Raymond James Pettine

The case involved the United States government's antitrust lawsuit against Delta Dental of Rhode Island, challenging Delta's 'Prudent Buyer' or most-favored-nation clause in its contracts with participating dentists as an unreasonable restraint of trade under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Delta moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that the clause was a unilateral policy that did not involve the requisite concerted action and that the complaint failed to state a claim. The court accepted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation in full, denying the motion after applying de novo review and the rule-of-reason analysis. The core reasoning was that the contracts between Delta and its dentists satisfied the concerted-action element of Section 1, and the complaint sufficiently alleged anticompetitive effects that could outweigh any legitimate business justifications, making dismissal inappropriate at this stage.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case concerned licensed alcohol retailers who sued Rhode Island officials over state laws prohibiting the advertisement of liquor prices, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. After the Supreme Court held that the advertising ban abridged protected speech and was not saved by the Twenty-first Amendment, plaintiffs moved for attorneys' fees and costs under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. The district court denied the motion, ruling that it was filed beyond the fourteen-day deadline set by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B), that plaintiffs had not shown excusable neglect warranting an extension under Rule 6(b), and that the fees constituted special damages that should have been specifically pleaded under Rule 9(g).

free speechprocedurecivil rights

The case involved defendant James Lewis, who was indicted under the Child Support Recovery Act (CSRA), 18 U.S.C. § 228, for willfully failing to pay a past-due child support obligation where the child resided in a different state from the defendant. Lewis moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the CSRA exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause and violated the Tenth Amendment by intruding on state sovereignty in domestic relations matters. The court denied the motion, concluding that the CSRA was a valid exercise of Commerce Clause power because it addressed economic activity with an interstate nexus. The court further held that the statute did not encroach on state authority and that neither the domestic relations exception nor abstention doctrines barred federal jurisdiction.

criminal lawfederal powerfamily law

The case was an appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's entry of a default judgment against attorney Ina P. Schiff in an adversary proceeding where the State of Rhode Island sought to recover over $450,000 in fees and costs paid in connection with a prior civil lawsuit. Schiff had failed to file a timely answer after her motion for a more definite statement was denied, instead pursuing an interlocutory appeal, leading the Bankruptcy Court to grant default on the State's motion. The district court remanded the matter, ruling that the Bankruptcy Court's order lacked any analysis of the relevant factors for setting aside a default—such as whether the default was willful, whether the plaintiff was prejudiced, and whether Schiff had a meritorious defense—and thus it was impossible to determine if the court had abused its discretion under the applicable rules.

procedure

In this personal injury case, plaintiffs Patricia and Richard Piester sued IBM alleging that Mrs. Piester developed carpal tunnel syndrome from using an IBM computer keyboard at work, claiming strict products liability and negligence based on defective design and failure to warn. After a jury verdict for IBM, the plaintiffs moved for a mistrial and new trial, arguing judicial bias and erroneous rulings. The court denied the mistrial and recusal request, finding no evidence of animus or partiality under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), but granted a new trial because certain evidentiary rulings were inconsistent and prejudicial—specifically, excluding key expert testimony for the plaintiffs while allowing similar undisclosed testimony for IBM on the issue of causation. The core reasoning was that these errors, viewed in hindsight across the full trial, required a retrial in the interest of justice.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involves Charter International Oil Company seeking reimbursement for environmental cleanup costs from the United States and Texaco Defendants for a contaminated site in Rhode Island, based partly on state hazardous waste laws. The defendants moved to dismiss those state law claims, citing sovereign immunity for the federal government, lack of retroactive application of the statutes, and absence of a private right of action. The court determined that the United States had waived sovereign immunity under federal law and that the state statutes could apply retroactively to the contamination, thus denying the motion to dismiss on those bases while reserving judgment on the private right of action issue.

environmentpropertyfederal power

In Russo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., plaintiff Ronald Russo sued Baxter for misappropriation of trade secrets, intentional interference with contractual relations, and negligence, claiming that Baxter publicly disclosed his design for a closed tracheal suction device at a 1991 medical convention, which prevented him from obtaining foreign patents. The dispute followed a prior Rhode Island state court lawsuit by Russo against Superior Healthcare (Baxter's contracting partner) over ownership and royalties for the same device, which settled with Russo signing a general release of Superior and its agents or representatives in exchange for $400,000; Baxter, which had not participated in the settlement, moved for summary judgment arguing that the release and res judicata barred the federal claims. The court denied the motion, finding that the term "representative" in the release was ambiguous as applied to Baxter's independent contractual relationship with Superior, that extrinsic evidence raised genuine factual issues about the parties' intent not to release Baxter and the lack of consideration from Baxter, and that these disputes precluded summary judgment under Rhode Island law.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liabilityhealthcare

This case involves a police officer's summary suspension by the Warwick Police Department chief for allegedly withholding information from state police during a murder investigation, leading to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of procedural and substantive due process, along with other discrimination and contract claims. The court addressed the defendants' request for qualified immunity on the due process claims. It denied qualified immunity to Chief Blanchard on the procedural due process claim, reasoning that the clear requirements of Rhode Island's Officers’ Bill of Rights mandated a prompt hearing within fourteen days, which was not provided despite the plaintiff's request, and counsel's advice could not override this unambiguous law. The court granted qualified immunity to Chief Blanchard on the substantive due process claim, finding his actions were not egregious or conscience-shocking given that pay and benefits continued and the plaintiff was reinstated before the investigation concluded. It also granted qualified immunity to Mayor Chafee on both claims due to his lack of involvement in the suspension.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved probationers sentenced before July 1, 1994, who challenged Rhode Island Department of Corrections Regulation 10.07.03 imposing a $15 monthly supervision fee on them as violating the Ex Post Facto Clause of the U.S. and Rhode Island Constitutions, substantive and procedural due process, and exceeding the authority of R.I. Gen. Laws § 42-56-38. The court granted plaintiffs summary judgment on the ex post facto and statutory authority claims, granted defendants summary judgment on substantive due process, granted qualified immunity to the individual defendant, and left the procedural due process claim unresolved. The core reasoning was that applying the fee retroactively to pre-existing probation sentences increased the punishment attached to the original offense in violation of ex post facto principles and that the enabling statute did not authorize such retrospective application.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

This case involves an Asian-American woman employed as a Public Health Nutritionist who alleged employment discrimination and retaliation based on race, color, and national origin under Title VII, state law, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, including claims related to her 1989 termination and post-reinstatement harassment. The defendants moved to dismiss the claims tied to the 1989 termination, arguing that a prior stipulated arbitration award confirmed by state court barred them under res judicata. The court denied the motion to dismiss, treating the prior resolution as a binding arbitration award rather than a settlement. Under Rhode Island res judicata principles and Supreme Court precedents such as Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., arbitration awards from collective bargaining do not preclude later federal civil rights claims, allowing the plaintiff to proceed even if based solely on the 1989 events.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In this personal injury case, plaintiff Loi Nguyen sued Lewis/Boyle, the lessor of a forklift, and its manufacturer after a workplace accident caused by a co-worker's negligent operation of the equipment. Lewis/Boyle filed a third-party claim seeking contractual indemnification from Boliden, the lessee, under an indemnity clause in the equipment lease covering liability arising from the equipment's use. The court granted Lewis/Boyle's motion for summary judgment on the vicarious liability claim (Count I), holding that the lease clause unambiguously required Boliden to indemnify for that form of liability. The court denied summary judgment on the direct negligence and product liability claims (Counts II and V), finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding the parties' intended scope of the indemnity clause that required further factual development.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a public school art teacher who videotaped alleged health and safety violations at her school during non-working hours and sought to release the tapes, after which school officials ordered her to cease videotaping and prohibited release without permission. The teacher filed a § 1983 suit claiming a violation of her First Amendment rights. The court held that the school could not interfere with the release of videotapes made during non-school, non-working hours but could require the teacher to follow the same access application process as the general public for entering the building at restricted times. The decision rested on precedents protecting public employees' speech on matters of public concern, balanced against the school's interest in efficient operations and building access control.

free speechlabor & employmentenvironmentcivil rights

This case involves an Asian-American female employee of the Rhode Island Department of Elderly Affairs who alleged employment discrimination based on race, color, and national origin, claiming violations of federal and state constitutional and statutory rights by the department and its officials. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part. It applied the standard that dismissal is inappropriate unless no set of facts could support the claims, treated the right-to-sue letter requirement under Title VII as a non-jurisdictional condition precedent subject to equitable modification, and found insufficient grounds for such modification here while addressing other claims such as those under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1981.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involved debtor Edouard Gadoury’s appeal from bankruptcy court orders concerning his liability under 26 U.S.C. § 6672 for unpaid employee withholding taxes assessed by the IRS against him as a responsible person for two companies in 1988. After the IRS seized assets from Gadoury, he filed for bankruptcy and sought a determination of his tax liability and a refund; the bankruptcy court initially granted relief by default but later vacated that order and, after an evidentiary hearing, ruled in favor of the United States on the merits. The district court, adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, denied the appeal. The core reasoning was that the bankruptcy court’s findings—that Gadoury was a responsible person who willfully failed to pay the taxes—were supported by the joint pretrial order, his own testimony, and other evidence and were not clearly erroneous.

taxesprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a plaintiff suing the Narragansett Tribe and other defendants for breach of contract over unpaid fees for legislative lobbying services related to achieving gaming qualifications. The Tribe moved to dismiss on grounds of sovereign immunity from suit. The court granted the motion to dismiss, reasoning that federally recognized tribes like the Narragansett possess sovereign immunity that cannot be impliedly waived by commercial activity or contracts and requires an unequivocal expression of relinquishment, which was absent here even in the context of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.

federal powerprocedure

This case is a § 1983 action in which an art teacher and union member at Johnston High School alleged that school officials violated her First Amendment rights by ordering her to stop videotaping health and safety code violations at the school and to refrain from releasing the recordings without permission. The plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the defendants from barring her access to the property for documentation purposes or interfering with the release of the videotapes. The court granted the TRO and denied the defendants' motion to stay proceedings or dismiss the case under the collective bargaining agreement and Federal Arbitration Act. It reasoned that the FAA does not apply to the agreement because it is not a maritime transaction or one involving commerce, that First Amendment claims in a § 1983 action are not appropriate for arbitration due to the tension between collective bargaining and individual rights, and that the plaintiff's speech interests in publicizing safety concerns were implicated. The court distinguished the facts from a prior case involving commercial photography access and found that the balance favored allowing the plaintiff's activities.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

This case is a breach of contract dispute arising from the 1992 sale of a cosmetics import and distribution business, in which the buyers stopped making required monthly payments under an employment agreement and the sellers sought a permanent injunction barring continued use of the trade name, trademarks, and related rights. After the defendants removed the action from state court to federal court on diversity grounds, the plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the amount in controversy was only $28,500 and therefore fell below the $50,000 jurisdictional threshold. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that diversity jurisdiction existed. It reasoned that, in actions seeking injunctive relief, the amount in controversy may be measured from the defendant's viewpoint, and an injunction shutting down the ongoing business would place well over $50,000 at stake.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a copyright infringement lawsuit filed by Charles Garnier, Paris against Andin International, Inc. over identical copies of a swirled hoop earring design that Garnier had created and sold without copyright notice. After the district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the grounds that Garnier had forfeited its copyright by omitting notice and failing to cure the omission, and the First Circuit affirmed, the defendants moved for attorneys' fees under 17 U.S.C. § 505 as the prevailing party. The court denied the motion, exercising its discretion under the Supreme Court's Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc. decision, which treats prevailing plaintiffs and defendants alike and directs consideration of factors such as frivolousness, motivation, objective reasonableness, and deterrence. The court found that the plaintiff had prosecuted the case in good faith, that it involved complex legal questions regarding copyright notice and cure, and that these circumstances did not warrant an award of fees.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, plaintiff Joseph Wilkicki, a police lieutenant, sued the Town of Charlestown and its police chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he was discharged in retaliation for filing complaints against the chief and exercising other First Amendment rights. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants after determining that Wilkicki had validly waived his First Amendment rights in a prior settlement agreement that resolved earlier departmental complaints and prohibited him from making further public accusations without following internal procedures. The waiver was found enforceable because it was knowing, voluntary, and narrowly tailored to the dispute at hand, leaving no remaining constitutional basis for the § 1983 claim. The court also rejected arguments that the waiver violated public policy or was limited to a single incident.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

The case concerned a declaratory judgment action under a 1991 limited partnership agreement for acquiring and developing Rhode Island property, following a disputed buy-sell bidding process in which each side claimed ownership of the other's interest. After one plaintiff merged a Rhode Island corporation into a New York corporation (with the merger concededly motivated in part by creating diversity), the plaintiffs sued in federal court alleging diversity jurisdiction. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and filed a counterclaim. The court held that the merger was an improper attempt to manufacture diversity jurisdiction in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1359 and dismissed both the claim and counterclaim, rejecting arguments that the merger was permissible or that supplemental jurisdiction could apply.

procedurebusiness & regulatory