an attorney, and Corneaby, his associate, who were charged with contempt after approaching Huckenpoehler, a defendant in a National Prohibition Act case pending in federal district court. They allegedly offered to use influence with a senator and a prohibition agent to have the charges dismissed in exchange for $2,500 and urged Huckenpoehler to raise funds or flee rather than appear as required by his bond. The district court convicted both of contempt, sentenced Corneaby to two years' imprisonment, and disbarred Conley for unprofessional conduct. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the judgments, holding that the evidence showed corrupt obstruction of justice rather than any legitimate attorney-client relationship and that third parties who induce a defendant to violate a recognizance are guilty of contempt.
This case involved a taxpayer seeking to deduct annual payments on promissory notes issued to his wife and children as interest expenses on his 1922 and 1923 income tax returns. The notes were given after the wife returned prior assignments of land sale contract payments, with the payments characterized as 5% interest on the note principal. The court upheld the Board of Tax Appeals' disallowance of the deductions, ruling that the instruments did not create valid indebtedness because payment was contingent on the payees' survival until maturity in 1950 and the notes were non-negotiable and unenforceable. The court further held that the transactions amounted to revocable promises of future gifts tied to family support rather than genuine debt obligations under the revenue laws.
This case involved a dispute over ownership and control of railway terminal tracks, rights of way, and facilities in Des Moines, Iowa, between the Des Moines Terminal Company and the Des Moines Union Railway Company along with its proprietary railroads (Milwaukee and Wabash). The Terminal Company sought to quiet title, while the defendants claimed the properties were held in trust for their benefit due to alleged breaches of fiduciary duty by the Hubbell family officers who controlled both entities. The district court found violations of trust obligations but ruled that claims to ownership had been waived, instead impressing the properties with a trust granting the Union Company exclusive use on reasonable terms and voiding leases to intervening railroads. On appeal, the circuit court affirmed this equitable adjustment, reasoning that the Union Company's open possession provided notice to others and that the decree properly separated beneficial use rights from compensation for services without creating an invalid self-trust.