The case concerns defendant McGee's Rule 35 motion seeking reduction of concurrent two-year sentences imposed on three valid counts of selective service violations after an appellate court vacated an order denying relief and remanded due to possible taint from an invalid fourth count. The district court declined to reduce the sentences, holding that the circumstances differed from North Carolina v. Pearce because there had been no successful appeal, retrial, sentence increase, or evidence of vindictiveness. The court explained that Congress had set equal maximum penalties for each count, that character letters and reputation did not outweigh the convictions, and that the original sentences were lenient relative to statutory limits; it also corrected perceived inaccuracies in the appellate opinion regarding the seriousness of the counts and a Selective Service manual.
The case concerned whether PepsiCo and W.R. Grace had formed a binding contract on May 8, 1969, for PepsiCo to purchase Grace's 53% interest in Miller Brewing Company, and whether Grace or Philip Morris had violated federal securities laws by any manipulative or deceptive conduct in connection with that transaction. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It held that the parties had reached only an agreement in principle, not an enforceable contract, because multiple contemporaneous documents—including a joint press release, a confirmatory letter signed by both sides, and PepsiCo's SEC prospectus supplements—explicitly stated that the deal remained subject to negotiation and execution of a definitive purchase agreement and created no legal obligation until that occurred. The court also found no evidence that Philip Morris had conspired with Grace or that any deceptive device had been used.
This case involved consolidated challenges by citizen groups, a conservation organization, and a village to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' issuance of a permit allowing New York State to place fill in the Hudson River for a proposed six-lane expressway. The plaintiffs argued that the project included dikes and causeways requiring prior approval from Congress and the Secretary of Transportation under the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899, which the Corps had not obtained. The court held that the Corps exceeded its statutory authority by issuing the permit without those approvals, as the project plans and permit explicitly referenced dikes and involved causeways over navigable waters. The decision rested on interpretation of 33 U.S.C. §§ 401 and 403, along with subsequent statutes transferring oversight responsibilities, and review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
The case concerned the U.S. government's effort under 19 U.S.C. § 1305 to forfeit and confiscate an imported Swedish film titled "I Am Curious—Yellow" on grounds of obscenity. Claimant Grove Press moved for summary judgment, contending that the statute was unconstitutional on its face and as applied, and that the film could not be deemed obscene as a matter of law. The court rejected these arguments, holding that § 1305 satisfies the procedural safeguards required by Freedman v. Maryland and related cases, including provisions for prompt judicial review, and that the absence of a pre-seizure adversary hearing or specific statutory time limits did not render the statute unconstitutional.
This case concerns the Securities and Exchange Commission's allegations that the corporate defendants S & P National Corp., Smith-Palmer, and Southwest operated as unregistered investment companies in violation of the Investment Company Act of 1940, with undisclosed control and affiliations by individual defendants Milton and Still that rendered required filings under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 materially false. After the court appointed a trustee who registered the companies and substantially increased their assets through asset sales, the trustee proposed a Plan of Settlement and Reorganization to resolve all claims, including a potential lawsuit against the individuals and affiliates for voidable transactions. The court approved the Plan after notice and hearing, concluding that its financial provisions represent an optimum result for all parties by subordinating certain insider claims and interests to public shareholders while avoiding the uncertainties, costs, and defenses such as statutes of limitations that would arise in further litigation. The decision also found that the Commission's enforcement objectives had been achieved through prior consent judgments.
The case involved a contract dispute in which a New York corporation sued a Swiss corporation for payment under an agreement appointing the plaintiff as the defendant's correspondent to supply vessels, with the defendant entitled to a 5% commission. After the plaintiff served process by mail under New York CPLR 302(a)(1) and 313, the defendant appeared, moved to dismiss or stay for arbitration, and later waived arbitration by stipulation, but failed to answer by the extended deadline. The court held a hearing on the plaintiff's motion for default judgment and the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. It concluded that the defendant had sufficient New York business contacts through contract negotiations and performance to satisfy long-arm jurisdiction, that service complied with federal rules and Swiss law, and that the defendant was in default without an adequate showing of excusable neglect or merits. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss and granted the default judgment.