Calvert Magruder

The case involved a dispute between prime contractor Ferro Concrete Construction Company and subcontractor L. Luchini & Son over payment for furnishing stone on a federal public building project in Rhode Island under a fixed-price subcontract of $30,000. Luchini intervened in proceedings under the Hurd Act claiming the contract had been modified to pay "what it was worth," and a jury awarded them over $27,000. On appeal, the court held that the only evidence of modification came from a conversation with Ferro's construction superintendent, who lacked authority to change the written contract price, and Luchini was on notice of this limitation. The appeals court therefore set aside the verdict and directed judgment for the defendant on the claim while remanding for a new trial on Ferro's counterclaim for overpayments.

business & regulatory

This case concerns whether the proceeds of two life insurance policies taken out by the decedent on his own life should be included in his gross estate for federal estate tax purposes beyond the $40,000 statutory exemption. The decedent had executed beneficiary designations naming a vested irrevocable primary beneficiary whose written consent was required for any changes or loans, while reserving the right to alter contingent beneficiaries. The court decided that the proceeds were not includible in the gross estate, reasoning that Treasury Regulations 80, Article 27, limit inclusion under Section 302(g) of the Revenue Act of 1926 (as amended) to policies in which the decedent retained legal incidents of ownership at death, an interpretation that had received implicit congressional approval through subsequent reenactments.

taxes

This case involved an employer's challenge under the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act to a compensation award for an employee who suffered a severe heel injury in 1932 while working for Eastern S. S. Lines. The Deputy Commissioner found the employee totally disabled since 1936, based on the unhealed injury, ongoing pain, and inability to obtain suitable light work despite efforts to resume employment. The district court dismissed the employer's bill in equity seeking to set aside the award, and the court of appeals affirmed that decision. The court reasoned that the Act defines disability as incapacity to earn wages in the same or any other employment, that findings of ability to perform limited work do not contradict total disability if such work is unavailable, and that the Commissioner's determinations were supported by substantial evidence including the employee's age, work history, and failed job attempts.

labor & employmentfederal power

This case arose from a 1936 truck collision on a Massachusetts highway in which plaintiff Cochran was injured when his improperly registered vehicle was struck from behind; his suit alleged both ordinary negligence and willful misconduct by the defendant. After a jury verdict favoring the plaintiff only on the willful misconduct count, the trial court entered judgment accordingly, but a prior appeal reversed that judgment for insufficient evidence of wanton conduct and limited retrial to that count. On the present motion to dismiss a later appeal from judgments entered for the defendant on the negligence counts, the court held that its earlier mandate had rested on a mistaken assumption that those counts were already final, and therefore denied the motion to allow review of alleged trial errors on the negligence claims so that the plaintiff would not be deprived of appellate access if he lost on retrial of the fourth count. The decision recognized that exceptional circumstances can justify what would otherwise be piecemeal appeals.

proceduretorts & liability

This case was an appeal from a civil contempt decree in an underlying copyright infringement suit, where the plaintiffs had obtained a final judgment awarding them damages and attorneys' fees against the Raymor Ballroom Company and its manager Galvin. After the defendants failed to pay, a writ of execution issued, but deputy marshals were prevented from levying on box office receipts due to the defendants' actions in hiding cash and misleading officers on two occasions. The district court held the company and Galvin in contempt and ordered them to pay a $600 fine to be applied toward the judgment. The court of appeals upheld the decree, finding that the conduct amounted to willful resistance to a lawful writ under 28 U.S.C. § 385 and that the evidence supported the findings of obstruction.

procedurecriminal law