Norman A. Mordue

This case involved a FOIA lawsuit by plaintiffs Susan B. Long and David Burnham against the DOJ seeking records from the Civil Division's CASES database, including fields for vaccine type and date of administration in vaccine-related litigation matters. The court had previously granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs on those fields and ordered their release under FOIA Exemption 6. On the DOJ's motion for reconsideration under Rule 54(b), the court granted the motion after determining that its prior ruling relied on the inapplicable statute 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-25 instead of the relevant provision in § 300aa-12(d)(4)(A), which restricts disclosure of certain information submitted in Vaccine Injury Compensation Program proceedings. The court found this constituted a legal error warranting reconsideration of whether the information could be withheld under FOIA Exemptions 3 or 6 based on privacy interests and statutory prohibitions.

procedurehealthcarefederal power

In Saxon v. Astrue, plaintiff Shanna Saxon sought judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming inability to work due to mental health conditions such as depression, bipolar disorder, anxiety, and schizophrenia. The ALJ applied the five-step sequential evaluation process and concluded the plaintiff was not disabled from July 13, 2005 onward, declining to reopen prior applications. The district court found that the ALJ failed to properly weigh treating physician opinions under the relevant regulations, did not adequately assess whether the plaintiff's impairments met listed criteria, and did not correctly determine her residual functional capacity, which undermined the analysis at steps four and five. The court therefore reversed the Commissioner's decision and remanded the matter for further administrative proceedings.

healthcare

The case concerns a mother's application for supplemental security income benefits on behalf of her nine-year-old daughter, who was claimed to be disabled due to a learning disorder and speech/language delays. After the ALJ denied the application at the third step of the three-part child disability evaluation, finding no marked limitations in the six functional domains, and the Appeals Council declined review, the plaintiff sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The court determined that the Appeals Council erred by failing to consider new evidence submitted after the ALJ decision and that the ALJ's findings regarding the child's limitations in acquiring and using information and attending and completing tasks were not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed the Commissioner's determination and remanded the matter for further proceedings.

federal powerhealthcare

In Campbell v. Astrue, plaintiff Bruce Campbell sought judicial review under the Social Security Act of the Commissioner of Social Security's final decision denying his application for Supplemental Security Income benefits, which he claimed due to multiple impairments including a low back condition, obesity, diabetes, depression, anxiety, and illiteracy. The district court reviewed the case following a magistrate judge's report and recommendation, with no objections filed by the parties. The court adopted the report and recommendation in full and remanded the Commissioner's decision for further administrative proceedings pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The underlying analysis applied the five-step sequential evaluation process for disability claims, examined whether the ALJ's findings were supported by substantial evidence and correct legal standards, and identified deficiencies such as inadequate consideration of the plaintiff's mental impairments and literacy level when applying the Medical-Vocational Rules.

healthcareprocedure

The case involves a former graduate student at SUNY Binghamton's Biology Department who sued professors, students, and administrators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his dismissal from the program and loss of funding stemmed from his criticism of a professor's research, among other claims. After earlier dismissals, only two claims remained, which the court addressed on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion and dismissed the claims with prejudice, reasoning that the plaintiff's speech did not address a matter of public concern as required for First Amendment protection in this employment/educational context and that no evidence supported a causal link to any adverse actions. The opinion details the program's academic requirements and the plaintiff's disputes over support eligibility but focuses on the lack of protected speech and evidentiary deficiencies.

free speechcivil rights

Plaintiffs Susan B. Long and David Burnham, operators of the Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse, sued the Department of Justice under FOIA to obtain electronic records from the Civil Division’s CASES database covering filed civil cases since fiscal year 2000, plus descriptive information such as table schemas, code definitions, scope of coverage, and data manuals. The court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the adequacy of its search, the withholding of JCON IDs and attorney time reporting information under applicable FOIA exemptions, and the absence of markings indicating redactions for sealed cases, finding the agency’s declarations sufficient to show technical infeasibility and exemption applicability. It granted the plaintiffs’ cross-motion in part, ordering release of fields concerning vaccine type and date of administration. Remaining issues were denied without prejudice and referred for supplemental declarations and further proceedings.

procedurefederal power

The case concerned whether New York State violated the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 by failing to designate disabled student services offices at SUNY and CUNY campuses as mandatory voter registration agencies. The NVRA requires states to designate all state-funded offices primarily serving persons with disabilities for federal voter registration. The United States moved for summary judgment, presenting undisputed facts about the state funding, operation, and disability-service focus of over 100 DSS offices across state-operated and community college campuses. The court examined the extent of state appropriations and supervisory control over these offices to determine if they fell within the statutory definition of covered agencies.

electionsfederal power

This case involves multiple appeals from orders by a U.S. Bankruptcy Judge in jointly administered chapter 11 proceedings by Pal Family Credit Co., Inc., related Pal entities, and Three Real Estate Holding Co. The debtors, who share principals and have filed numerous prior bankruptcy cases focused on the same real property, challenged the dismissal with prejudice for 180 days of their cases and related adversary proceedings (including one seeking to set aside a tax foreclosure by Albany County), the denial of a stay, the dismissal of another adversary action for failure to prosecute, and the approval of attorney fees. The district court affirmed all orders, finding that the bankruptcy court properly determined cause for dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1112 based on the debtors' bad faith, serial filings without meaningful progress toward reorganization, and other factors such as the lack of a confirmable plan. Related appeals were denied as moot or without error once the underlying cases were dismissed. The court applied standards of review including clear error for facts and de novo for legal conclusions.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involves a dispute over ownership and access rights to a 40-foot strip of former railroad land along Cayuga Lake in Aurora, New York. Plaintiffs filed an action under New York Real Property Actions and Proceedings Law Article 15 seeking a determination that they own land west of the strip and hold easements across it by deed, adverse possession, necessity, or prescription, while also requesting an injunction against defendant's fencing; defendant removed the case to federal court on diversity grounds and cross-moved for summary judgment asserting fee ownership of the strip and adjacent land with no easements existing. The court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment by analyzing 19th-century deeds, surveys, maps recorded in the county clerk's office, and evidence of use and accretion, determining that defendant holds fee title to the strip itself but that plaintiffs received ownership of the western parcels from Wells College via prior conveyances. Core reasoning focused on interpreting deed descriptions, the effect of railroad conveyances, and whether maps constituted admissible ancient documents to establish boundaries and any rights-of-way.

propertyprocedure

This case concerns a contract dispute arising from a 1991 lease and Payment in Lieu of Taxes (PILOT) agreement between the County of Oswego Industrial Development Agency (COIDA) and Fulton Cogeneration Associates (FCA) for redevelopment of a cogeneration facility, under which FCA was obligated to make annual fixed payments in place of real estate taxes. After FCA's general partners changed through mergers and sales, the 2005 PILOT payment went unpaid, prompting COIDA to declare a default, terminate the lease, and accelerate all remaining amounts due. The court granted COIDA's motion for summary judgment against ANR Venture Fulton Company and El Paso Merchant Energy-Petroleum Company (as former general partners), awarding $4,728,799.08 plus interest, attorneys' fees of $271,636, and costs of $521,162.99, based on the lease's incorporation of the PILOT obligations and default/acceleration clauses; it also granted partial indemnification to those defendants against other parties.

business & regulatorytaxespropertyprocedure

Brenda Pardee filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her application for disability benefits after a 1999 work-related injury to her right shoulder and neck. The Magistrate Judge recommended affirming the Commissioner's decision, and Pardee objected to that Report and Recommendation. The court adopted the factual background, reviewed the ALJ's five-step sequential analysis, considered medical opinions from treating physicians that indicated the plaintiff could perform sedentary work, and evaluated the credibility of her pain complaints. The court overruled the objections, finding that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's conclusion that Pardee was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.

healthcarefederal power

This case involves Dianna Rockwood's challenge to an Administrative Law Judge's determination that she was not entitled to supplemental security income or disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, based on alleged disabilities from a herniated disc, arthritis, depression, and anxiety starting in 2002. After the ALJ's denial was upheld by the Appeals Council, becoming the Commissioner's final decision, Rockwood sought judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3). The district court adopted the magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation in full, granting the plaintiff's motion for judgment on the pleadings in part, denying the defendant's cross-motion, and remanding the action to the Commissioner for further proceedings due to deficiencies in the ALJ's analysis, including inadequate consideration of obesity's impact on limitations.

healthcareprocedurefederal power

In United States v. Barner, defendant Jeffrey Barner, a New York-registered Level 3 sex offender convicted in 1987, was indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a) for knowingly traveling interstate from Indiana to New York between September and October 2008 while failing to register or update his sex offender registration in either state. Barner moved to dismiss the indictment on six grounds: SORNA's inapplicability due to non-implementation by New York and Indiana; violations of the Ex Post Facto Clause; Due Process Clause; Commerce Clause; Tenth Amendment; and the non-delegation doctrine. The court denied the motion in full, ruling that SORNA applies to pre-2006 offenders through the Attorney General's authority under 42 U.S.C. § 16913(d), that the statute provides sufficient intelligible principles to avoid non-delegation issues, and that the remaining constitutional challenges failed under precedents and statutory text. The decision relied on the comprehensive national registration system established by the Adam Walsh Act and prior district and circuit rulings rejecting similar claims.

criminal lawfederal power

The case involved a defendant charged under the PROTECT Act with one count of possessing child pornography, specifically images in which the faces of six identifiable minor girls had been digitally superimposed onto the bodies of nude or partially nude adults engaged in sexually explicit conduct. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C) was unconstitutional as applied because it criminalized speech that did not involve actual child abuse. The court denied the motion, holding that the images at issue used the faces of real minors and thereby created a lasting record of those minors appearing to engage in sexual activity, implicating the governmental interests in protecting children recognized in New York v. Ferber and Osborne v. Ohio and distinguishing the case from Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, which addressed purely virtual or computer-generated depictions.

criminal lawfree speech

Lamar Advertising sued the Village of Marathon and its zoning officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985 after the Zoning Board of Appeals denied its application for an area variance to erect a billboard exceeding local height and size limits. The company had obtained a building permit, begun construction, and faced a stop-work order, leading to unsuccessful state-court Article 78 proceedings that upheld the restrictions and the denial. It alleged violations of due process, equal protection, free speech, and conspiracy based on alleged procedural irregularities, malice, and the ordinance's on-premises advertising rule. The court granted defendants' summary judgment motions and dismissed all claims, finding no constitutional deprivations, no vested rights in the permit, and that any free-speech issues would be addressed by a proposed ordinance amendment. A related state-law claim was dismissed on the merits after the federal claims were resolved.

free speechcivil rightsbusiness & regulatoryproperty

In Ferrer v. Superintendent, petitioner Alex Ferrer sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after pleading guilty in New York state court to attempted burglary in the second degree and receiving a five-year sentence. He raised claims including ineffective assistance of counsel, an invalid guilty plea due to competency issues and lack of advice on post-release supervision, grand jury irregularities, and improper questioning. The district court denied the petition in full, finding several claims procedurally defaulted for failure to exhaust or preserve them in state court, while others were meritless because the state courts' decisions were not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court precedent under AEDPA. The court also denied a certificate of appealability.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves homeowners who obtained a mortgage loan from a lender and later sought rescission and other relief under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA), alleging failures to provide required disclosures, notices of the right to cancel, and accurate finance charge calculations. The lender moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims, while the plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment. The court granted the lender partial summary judgment, ruling that the plaintiffs could not rescind the portion of the new loan that refinanced their prior loan with the same lender, but denied the remainder of the lender's motion and the plaintiffs' motion in full. The decision rests on the statutory limits on rescission rights under TILA for transactions involving refinancing of existing obligations with the same creditor, along with factual disputes over disclosure compliance that precluded broader summary judgment.

business & regulatoryproperty

In Pelchy v. United States, the plaintiff sued the federal government under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries from tripping and falling on an uneven plaza outside a federal courthouse in Syracuse, New York, in 2003. The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that sovereign immunity barred the claim because an independent contractor was responsible for maintaining the plaza. The court denied the motion without prejudice, finding that while the contractor handled maintenance, it was unclear whether the government retained any responsibility for the plaza's condition, thus not establishing a lack of subject matter jurisdiction at this stage.

torts & liabilityprocedurefederal power

In Sutton v. Tompkins County, parents sued Tompkins County DSS and caseworkers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law after DSS obtained temporary custody of their 16-year-old daughter and placed her in foster care based on her allegations of long-term sexual abuse by her father. The court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment, dismissing the federal claim on the merits and the state claims without prejudice. The decision rested on findings that the caseworker's investigation produced a good-faith belief that abuse had occurred, that Family Court orders authorizing removal were supported by the evidence and provided due process, and that the parents failed to show any constitutional violation from the temporary custody transfer. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims.

civil rightsfamily law

In this patent infringement case, plaintiff Pass & Seymour sued defendant Hubbell, alleging that Hubbell's competing quick-connect electrical wiring device infringed P&S's U.S. Patent No. 7,189,110 covering its PLUG-TAIL product. P&S moved for a preliminary injunction to halt Hubbell's sales during the litigation, while Hubbell cross-moved for a stay pending reexamination of the patent by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. The court denied the preliminary injunction, finding serious questions regarding the patent's validity due to obviousness and that other factors, including lack of irreparable harm to P&S, weighed against relief. It granted the stay to allow the PTO to complete its reexamination, which could inform or resolve validity issues and conserve litigation resources.

business & regulatoryprocedure