The case involves the United States' request for the extradition of Mary Beth Harshbarger to Canada under the US-Canada extradition treaty and 18 U.S.C. § 3184, based on charges of criminal negligence causing death and careless use of a firearm stemming from a 2006 hunting incident where she fatally shot her husband, mistaking him for a bear. The court reviewed evidence including Canadian investigation reports, witness statements, and reenactments indicating poor lighting conditions at the time of the shooting. The court determined that there is sufficient evidence to support extradition and ordered Harshbarger committed to the custody of the U.S. Marshal pending surrender to Canadian authorities.
The case involves the United States, acting on behalf of Canada, filing an ex parte complaint seeking the extradition of American citizen Mary Beth Harshbarger to face Canadian charges of criminal negligence causing death and careless use of a firearm, stemming from a 2006 hunting incident in Newfoundland where she fatally shot her husband after mistaking him for a bear. The complaint requested interim relief in the form of an arrest warrant under 18 U.S.C. § 3184 to bring her before the court for an extraditability hearing. The court determined that an arrest warrant was unnecessary and instead ordered that a summons be issued and served by the U.S. Marshal. The core reasoning was that review of the U.S.-Canada extradition treaty and protocols, along with the facts that Harshbarger is a U.S. citizen who did not flee and that Canada did not invoke the treaty's provisional arrest provision for urgent cases, supported use of a summons rather than arrest at this stage.
This case involves a dispute over the formation and operation of a Pennsylvania restaurant partnership between plaintiff Alnoor Rahemtulla and defendant Nazim Hassam, in which Rahemtulla alleged that Hassam fraudulently induced him to invest $340,000 that was then misappropriated, along with related claims of breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, unjust enrichment, and others. The plaintiffs sought damages, rescission of partnership documents, and other relief, while the defendants moved to dismiss the amended complaint and the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. The court applied Pennsylvania law after a choice-of-law analysis and granted the defendants' motion in part and denied it in part, while denying the plaintiffs' motion, primarily because several claims such as equitable fraud, misappropriation, and certain contract invalidation theories failed as a matter of law or were duplicative of other counts. The ruling turned on the absence of viable causes of action under governing precedents and the lack of evidence supporting unconscionability or other grounds for relief at the pleading and summary judgment stages.
The plaintiff sued her former employer, alleging disability discrimination and failure to accommodate under the ADA and PHRA, violations of the FMLA, retaliation under the ADA, FMLA, and workers' compensation laws, and pregnancy discrimination under the PDA. After discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment on all counts. Applying the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to the circumstantial evidence presented, the court granted the motion, concluding that the plaintiff failed to establish prima facie cases or show that the employer's stated reasons were pretextual. The plaintiff conceded she could not seek punitive damages under state law.
The case concerns a motion by the Scranton Housing Authority under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g) seeking to unseal the affidavit of probable cause and related documents for search warrants issued and executed on its offices in December 2004, as well as the return of seized property. The court determined that a Rule 41(g) motion qualifies as an independent proceeding that can be brought without an accompanying civil or criminal case, drawing on the rule's self-contained structure and precedents allowing such ancillary actions. It applied a standard requiring the movant to demonstrate entitlement to possession of the property and that continued government retention is unreasonable, but found the facial validity of the warrants supported by colorable probable cause allegations and declined to unseal the affidavit or order return at this pre-indictment stage. The decision was without prejudice to renewal after any indictment and unsealing.
This case involves an inmate at SCI-Mahanoy who filed a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that defendant Hopta subjected him to unsafe conditions in the prison welding shop, leading to respiratory issues like COPD, and that defendant Cerullo was deliberately indifferent to his resulting medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The defendants moved for summary judgment, which was unopposed. The court granted the motion, finding no evidence that Hopta acted with deliberate indifference because the plaintiff had been transferred away from the welding shop and there was no showing of an ongoing substantial risk of serious harm. As to Cerullo, the court held that as a non-medical administrator she could not be liable where the plaintiff received treatment from prison doctors, filed no grievances alerting her to any mistreatment, and she had no knowledge of inadequate care.