The case involved a former employee of Prudential Insurance who sued the company after it refused to issue a required service letter detailing his employment and reason for leaving, as mandated by Missouri statute, and after an alleged agreement among Prudential and two other insurers not to hire each other's former employees for two years, which prevented him from finding work and caused damages. The Missouri courts rejected constitutional challenges to the statute under the Fourteenth Amendment and allowed recovery on both claims, leading to a judgment for the plaintiff that was affirmed on appeal. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld this outcome, reasoning that the statute validly imposed a duty on corporations to provide such letters without violating due process or equal protection, applied equally to all corporations doing business in the state, and that the employment agreement amounted to an unlawful monopoly contrary to state public policy, which the state could prohibit without conflicting with federal constitutional protections.
This case challenged the constitutionality under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of Oklahoma's Service Letter Law, which requires public service corporations to issue departing employees a letter stating the nature of their service and reason for discharge or quitting. Plaintiff Daniel Perry, a former railway switchman, sued after his employer provided a false service letter that prevented him from obtaining new work, resulting in a jury verdict and state supreme court affirmance in his favor. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the statute, finding it a permissible regulation to promote truthful disclosures, with its formatting mandates designed to prevent fraud and its limited application to public service corporations not constituting arbitrary classification.
labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorycivil rights
The case concerned whether New York’s expanded Workmen’s Compensation Law could constitutionally impose liability on an employer of more than four workers in its subway newsstand and vending business for injuries to a salesman who was struck by a train while emptying water from his booth onto the tracks. The Supreme Court affirmed the compensation award, holding that the 1918 amendment extending coverage to all employments with four or more regular workers (except farm labor and domestic service) satisfied the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court’s core reasoning was that the statute rationally charged industry with the pecuniary losses of accidental injuries arising in the course of employment when the business involved real hazards, and that the numerical threshold created a permissible classification without requiring every individual role to itself be inherently dangerous.
The case concerned whether proceeds from a guardian's sale of subscription rights to new shares of Hartford Fire Insurance Company stock, held for a minor ward, constituted taxable income under the Revenue Act of 1919 and the Sixteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's judgment that only the realized profit above the cost basis was taxable income, not the full amount received, while no tax applied to retained shares until sold. The core reasoning held that the rights distribution was an opportunity to contribute additional capital rather than a division of surplus, and the gain was correctly computed by adding the subscription price to the stock's estate-tax value at acquisition and averaging costs across old and new shares, consistent with statutory definitions and Treasury regulations distinguishing capital from income.
Texas Co., a Texas corporation, sued Georgia state officials to enjoin enforcement of state laws requiring inspection of petroleum products like kerosene and gasoline brought into Georgia from other states, along with associated fees that exceeded inspection costs. The company argued the fees violated due process under the state and federal constitutions, uniformity requirements in the state constitution, and the federal commerce clause by burdening interstate commerce. The district court granted a limited injunction for products sold in unbroken original packages but denied it for goods stored or sold after breaking packages. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the inspection system and graduated fees applied only after interstate transportation ended, constituted a valid excise classification for health and safety reasons rather than an unconstitutional tax, and did not violate uniformity or due process standards.
The case involved an Illinois corporation seeking to enjoin a New Jersey resident from pursuing a pending damages action in state court for conversion of property, claiming that service of process on the Secretary of State was invalid and violated due process because the company had not transacted business in the state and the service did not qualify as proper notice. The district court and circuit court of appeals denied the injunction under the federal anti-injunction statute, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that Judicial Code § 265 prohibits federal courts from staying proceedings in pending state court actions, even when constitutional claims like due process are raised, distinguishing this from cases involving enforcement of final judgments. The proper avenues for challenging jurisdiction are in the state court or through direct review by the Supreme Court after final judgment.
