Rumael Green was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon after a private security guard at a Chicago Housing Authority public housing unit stopped and searched him, recovering a handgun. Green moved to suppress the evidence, claiming a Fourth Amendment violation, but the district court denied the motion on the ground that the guard was not a state actor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that under Illinois law the CHA's security contracts are distinct from police powers, the guard worked for an independent contractor without direct government involvement, and precedent established that such private security personnel are not subject to the Fourth Amendment.
Rumael Green was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon after a private security guard at a Chicago Housing Authority building stopped and searched him, recovering a handgun. Green moved to suppress the evidence, contending that the search violated the Fourth Amendment, but the district court denied the motion on the ground that the guard was not a state actor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the guard, employed by an independent contractor under a CHA security services agreement, did not act as a government agent or with official participation. The court relied on Illinois law distinguishing CHA police powers from security personnel functions and on precedent finding similar private guards not subject to the Fourth Amendment. Green had entered a conditional guilty plea preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling.
Rumael Green was indicted for possession of a firearm by a felon after a private security guard employed by an independent contractor at a Chicago Housing Authority building stopped and searched him, recovering a handgun. Green moved to suppress the gun on Fourth Amendment grounds, but the district court denied the motion after determining that the guard was not a state actor. Green entered a conditional guilty plea reserving his right to appeal. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to searches by private individuals unless they act as government agents, and that the security guard here performed only private functions under a contract without direct government involvement, consistent with circuit precedent.
Gerald Peeters appealed the denial of his claim for Social Security disability insurance benefits based on impairments including degenerative disc disease, shoulder joint disease, depression, PTSD, anxiety, and learning disabilities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's upholding of the ALJ's decision that Peeters was not disabled under the regulations. The court held that the ALJ's opinion was supported by substantial evidence, as it properly gave partial weight to the treating psychologist's assessments due to unexplained changes in severity ratings and issues outside her expertise, while assigning great weight to the state agency psychologists' opinions that Peeters could perform light, simple, routine work. The ALJ also relied on vocational expert testimony identifying jobs such as food preparation worker and mail clerk that Peeters could perform within his residual functional capacity.
Gerald Peeters appealed the denial of his application for Social Security disability insurance benefits, asserting that impairments including degenerative disc disease, shoulder joint disease, depressive disorder, PTSD, anxiety, and learning disabilities prevented him from working since 2014. The district court affirmed the ALJ's 2018 decision that Peeters did not meet the severity requirements for disability and could perform light unskilled work. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the ALJ's decision was supported by substantial evidence after properly assigning partial weight to an inconsistent opinion from Dr. King and great weight to consistent assessments from six state agency psychologists.
This case involves Ladmarald Cates, a Milwaukee police officer convicted of violating a woman's civil rights under color of law by sexually assaulting her after responding to her 911 call. After his initial conviction was upheld but later vacated due to ineffective assistance of counsel and flawed jury instructions on aggravated sexual abuse, the government sought a retrial via superseding indictment. Cates moved to dismiss the aggravated sexual abuse allegation, arguing double jeopardy and issue preclusion barred relitigation based on the first jury's split verdict, which found guilt on the civil rights count but acquitted on the firearm count and found no bodily injury. The district court denied the motion, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the prior jury's findings did not necessarily resolve the elements of physical force or threats/fear in Cates's favor, as the victim's testimony could rationally support those findings in a properly instructed retrial.
