Alan Angus McDonald

The case involves the City of Moses Lake seeking to recover or obtain contribution for environmental cleanup costs at the Moses Lake Wellfield Contamination Superfund Site from Lockheed Martin Corporation under CERCLA and the Washington Model Toxics Control Act (MTCA). In a prior order, the court had barred recovery of certain past costs due to statutes of limitations and lack of necessity. Lockheed moved for clarification or summary judgment, arguing that Moses Lake's contribution claims for potential future liabilities were not ripe and that no further claims remained. The court denied the motion, holding that Moses Lake's contribution claims under CERCLA and MTCA for future response costs were ripe for adjudication because of the possibility of impending liability from EPA actions, while distinguishing these from already-barred cost recovery claims for past expenses; it also noted potential ongoing cost recovery claims for other costs.

environmentprocedurefederal power

This case is an insurance coverage dispute arising from long-running litigation between Feature Realty and the City of Spokane over delays and denials of permits and approvals for a planned unit development known as Canyon Bluffs. Feature asserted claims including intentional interference with business expectancy against the City, which settled the underlying actions and sought to collect from the City's insurers. USF&G moved for summary judgment arguing its policy provided no coverage for the tortious interference claim. The court denied the motion, finding that factual questions remained about whether the relevant acts fell within the policy period and whether any exclusions applied, and that the settlement did not clearly allocate liability among claims.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved the City of Moses Lake seeking recovery of response costs incurred between 1989 and 1994 from Lockheed Martin Corporation for cleanup at the Moses Lake Wellfield Contamination Superfund Site under CERCLA and Washington's MTCA. The court had previously granted summary judgment to Lockheed, holding the claims time-barred, and Moses Lake moved for reconsideration alleging clear error, including a misstatement that Lockheed was named a PRP in 1992. Upon review, the court denied the motion, acknowledging the factual inaccuracy but concluding it was not material because the statutes of limitations for removal actions or independent remedial actions had begun running by 1994 and expired by 1997 without a tolling agreement, regardless of PRP notice. The reasoning emphasized that the limitations periods depend on when specific events occurred rather than formal notices, and Moses Lake's actions did not qualify for a later trigger under relevant precedents.

environmentprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute between RAHCO International, a Washington-based manufacturer, and Laird Electric, a Canadian corporation, concerning electrical assembly work on industrial equipment for a Canadian mining project. RAHCO sued Laird in federal court in Washington, asserting jurisdiction based on a forum selection clause in a purchase order document that designated Washington courts and law. The court granted Laird's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), holding that Laird had not accepted or agreed to the purchase order or its forum selection clause, as the document was not executed by anyone with authority and performance aligned instead with Laird's earlier budget proposal. The court further found insufficient minimum contacts to establish personal jurisdiction over the foreign defendant consistent with due process.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved the City of Moses Lake seeking cost recovery and contribution from Lockheed Martin under CERCLA and Washington's MTCA for expenses related to TCE contamination in the city's drinking water wells near a former Air Force base, where Lockheed's predecessor had been involved in missile work. The court granted Lockheed's motion for summary judgment on these statutory claims while denying the city's cross-motion for a liability determination. The core reasoning centered on the claims being barred by the applicable statutes of limitations under CERCLA and MTCA, with additional findings that Lockheed did not qualify as an operator or arranger and that certain post-1994 costs were not recoverable as necessary response costs.

environmentprocedure

The case involved the estate and family of Christopher L. Rentz, a pre-trial detainee murdered by fellow inmates in the Spokane County Jail, who brought claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged constitutional violations by county officials, along with related state-law wrongful death, survival, and emotional distress claims. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment, primarily arguing that the absence of financial dependency on the decedent barred recovery on the wrongful death causes of action. The court granted the motion in part, holding that Washington’s wrongful death statutes, borrowed for the federal claims, require proof of financial dependency for parents and siblings to recover, while also addressing related motions to amend the complaint and continue trial. The opinion further clarified that the decedent’s status as a pre-trial detainee precluded an Eighth Amendment claim, directing analysis instead to the Fourteenth Amendment.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a challenge by the United States, Fluor Hanford, and the Tri-City Industrial Development Council to the constitutionality of Washington's Cleanup Priority Act (CPA), enacted via voter initiative, which restricts mixed radioactive and hazardous waste facilities like the Hanford Nuclear Reservation from accepting additional waste until on-site cleanup complies with all state and federal environmental laws. The plaintiffs sought summary judgment, arguing the CPA violated the Supremacy Clause through preemption by federal RCRA requirements and the Tri-Party Agreement, as well as sovereign immunity, the dormant Commerce Clause, and the Contract Clause. The court granted the motion for summary judgment, finding the CPA preempted because it imposed permitting and closure conditions that directly conflicted with federal law and the existing federal-state cleanup framework at Hanford. The decision rested on the Supremacy Clause analysis showing that state law could not override federal authority over nuclear waste management at the site.

environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the City of Moses Lake bringing common law tort claims (nuisance, trespass, and negligence) against Boeing and Lockheed Martin for contamination of its municipal water wells with trichloroethylene (TCE) from activities at a former Air Force base. The court granted the defendants' motions for partial summary judgment. It held that the claims were barred by applicable Washington statutes of limitations because the city had discovered the contamination in 1988 through regulatory testing, took immediate steps including removing a well from service and planning remediation, and thus the claims accrued at that time more than the limitation periods before the suit was filed.

environmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

The City of Moses Lake sued the United States and other defendants under CERCLA, Washington's Model Toxics Control Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act, seeking damages and other relief for trichloroethylene contamination in its municipal wells that originated from the former Larson Air Force Base conveyed to the city in the 1960s. The United States moved to dismiss the FTCA claims (public nuisance, private nuisance, trespass, and negligence) under Rule 12(b)(1), arguing they were time-barred. The court converted the motion to one for summary judgment and granted it, holding that the claims accrued no later than 1991 when the city knew of the contamination, its likely source, and the need for remediation, but did not file its administrative claim until 2003—well beyond the FTCA's two-year limitations period. The court found no basis for equitable tolling or continuing-tort liability on the undisputed facts, so the FTCA claims were dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

environmentfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case involves the City of Moses Lake suing Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and various U.S. agencies for groundwater contamination at wells obtained from the former Larson Air Force Base, asserting claims under CERCLA, Washington's MTCA, and the FTCA. Moses Lake sought to amend its complaint to add a CERCLA citizen-suit claim against the Army Corps of Engineers and EPA alleging violation of 42 U.S.C. §9620(f) by failing to provide required information and allow local participation in remedy selection, and moved for a preliminary injunction barring issuance of any proposed remedial plan until compliance. The court granted both motions after applying the preliminary-injunction standard, determining that serious legal questions existed on the §9620(f) obligations, the balance of hardships tipped in the city's favor, and public-interest considerations supported interim relief.

environmentfederal power

This case involved a union welfare fund suing an employer under ERISA and the NLRA for unpaid contributions to the fund on behalf of apprentice employees, as required by a collective bargaining agreement. The employer paid the contributions after the lawsuit was filed but contested the fund's entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs, arguing that the dispute should have been resolved solely through the agreement's grievance process and that fees were limited to pre-payment collection efforts. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that the contributions were due when the complaint was filed and awarding $41,090.75 in attorneys' fees plus $2,326.94 in costs. It reasoned that ERISA Section 502(g)(2) mandates fees and costs in such actions where a judgment favors the plan, that the fund trustees were not bound by the labor agreement's grievance procedures, and that fees for defending a related counterclaim were also recoverable.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved cross-motions for summary judgment on defendant Kenneth Badgley's counterclaim for malicious prosecution under RCW 4.24.350 against plaintiff Gausvik. The court granted the plaintiff's motion and denied the defendant's, dismissing the counterclaim. It applied federal collateral estoppel rules because a prior Ninth Circuit-affirmed decision in Hidalgo v. Perez had rejected an identical counterclaim by Badgley, finding the issues of probable cause and malice to be the same due to identical facts, evidence, and claims presented by the same counsel. The court also denied the plaintiff's request for attorney fees under RCW 4.84.250 for lack of a required settlement offer and notice.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involves the State of Washington suing the U.S. Department of Energy over plans to ship transuranic mixed waste to the Hanford Nuclear Reservation, claiming the shipments and storage would violate the state's Hazardous Waste Management Act (HWMA) by storing land-disposal-restricted waste without the required purpose of facilitating treatment or disposal. The court granted the state's motion for partial summary judgment on the HWMA claim, finding that the 1996 amendments to the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act exempt such waste from treatment standards and land disposal prohibitions only when it is at the WIPP facility itself, not when stored elsewhere like Hanford. The core reasoning rests on the statute's plain language limiting the exemption to waste "designated by the Secretary for disposal at WIPP," supported by legislative history showing the provision was not intended to broadly preempt state hazardous waste rules at other sites.

environmentfederal power

This case involves claims by members of the Doggett family against former Wenatchee police detective Robert Perez under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, arising from his investigation of alleged child sexual abuse within the family that led to arrests, convictions, and later reversal of those convictions on appeal. The court granted Perez's motion for summary judgment on the remaining non-conspiracy § 1983 claims asserted by Mark, Carol, Elizabeth, and Amber Doggett. It found no genuine issue of material fact that Perez deliberately fabricated evidence or that his interview tactics violated the plaintiffs' constitutional rights, including familial association rights from the removal of children from parental custody. The court also dismissed the state law claims of Amber and Elizabeth without prejudice for lack of supplemental jurisdiction after disposing of all federal claims.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involved 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 claims brought by Mark and Carol Doggett and their daughters against Wenatchee police officer Robert Perez, Police Chief Kenneth Badgley, and the City of Wenatchee. The claims arose from the 1994-1995 investigation into alleged child sexual abuse within the Doggett family, which led to the parents' arrest, conviction, imprisonment, and eventual reversal of the convictions on appeal with charges later dismissed. The court granted the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the federal civil rights claims.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Doggett v. Perez, plaintiffs Mark, Carol, and John Doggett brought federal claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, along with state-law tort claims for negligence, false arrest, false imprisonment, and emotional distress, arising from their 1994 arrests and convictions on child sexual abuse charges that were later reversed on appeal and dismissed in 2000. Defendants moved for partial summary judgment on statute-of-limitations grounds. The court granted the motion in part, holding that all claims by John Doggett and all state-law claims by Mark and Carol Doggett were time-barred under Washington's three-year personal-injury statute and applicable tolling rules, but denied the motion as to the federal claims of Mark and Carol Doggett. The ruling rested on the dates when the appellate mandate issued and the underlying criminal charges were dismissed, which determined when the limitations periods began to run.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The case concerns Pacific Aerospace & Electronics (PAE) suing its former employees Edward Taylor and James Petri, along with their new competing company RAAD Technologies, for allegedly misappropriating confidential business information and soliciting PAE customers after their departure in 2002. PAE moved for partial summary judgment on breach of contract claims involving confidentiality and non-solicitation provisions in the defendants' employment agreements, as well as breach of common law duties of loyalty and confidentiality. The court granted the motion, finding that the signed agreements made all confidential information PAE's exclusive property and barred post-employment disclosure or customer contact, and that evidence including the defendants' admissions established violations through meetings with PAE customers such as Northrop Grumman and Raytheon. Based on this, the court ordered permanent injunctions against further use or disclosure of PAE's confidential information and against customer contacts until June 2005, plus an accounting and constructive trust on related profits.

business & regulatorylabor & employment

The case concerns a company, Pacific Aerospace & Electronics (PAE), suing its former vice president of engineering, Edward Taylor, after he left to form a competing business, alleging breach of confidentiality and invention assignment agreements, misappropriation of trade secrets and customer lists, and violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. The court granted PAE's motion for a preliminary injunction, enjoining Taylor and related parties from using or disclosing PAE's confidential information, soliciting its employees or customers, and competing in certain ways. Jurisdiction was upheld under federal question based on the CFAA claim, with the court resolving ambiguities in the plaintiff's favor; the decision rested on findings that PAE demonstrated likely success on the merits, irreparable harm from loss of proprietary data and business relationships, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored relief, drawing from evidence of Taylor's employment agreements and post-employment conduct.

business & regulatorylabor & employmentprocedurecriminal law

The case involves plaintiff Ralph Gausvik's federal civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims against Wenatchee police investigator Robert Perez, the City of Wenatchee, and other officials, stemming from his 1995 convictions in the Wenatchee Sex Ring cases that were later reversed or dismissed due to concerns over coercive interviewing techniques. Gausvik sought reconsideration of the court's September 2002 order granting summary judgment to the City on the § 1983 claims (finding no municipal policy or custom of misconduct) and dismissing the state claims as time-barred by statutes of limitations. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate clear error, manifest injustice, or new evidence sufficient to warrant reconsideration, and that evidence of isolated incidents or post-investigation declarations did not establish liability or toll the limitations periods.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case arose after plaintiff Ralph Gausvik was convicted in 1995 on multiple counts of child rape and molestation based on an investigation led by Wenatchee police officer Robert Perez into alleged sexual abuse; the convictions were partially reversed on appeal, a reference hearing raised concerns about Perez's interview techniques, and the remaining charges were dismissed in 2000. Gausvik then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of his federal constitutional rights, along with state-law tort claims, against Perez, police chief Kenneth Badgley, mayor Earl Tilly, and the City of Wenatchee. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing the § 1983 claims and most state claims against Badgley, Tilly, and the City in full, and dismissing many claims against Perez. The core reasoning was that the applicable statutes of limitations had expired on the false-arrest, false-imprisonment, and other claims, with no basis to toll the periods based on imprisonment or the discovery rule, and that the court would address the remaining claims against Perez separately.

criminal lawcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability