Marshall Allen Neill

The case involves a dispute over rights to the surface and groundwater of No Name Creek, a small waterway lying entirely within the Colville Indian Reservation. The Colville Confederated Tribes sued non-Indian defendants Walton to enjoin their use of the water, asserting superior reserved rights for irrigation and trout spawning; Waltons claimed rights both as successors to original Indian allottees and under a state-issued permit, while the State of Washington intervened to assert its own regulatory authority. The court consolidated the actions and stated it must determine the relative priorities among the Tribe, Waltons, and the State, as well as which entity holds power to allocate and control the water. The reasoning rests on the creek's location inside reservation boundaries established by executive order, the hydraulic connection between surface and ground waters, historical allotment and irrigation patterns, and the reserved-rights doctrine tied to the purpose of the reservation.

federal powerpropertyenvironment

This case involves a farmworker challenging alleged practices by Immigration and Naturalization Service officers in the Yakima Valley, including nighttime flashlight searches of his tent and cabin residences without warrants or consent, as well as an officer reaching inside a door. The plaintiff claimed these actions formed a pattern of unlawful interrogation, harassment, and searches violating the Fourth Amendment. The court denied the defendants' motion for summary judgment, holding that the alleged intrusions into private homes differed from consent-based encounters in prior precedent and could not qualify as plain-view searches due to the use of flashlights in darkness. It found genuine issues of material fact regarding the officers' conduct that made summary judgment inappropriate.

immigrationcivil rightsprocedure

The case is a Farm Home Administration mortgage foreclosure action brought by the United States against the defendant borrowers. The defendants opposed foreclosure on the ground that the government had not complied with statutory and regulatory requirements for notifying them of possible moratorium relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1475 and 7 C.F.R. 1861.10. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, holding that the regulation requires the County Supervisor to give borrowers written notice of moratorium availability when payments are missed and that acceleration of the loan after default does not remove the loan from the statute's protection. The court further concluded that publication of the regulation in the Federal Register does not satisfy the regulation's specific notice requirement.

federal powerpropertybusiness & regulatory

This case involves the United States seeking to foreclose on a Farm Home Administration loan made to the defendant. The court held that the FmHA must comply with regulations requiring notice to delinquent borrowers about available moratorium relief, along with related hearing and appeal procedures, before foreclosure can proceed, and it stayed the action pending such compliance. The court reasoned that the regulations apply to the loan despite the acceleration occurring before their effective date, that a prior foreclosure action did not bar the defense, and that eligibility for relief is a factual matter for the agency to determine initially.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

Jerry Lewis, an inmate at the Washington State Penitentiary, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, claiming that his guilty pleas to robbery and first-degree murder were invalid because he was mentally incompetent to waive his constitutional rights due to severe brain damage from a police shooting. The court noted that Lewis had been found competent to stand trial after initial incompetency proceedings but that the trial court accepted his pleas eight days later with only brief questioning and without a separate hearing on his capacity to make a reasoned choice regarding the plea. Drawing on Ninth Circuit precedents such as Sieling v. Eyman and de Kaplany v. Enomoto, the court explained that the standard for competency to plead guilty is higher than for standing trial and requires an inquiry into whether mental illness substantially impaired the defendant's ability to understand the consequences and choose among alternatives. The court therefore ordered that the writ would be granted unless the state obtained a trial court review, within 60 days, of Lewis's competency to enter the guilty pleas at the time they were made.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved the federal government's exercise of eminent domain to acquire a clearance easement over 104.09 acres of the defendants' land near Fairchild Air Force Base, restricting its use to agricultural purposes and allegedly rendering a portion previously used for mining unusable. The defendants argued that the affected land should be considered part of their larger 450-acre holding for purposes of determining compensation, while the government contended the parcels formed a unified tract based on potential industrial use. The court held that the northwest quarter of Section 34, which was zoned and used for mining, constituted a separate parcel from the defendants' other lands zoned and used for agriculture, with no unity of use connecting them despite proximity. It rejected reliance on highest and best use for determining tract unity, instead applying the test of actual current use and zoning to conclude the parcels were legally distinct.

propertyfederal power

In Tillay v. Idaho Power Co., plaintiffs sued Idaho Power Company for negligence after a 1974 plane crash near La Grande, Oregon, that killed all aboard when the aircraft struck the company's unmarked power lines, invoking federal diversity jurisdiction. The defendant, a Maine corporation headquartered in Idaho and unlicensed in Washington, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or, alternatively, to transfer venue to Oregon where a related case from the same crash was pending. The court determined it lacked in personam jurisdiction because the claim did not arise from the defendant's contacts with Washington under the state's long-arm statute and the contacts were not substantial enough to support general jurisdiction under the doing-business doctrine. Nevertheless, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) and Goldlawr v. Heiman, the court denied dismissal and transferred the action to the District of Oregon to serve the interests of justice, given the defendant's notice of the suit and the opportunity for consolidation.

procedure

The EEOC sued defendant under Title VII alleging racial discrimination against Indians and other minorities in hiring, advancement, overtime, harassment, layoffs, and discharges, seeking injunctive relief and damages. Defendant moved to dismiss the class claims for failure to comply with Rule 23, for partial summary judgment limiting the complaint to the scope of the original EEOC charge, and for partial summary judgment on the untimeliness of a second charge filed by the charging party. The court denied all motions, holding that the EEOC as a government agency need not satisfy Rule 23 when seeking class-wide relief, that the complaint's allegations were properly within the scope of the EEOC's investigation and conciliation efforts, and that the second charge was reasonably related to the timely first charge under the continuing violation doctrine and Ninth Circuit precedent. The decision rested on distinctions between private and government suits under Title VII and the principle that judicial complaints may include discrimination like or reasonably related to the original charges.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved a dispute over whether the State of Washington could enforce its fishing license requirements against non-Indians fishing on the Colville Indian Reservation. The tribes sought a declaratory judgment and injunction against state regulation, claiming exclusive tribal authority. The court ruled that the state lacked jurisdiction to regulate fishing on the reservation by either Indians or non-Indians. This decision was based on federal preemption through treaties, executive orders establishing the reservation, and statutes like Public Law 280, which reserve regulatory authority to the tribes without state interference. The court denied injunctive relief due to lack of evidence of ongoing threats by the state.

federal powercivil rights

The case involves a mechanical subcontractor suing an architectural firm for damages over $30,000 after the architect approved a substitution of grooved piping in a university coliseum project but later required replacement with welded pipe. There was no privity of contract between the parties, so the court rejected contract-based claims including third-party beneficiary and implied warranty theories. However, the court allowed the tort claim for negligence to proceed, finding that the absence of privity does not bar such a claim if a duty can be shown and that material factual issues existed for trial under emerging case law from other jurisdictions. The court denied the architect's motion for summary judgment but granted in part the subcontractor's protective order motions, limiting discovery scope and deferring one deposition. Washington law applied in this diversity action.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a challenge by a group of Washington farmland owners to the Bonneville Power Administration's decision to route a 500-kilovolt transmission line across their property as part of a larger energy redistribution project from dams on the Lower Snake River. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction under NEPA, arguing that the agency's environmental impact statement was inadequate because it lacked a sufficient cost-benefit analysis, failed to consult properly with other agencies, omitted material facts about future expansions and costs, and did not adequately address alternatives or historic preservation requirements. The court focused on the likelihood of success on the merits as the decisive factor for the injunction motion and found that the EIS adequately discussed environmental impacts, alternatives, and related considerations under NEPA's requirements, with any alleged omissions being either speculative or immaterial. Accordingly, the court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that the agency's choice of route was not arbitrary or capricious and that procedural compliance was sufficient.

environmentprocedure

The case involved a habeas corpus petition by a parolee whose parole was revoked after he was acquitted in a criminal trial on new charges of abduction and assault with intent to rape. The petitioner had been convicted of rape in 1959, paroled in 1970, and arrested in 1971; he was acquitted at a bench trial based on alibi evidence creating reasonable doubt, but the Parole Board later found by a preponderance of the evidence that he had committed the acts and revoked his parole. The court granted the writ, ruling that the acquittal collaterally estopped the Board from relitigating the ultimate fact of guilt under principles of the Double Jeopardy Clause as interpreted in Ashe v. Swenson, applied through the Fourteenth Amendment, because the parole revocation imposed a punitive sanction based on the same conduct. The decision emphasized that due process and collateral estoppel prevent inconsistent findings when the state accedes to a criminal prosecution on identical facts.

criminal lawprocedure

In this FELA case, a railroad employee sued his employer for injuries from a hoist accident during car maintenance, claiming the employer’s violation of OSHA inspection rules for hoists meant contributory negligence could not reduce any damages. The plaintiff moved for summary judgment on liability, arguing the OSHA breach triggered the bar on damage reduction under 45 U.S.C. § 53. The court denied the motion, holding that the comparative-negligence proviso in § 53 applies only to violations of the Safety Appliance Act or Boiler Inspection Act, not OSHA regulations, and that OSHA itself expressly does not enlarge or diminish rights under FELA. Because the extent of the employee’s contributory negligence remained a disputed factual issue, summary judgment was inappropriate.

labor & employmentfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

The case is a diversity action by a landlord against its tenant for $100,000 in damages after a fire of unknown origin destroyed the leased potato warehouse and packing shed in Washington. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment by interpreting the lease provisions on indemnity (paragraphs 6 and 7) and repair duties (paragraph 4), applying Washington law. It reasoned that the indemnity clauses addressed only third-party claims arising from the premises or the tenant's operations, not inter-party repair obligations, and examined whether the tenant's covenant to maintain and return the premises in good condition created an unqualified duty to rebuild after non-negligent fire damage, citing precedents like Anderson v. Ferguson that require specific ongoing maintenance obligations for such a duty to arise.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a federal parolee serving a sentence for bank robbery who, after state convictions for robbery and murder, challenged a 1973 parole violation warrant and detainer filed by the U.S. Board of Parole at the state prison. The petitioner sought to quash the warrant because the Board had not provided a revocation hearing for over nineteen months, relying on Morrissey v. Brewer due process principles. The court decided to quash the detainer and remove the unexecuted warrant from the file while denying the Board's motions for summary judgment and a stay. The core reasoning was that the detainer caused the petitioner uncontroverted grievous losses, including denial of concurrent sentencing and prejudice to his defense, thereby meeting the custody requirement and requiring a timely revocation hearing under precedents like Peele v. Sigler.

criminal lawprocedure

In this habeas corpus case, a federal parolee serving a state sentence challenged a U.S. Board of Parole warrant and detainer for alleged parole violations, arguing that the lack of a prompt revocation hearing violated due process under Morrissey v. Brewer. The court held that the filing of the detainer itself triggered the right to a timely revocation hearing because it caused a grievous loss of liberty interests, such as ineligibility for rehabilitative programs and potential distortion of state parole decisions. It rejected the view that the right arises only upon execution of the warrant and ordered the respondents to provide a hearing within fifteen days or face quashing of the warrant and detainer. The ruling was based on the principle that due process protections apply once a detainer imposes substantial restrictions on the prisoner.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves the federal government's eminent domain action to acquire additional land from respondents for relocating a railroad and state highway as part of the Lower Granite Dam project on the Snake River, after earlier acquisitions in 1964 and 1966. The government filed a motion in limine to bar evidence of any project-related value enhancement in determining just compensation, citing United States v. Miller and arguing the relocation was always within the project's scope. Respondents countered that the shift in relocation plans away from the shoreline constituted a change creating a 'second taking,' and that government representations during prior negotiations estopped the denial of enhanced value. The court denied the motion, reasoning that the lands were not demonstrably within the project's original scope due to later alterations driven by state and local interests, and that reliance on statements by the Assistant U.S. Attorney during the 1966 settlement was reasonable, satisfying estoppel elements. The decision allows the jury to consider project-enhanced value in compensation.

propertyfederal powerprocedure

This case concerns an employee's petition to enforce an arbitration award under a collective bargaining agreement after she was laid off in a workforce reduction. The arbitrator rejected her seniority-based grievance but sustained her claim that a transfer out of classification violated the contract, over the employer's objection that only the seniority issue had been submitted to arbitration. The court reviewed precedents from the Steelworkers trilogy to determine whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority by deciding the scope of arbitrability. It noted that the employer's post-hearing brief effectively submitted the question of arbitrability to the arbitrator for decision under the agreement's terms, limiting judicial review to whether the arbitrator's interpretation was plausible.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case concerned whether an adopted child could inherit by intestate succession from her natural grandparents under Washington law. The trial court and Court of Appeals held that the granddaughter remained an heir, but the Supreme Court reversed, ruling that she could not inherit from her natural grandparents. The majority reasoned that RCW 11.04.085, which provides that an adopted child shall not be considered an heir of his natural parents, extends to bar inheritance from natural grandparents as well, relying on the precedent in In re Estate of Wiltermood. The court interpreted the descent and distribution statutes (RCW 11.04.015) in light of this bar, concluding that the adoption severed the lineal heirship rights from the natural grandparents' estates.

family lawproperty

The case involved a challenge by an association of commercial fishermen using sports angling gear to a Washington statute (RCW 75.12.650) that banned such gear for commercial salmon fishing. The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. The court reasoned that the law was not a valid exercise of police power because it lacked a real or substantial relation to the Department of Fisheries' conservation and management objectives for salmon stocks, and it improperly discriminated within the class of commercial licensees. The opinion reviewed the state's comprehensive regulatory scheme using tools of time, area, and gear restrictions but found no justification in the record for mandating conversion from sports gear to fixed gear.

environmentbusiness & regulatory