Frederick J. Martone

This case involved a claim filed in bankruptcy court by St. Joseph's Foundation and Barrow Neurological Foundation against debtors Bashas' Inc. and related entities, based on a 2005 letter from the debtors' representative promising $25,000 annually for ten years to support a capital campaign. The bankruptcy court disallowed the claim after sustaining the debtors' objection, ruling that the pledge was not an enforceable contract due to lack of consideration and that promissory estoppel did not apply. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that the foundations provided no bargained-for consideration in exchange for the promise and that they did not detrimentally rely on it, as the project was completed without the full pledged amount. The court also declined to apply a charitable subscription exception to estoppel requirements, noting that even if available, enforcement would not be required to avoid injustice in the bankruptcy context where it could prejudice actual creditors.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned Arizona judicial candidate Randolph Wolfson’s challenge to provisions of the state Code of Judicial Conduct that barred judicial candidates from personally soliciting campaign contributions and from endorsing or campaigning for other political candidates. Wolfson sought declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the rules violated his First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, upholding the restrictions. The court reasoned that the rules advanced compelling state interests in preserving the actual and perceived impartiality of the judiciary and that those interests outweighed the speech and associational rights of judicial candidates, applying a balancing test drawn from precedent on judicial speech.

free speechelectionscivil rights

This multidistrict litigation involves plaintiffs who allege that their use of Zicam Cold Remedy Intranasal Gel Spray or Swabs caused them to lose their sense of smell (anosmia), asserting various state-law products liability claims including negligence, strict liability, and failure to warn. Defendants moved for summary judgment solely on the issue of general causation, arguing that plaintiffs lacked sufficient evidence that ordinary use of Zicam could deliver a toxic dose capable of damaging olfactory tissue. The court denied the motion, holding that the collective expert opinions on the toxicity of Zicam, its distribution and deposition in the nasal cavity, and the diffuse location of olfactory epithelium created a genuine triable issue of fact as to whether Zicam could cause anosmia in humans. The decision applied the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and state substantive law requiring proof of general causation in products liability cases, while noting that admitted expert testimony under Daubert can still support a jury finding of scientific possibility even without precise quantitative data.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned whether Arizona’s Uninsured/Underinsured Motorist Act permits an insurer to offset underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits by amounts already paid under the medical expense coverage in the same policy. Plaintiffs, who had received medpay benefits after an accident and then sought UIM coverage, challenged the insurer’s denial based on a non-duplication clause in the policy. The court denied class certification because the proposed class of American Standard insureds numbered only three, failing the numerosity requirement. On the merits, the court granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that the offset was unenforceable under the statute as interpreted in Cundiff v. Farmers Ins. Co., which limits deductions from UIM coverage to liability limits only.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves homebuyers who purchased properties from KB Home in Arizona and allege that KB Home and Countrywide/Landsafe conspired through a joint venture to inflate appraisals using non-comparable sales data, enabling sales at above-market prices; the plaintiffs brought civil RICO claims along with claims under California's Unfair Competition Law and for unjust enrichment. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss, dismissing all claims by the Patron plaintiffs, dismissing the UCL and unjust enrichment claims for the remaining plaintiffs, and allowing the RICO claims of the remaining plaintiffs to proceed. It held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing based on the alleged $400 appraisal fees, that Arizona law rather than California law governed the UCL claims due to the most substantial relationship to the claims, and that valid contracts with implied covenants of good faith barred the unjust enrichment claims. The court denied as moot the plaintiffs' motion to amend the scheduling order.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryproperty

This case involves the loss of valuable household goods by fire during an interstate shipment from Illinois to Arizona and California. After paying the insured claim, Pacific Indemnity sued the carriers Pickens Kane and Atlas under the Carmack Amendment for the declared $1 million value plus state-law claims of negligence and breach of contract. The court granted summary judgment on liability against both carriers under the Carmack Amendment, held Pickens Kane liable for the full declared value, dismissed the state claims as preempted, and apportioned further liability between the carriers according to their bills of lading and tariffs. The core reasoning was that the shipper established the statutory prima facie case, the carriers admitted liability, and federal law exclusively governs interstate shipping contracts.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves a former employee's claim for long-term disability benefits under an ERISA-governed plan issued by MetLife to Travelers, where the plaintiff stopped working due to mental health issues and initially received benefits but later had them terminated for failing to apply for Social Security benefits and provide updated proof of disability. The court denied summary judgment to both MetLife and Travelers, granted the plaintiff's request for statutory penalties against Travelers in the amount of $4,400 for delaying the provision of plan documents by 40 days beyond the statutory 30-day period after receiving a request through her attorney, and remanded the benefits claim to MetLife for redetermination. The core reasoning was that MetLife had discretionary authority to interpret the plan and terminate benefits for non-compliance with requirements, but Travelers, as plan administrator with actual notice of the document request, improperly insisted on a subpoena rather than cooperating, contrary to ERISA's goals, while the benefits termination itself warranted further administrative review rather than a final court ruling.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case was a defamation action brought by Global Royalties against the operators of the Ripoff Report website, alleging that third-party posts calling Global's gemstone investment business a scam were defamatory and that the site operators should be liable for failing to remove them after the author requested it and for allegedly profiting from such posts via a paid advocacy program. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the amended complaint and denied the plaintiffs' motion to stay. It reasoned that the Communications Decency Act provides broad immunity to interactive computer service providers for content created by others, that the posts were provided for publication by a third party, and that neither notice of potential defamation, a request for removal, nor the site's general business practices made the defendants responsible for the creation or development of the content under the statute.

free speechtorts & liabilityprocedure

This case is a federal delinquency proceeding against a juvenile charged with aggravated sexual abuse of a minor on the Navajo reservation under the Major Crimes Act. The juvenile sought subpoenas duces tecum for records from Navajo Nation school and social services agencies to support a defense of false accusation, but tribal officials refused compliance, citing tribal sovereignty, immunity, and the need to domesticate federal subpoenas in Navajo courts. The court held that the Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process applies and extends to these tribal custodians of records, that federal process is independently effective on the reservation without domestication, and that tribal sovereignty does not override the federal government's plenary authority or the Constitution's Supremacy Clause in this context. The court rejected contrary precedent from another circuit as inapposite because it did not address constitutional challenges and granted the motions to compel while denying the tribe's motions to quash.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

The case involved the Arizona State Board for Charter Schools and for-profit charter school operators challenging a Department of Education determination that such schools were ineligible for federal grants under the ESEA and IDEA because they did not qualify as local educational agencies. The court granted the Department's cross-motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' motion, concluding that for-profit charter schools cannot receive the funds. The core reasoning was that the statutes define elementary and secondary schools as nonprofit institutions, with charter schools listed as an included example rather than an exception to the nonprofit requirement; legislative amendments added the nonprofit language without exempting charters, and the agency's view was permissible under Chevron deference.

federal powerbusiness & regulatory

In this case, plaintiff De Shazer sued manufacturers National RV Holdings and Freightliner Custom Chassis after purchasing a 1999 recreational vehicle with 51 alleged defects, claiming breaches of express and implied warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act and Arizona common law. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the chassis was not defective, certain components were excluded from warranty coverage or already repaired, and consequential damages were limited by the warranty terms. The court applied Arizona law due to the parties' significant contacts with the state, noted that lack of privity does not bar express warranty claims, and found material factual disputes over whether unexcluded defects had been properly fixed and whether the limited remedies failed in their essential purpose. It therefore denied both summary judgment motions while granting the plaintiff's motion to supplement the record.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves Qwest Corporation's challenge to an Arizona Corporation Commission order that retroactively applied older 1998 rates for unbundled network elements (entrance and transport facilities) instead of rates set in a 2002 Phase II arbitration order under the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The ACC had determined that the combined rates from the Phase II order produced unintended results and sought to revert to prior rates for the period from June 2002 to October 2003. The court held that the Phase II rates resulted from binding arbitration under 47 U.S.C. § 252(b), forming a legally binding interconnection agreement that the ACC could not alter retroactively. It vacated the supplemental order only to the extent it applied the 1998 rates retroactively, while allowing prospective interim application and noting that permanent rates could be set in future proceedings. The decision rested on the statutory framework treating arbitrated agreements as contracts and the prohibition on retroactive ratemaking.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involves a plaintiff who purchased a defective Winnebago motor home for nearly $200,000 and sued the manufacturers, including Workhorse for the chassis, under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act seeking damages or a refund. Workhorse moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, claiming the amount in controversy fell below the Act's $50,000 threshold and that the plaintiff failed to exhaust an informal dispute resolution process. The court denied the motion, holding that the jurisdictional amount is measured by the value of the entire motor home purchased rather than individual components, satisfying the threshold, and that Workhorse's IDR mechanism was invalid under federal regulations because it improperly limited available damages under state law, so exhaustion was not required.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved an ERISA plan assignee seeking to recover medical expenses paid for a beneficiary injured in an accident, claiming subrogation or reimbursement rights from a $105,000 settlement paid by defendant GMAC (the third party's insurer) to the beneficiary and her lawyer, defendant Brown. The plaintiff alleged intentional interference with contractual rights against Brown and breach of contract or promissory estoppel against GMAC after the defendants disbursed the funds despite the plaintiff's assertions of its claims. The court denied the plaintiff's motions for partial summary judgment and granted the defendants' cross-motions. It reasoned that no reasonable jury could find Brown's actions improper under Arizona tort law given the uncertainty created by Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson and related precedent, and that GMAC had no contractual obligation or basis for promissory estoppel due to lack of mutual assent, consideration, substantial detriment, or injustice.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

This case involves pretrial detention of defendant Samih Fadl Jamal, who was indicted on charges including conspiracy to transport and receive stolen property, money laundering, and false statements related to a large-scale baby formula fencing operation. The court granted the government's motion to review and overturn the magistrate judge's release order, ordering Jamal detained under 18 U.S.C. § 3142(e). The decision was based on factors from § 3142(g), including the serious nature of the offenses, the weight of the evidence from surveillance and witnesses, and Jamal's history and characteristics such as his assets and plans in Lebanon, lack of substantial U.S. ties, and explicit statements about fleeing to Lebanon if facing prosecution, especially given no extradition treaty with Lebanon.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned whether employment-related claims by Navajo tribal members against Wide Ruins Community School, a tribal corporation converted from a BIA school, could proceed in Navajo tribal courts under the Navajo Preference in Employment Act or were required to be brought in federal court. The school argued that Public Law 101-512 deemed it part of the BIA, making any civil actions subject to the Federal Tort Claims Act and thus only cognizable against the United States in district court. The court held that tribal courts retained jurisdiction over the claims, denying the school's summary judgment motion and granting Stago's. It reasoned that the statute only addresses tort claims otherwise within the FTCA's scope that would have been available against the United States when the school was under BIA control, leaving other claims under tribal law fully subject to tribal institutions and remedies.

labor & employmentfederal power

The case concerned defendants' challenge to the admissibility of a forensic document examiner's opinions identifying certain writings and handprintings as theirs in a criminal prosecution. The court held a Daubert hearing featuring testimony from experts on both sides and reviewed studies on handwriting uniqueness and examiner proficiency. It found that claims of handwriting uniqueness rest primarily on examiner experience rather than rigorous proof, though studies showed trained examiners had substantially lower false-positive rates than laypersons. Applying post-Daubert and Kumho standards, the court assessed the reliability of the proffered evidence based on these factors.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a challenge by Save Our Sonoran, Inc. to a permit issued by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers allowing a developer to construct 66 road crossings over washes on a 608-acre desert property in Phoenix for residential development. The court considered a motion for preliminary injunction, focusing on whether the Corps' Environmental Assessment under NEPA was properly limited to the washes or should have encompassed the entire project due to their interdependence. The court found serious questions on the merits regarding the scope of analysis, as the washes permeate the land and development depends on the permit, distinguishing it from prior cases with separable components, and determined that the balance of hardships favored the plaintiffs due to potential irreparable environmental damage versus mere delay for the developer. Accordingly, the court granted the preliminary injunction, suspending the permit and enjoining related activities pending further proceedings.

environmentprocedurefederal power

The case involved James Cornell Harrod, who was convicted by a jury of premeditated first-degree murder and felony murder in the 1988 shooting death of Jeanne Tovrea in her Phoenix home. The state presented evidence that Harrod had been hired by the victim's stepson to commit the killing for inheritance money, including matching fingerprints at the scene, voice identification from a recorded phone message, extensive phone records linking Harrod to the stepson, and testimony from Harrod's ex-wife. The trial court imposed a death sentence after finding the pecuniary-gain aggravating factor and insufficient mitigating circumstances. On automatic appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and death sentence, upholding the trial court's evidentiary rulings, identification procedures, and findings on aggravating and mitigating factors.

criminal law

The case involved Arthur Leon Thompson, who committed two drug felonies before committing a theft felony, pled guilty to the drug offenses before his theft conviction, and was sentenced on all counts together. The question was whether the drug offenses qualified as historical prior felony convictions under A.R.S. § 13-604 to enhance Thompson's theft sentence, or whether the more lenient A.R.S. § 13-702.02 applied instead. The Arizona Supreme Court held that § 13-604 applied, affirming the trial court's enhanced sentence of three years in prison. The court reasoned that the statute requires only that the prior offenses precede the present offense and that convictions on the priors precede the present conviction, conditions that were met here since Thompson pled guilty to the drugs in May 1998 and was convicted of theft in December 1998. The court also clarified that sentencing is not required for a conviction to be considered historical under the statute.

criminal law