The case involved whether a clerical employee working in a railroad's office building, responsible for filing and retrieving tracings used to produce blueprints for the railroad's equipment and structures, was covered by the Federal Employers' Liability Act when injured by a falling window pane. The Supreme Court held that she was covered under the Act as amended in 1939. The Court reasoned that the amendment extends protection to any employee whose duties in any part further or substantially affect interstate commerce, and the employee's role in maintaining essential files necessary for the railroad's operations met this standard, without requiring direct engagement in transportation or hazardous activities at the time of injury.
The case Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo concerned whether railroad employees injured while constructing new cars intended for interstate commerce could sue their employer under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA). The Supreme Court held that such employees are covered by the FELA as amended in 1939, which extends liability to employees whose duties further interstate commerce or directly and substantially affect it. The Court reasoned that the 1939 amendment broadened the scope beyond the prior "moment of injury" and "new construction" doctrines, allowing recovery for workers like Gileo engaged in new car construction. It dismissed two cases for lack of final judgments but affirmed coverage in the others.
This case concerned whether Ohio courts were required to give full faith and credit to a Florida divorce decree obtained by the husband on constructive service after his wife had moved to Ohio, specifically as to any effect on her alimony rights. The husband argued that the Florida decree not only granted the divorce but also denied alimony to the wife, while the wife later obtained an alimony award from the Ohio courts. The Supreme Court held that the Florida decree did not adjudicate the wife's entitlement to alimony but only declined to make an award at that time due to her possession of marital property and pending litigation elsewhere. The Court reached this conclusion by closely examining the language of the Florida complaint, master's report, and decree, which it interpreted as a refusal to decide the alimony issue rather than a ruling against the wife's rights. As a result, the Ohio alimony award did not fail to respect the Florida judgment.
The case concerned whether the Civil Aeronautics Board could investigate and prohibit North American Airlines from using its name under section 411 of the Civil Aeronautics Act, which bars unfair or deceptive practices and unfair methods of competition in air transportation, based on claimed public confusion with American Airlines' name. The Board found substantial ongoing public confusion after hearings, denied North American's name-change request, and issued a cease-and-desist order; the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia set aside the order on the ground that the public interest was insufficient to support Board jurisdiction. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether name confusion could justify a Board proceeding to protect the public and whether the confusion found could support a statutory violation, accepting the Board's findings for purposes of review and drawing on interpretations of the analogous section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. The Court noted that a public-interest finding is required to initiate an investigation but is not a prerequisite to issuing a cease-and-desist order once a violation is established.
In Doud v. Hodge, an Illinois partnership and its agent challenged the state's Community Currency Exchanges Act, which requires licensing and regulation of businesses selling or issuing money orders but exempts certain large companies like American Express. The plaintiffs argued that the Act violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by imposing burdens on them while exempting competitors engaged in the same activity. The district court dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction, reasoning that it could not address the federal constitutional claim until the Illinois Supreme Court had ruled on the statute's validity. The Supreme Court held that the district court possessed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281 and 2284 to hear the challenge to the state law and that dismissal was improper merely because state courts had not yet interpreted the statute. The Court vacated the dismissal and remanded the case without specifying further procedures.
This case involved a defendant convicted of federal income tax evasion who sought a new trial after learning that during the trial an outsider had approached one juror with a suggestion to make a deal for money, which the juror reported to the judge; the judge and prosecutor then had the FBI investigate without informing the defendant or resolving the matter before the verdict. The District Court found the contacts harmless after a hearing, and the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction. The Supreme Court held that any private communication with a juror about the case is presumptively prejudicial, and the full circumstances—including the juror's ongoing uncertainty about the FBI investigation—created an impermissible extraneous influence that was not dispelled. Accordingly, the Court vacated the judgment and remanded with directions to grant a new trial.
