
Judge, Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit · Born 1950 · Springfield, MO
State Ex Rel. Taylor v. Moore
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2004-06-22 · cited 12×
In this case, petitioner Andre Taylor sought a writ of habeas corpus after pleading guilty to multiple drug trafficking counts and being sentenced to imprisonment with placement in a Long Term Drug Program (LTDP) under section 217.362, based on advice that he would serve only nine to eighteen months. The department of corrections later determined he was ineligible due to prior convictions for dangerous felonies, which neither the trial court nor his counsel had verified before sentencing as required by statute. Although Taylor did not file a timely Rule 24.035 motion, the court found cause for the procedural default because he was misled about eligibility and did not learn of the error until after the filing period, along with prejudice because he would not have accepted the plea if fully informed. The court vacated the sentences as unlawful, allowing Taylor to withdraw his guilty plea while remanding him to the department of corrections.
criminal lawprocedure
Elrod v. Treasurer of Missouri as Custodian of the Second Injury Fund
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2004-06-08 · cited 25×
This case involved Lana C. Elrod's claim for workers' compensation benefits from Missouri's Second Injury Fund after a 1995 knee injury at work, which she argued combined with preexisting conditions like ankle injuries, obesity, and diabetes to cause greater disability. The Labor and Industrial Relations Commission awarded her permanent-partial disability benefits from the Fund but denied permanent-total disability. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that the claim against the Fund was timely under section 287.430 because it was filed within one year of an amended claim against the employer, and that sufficient evidence supported the partial disability finding while Elrod failed to prove total disability preventing any reasonable employment. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of the limitations period applying to any timely claim and factual review deferring to the Commission's credibility determinations on medical evidence.
labor & employmentprocedure
Werremeyer v. KC Auto Salvage Co., Inc.
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2004-05-25 · cited 22×
The case involved Brent and Tonya Werremeyer who bought a used car from K.C. Auto Salvage Co. after the seller represented that the vehicle had not been rebuilt or wrecked and had clean title, despite a scratched vehicle identification number; the buyers later learned the car was assembled from a stolen vehicle and a wrecked one. They sued for common-law fraud and violation of a statute barring sale of vehicles with altered identification numbers, obtaining a jury verdict of $9,000 in compensatory damages and $20,000 in punitive damages. The trial court denied prejudgment interest, but on appeal the court affirmed liability and the punitive award, ruling that the evidence supported fraud, the statute imposes strict liability without a knowledge element, and the total judgment exceeded the buyers' settlement offer. The court reversed on prejudgment interest, holding that the governing statute allows interest on the entire judgment, including punitive damages, when a proper settlement offer is rejected.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Wallingford v. State
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2004-04-27 · cited 12×
John Wallingford filed a pro se motion for post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15 after his felony convictions were affirmed on appeal, but omitted his signature on the motion within the 90-day filing deadline, although he signed an accompanying in forma pauperis affidavit. The circuit court dismissed the motion for lack of jurisdiction, treating the missing signature as rendering it a nullity. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that Rule 55.03(a) applies to such motions and allows a party to promptly correct an omitted signature after it is called to their attention, whether the correction occurs within or after the original 90-day period. Wallingford had corrected the omission once it was discovered by counsel, satisfying the rule as interpreted in Tooley v. State. The case was remanded for further proceedings.
criminal lawprocedure
State v. Pond
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2004-04-13 · cited 54×
In State v. Pond, the defendant was charged with first-degree statutory sodomy and convicted after the trial court declined to instruct the jury on the lesser-included offense of first-degree child molestation. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the lesser-included instruction was required because the evidence, including inconsistencies in the victim's testimony about whether penetration occurred, provided a basis for the jury to acquit on sodomy (which requires proof of penetration) while convicting on molestation (which requires only sexual contact). The court clarified that section 556.046.2 does not demand affirmative evidence from the defense to support a lesser-included instruction and overruled prior cases imposing such a requirement. It also upheld the trial court's finding that Pond qualified as a prior offender based on his earlier unconditional guilty plea.
criminal lawprocedure
State Ex Rel. BJC Health System v. Neill
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-12-23 · cited 14×
This case concerns the proper venue for lawsuits against multiple nonprofit corporations under Missouri law. The Missouri Supreme Court held that when several nonprofit corporations are sued together and share common or joint liability, venue is proper in any location where it would be proper for at least one of them, such as the county of its principal place of business. The court reasoned that the venue statute for nonprofits, section 355.176.4, applies to multiple corporations by interpreting the singular to include the plural, and followed precedents allowing venue based on one defendant's location in cases of joint liability. This resolved disputes over whether suits against BJC Health System and affiliates could proceed in St. Louis City despite the underlying events occurring in St. Louis County.
proceduretorts & liability
Blair Ex Rel. Snider v. Perry County Mutual Insurance Co.
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-11-04 · cited 21×
Heather Blair, through her mother, sued for equitable garnishment against Perry County Mutual Insurance Company and FMH Mutual Insurance Company to collect on a $200,000 judgment for injuries from a 1998 fall from a treehouse on property insured by the defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurers on the ground that the policy had lapsed for nonpayment of a quarterly premium due October 3, before the October 21 accident. The Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and remanded, ruling that the policy could be cancelled for nonpayment only after the insured failed to pay and the insurer then provided at least ten days' written notice stating the reasons. The court held that the September 14 notice of payment due was an invalid anticipatory cancellation that did not strictly comply with the policy's cancellation provisions, so coverage remained in force on the date of the injury.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Buchholz Mortuaries, Inc. v. Director of Revenue
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-07-29 · cited 12×
The case concerned whether Buchholz Mortuaries, Inc. was entitled to a refund of sales taxes it had collected and remitted on caskets and burial containers sold to customers under funeral contracts. The Administrative Hearing Commission granted the refund after finding both items were not taxable tangible personal property, but the Director of Revenue appealed. The Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that burial containers qualify as permanent fixtures annexed to cemetery land and thus are exempt from sales tax, while caskets are taxable because title and ownership transfer to customers before burial while the items remain movable personal property. The decision rested on statutory definitions of retail sales, the three-part fixture test of annexation, adaptation, and intent, and distinctions from prior precedent regarding the timing of title passage.
taxesbusiness & regulatoryproperty
Branson Properties USA, L.P. v. Director of Revenue
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-07-29 · cited 19×
The case concerned whether Branson Properties USA, an amusement park operator, qualified for a sales and use tax exemption on the purchase of rides and parts under Missouri statutes exempting machinery used in manufacturing or producing a product for sale. The Administrative Hearing Commission denied the exemption, and the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed that decision. The court held that BPU's activities did not qualify because operating amusement rides does not transform inputs like electricity and materials into outputs with a separate and distinct use, identity, or value, as required by the statutory exemptions. The opinion reviewed precedents distinguishing true manufacturing processes, such as printing or crushing rock, from non-qualifying activities like repackaging or cleaning items. Tax exemptions were strictly construed against the taxpayer, placing the burden on BPU to prove eligibility.
taxesbusiness & regulatory
In Re Marriage of Crow and Gilmore
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-05-13 · cited 89×
This case involves ex-spouses disputing modification of child support and a contempt finding against the husband for unpaid support and a bank debt ordered in the original dissolution decree. The court dismissed the appeal of the contempt judgment as premature, holding that civil contempt orders are not final and appealable until enforced. It reversed part of the child support modification after recalculating the husband's income to exclude certain retirement contributions and remanded the case, while affirming the trial court's use of the wife's actual income based on the evidence presented.
family lawprocedure
State v. Gilbert
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-04-22 · cited 47×
In State v. Gilbert, the defendant was convicted by a jury of two counts of first-degree murder plus burglary, tampering, stealing, and armed criminal action after he and an accomplice killed an elderly couple in their home during a crime spree that began with stealing a car in Ohio; he received two death sentences along with other prison terms. On appeal, Gilbert challenged the trial court's limits on voir dire questions about prospective jurors' prior statements on the death penalty and argued that the charging information was defective for failing to plead statutory aggravating circumstances under Apprendi and Ring. The Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the convictions and sentences in full, ruling that the voir dire restriction followed established precedent, was within the trial judge's discretion, and caused no prejudice because other questions sufficiently explored jurors' impartiality on sentencing; it also rejected the pleading claim based on its prior decision in Tisius and found the death sentences proportionate to those in similar cases involving murders during home burglaries of multiple or vulnerable victims.
criminal lawprocedure
Norman v. Wright
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-03-18 · cited 30×
The case involved parents suing a doctor for the wrongful death of their son from brain damage during birth, after settling with two other defendants (another doctor and a hospital) for $100,000 prior to trial. The jury awarded the parents $308,855.35 against the remaining defendant, but the trial court granted his post-verdict motion to reduce the amount by the settlement under section 537.060. The court reversed, holding that a reduction under section 537.060 is an affirmative defense requiring pleading and proof under the rules of civil procedure, which the defendant had not done; references to the statute in the settlement documents did not constitute consent to try the issue, and his earlier waiver of fault apportionment under the related health-care statute did not change the requirement. The case was remanded for entry of judgment on the full verdict amount.
torts & liabilityprocedurehealthcare
Cox v. Director of Revenue
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-03-04 · cited 74×
The case involved Steven R. Cox challenging the suspension of his driving privileges by the Director of Revenue after being arrested for driving while intoxicated. Cox was found sleeping in his parked vehicle with the engine running, keys in the ignition, and a blood alcohol content of 0.18. The circuit court ruled in Cox's favor, finding insufficient evidence that he was operating the vehicle, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed, holding that having the keys in the ignition and engine running constitutes operating the vehicle under the statute, providing probable cause for the suspension even after the 1996 legislative removal of the 'actual physical control' language from the definition of driving.
criminal law
Harvey v. Washington
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-01-28 · cited 45×
In Harvey v. Washington, Willie Harvey sued three doctors for the wrongful death of his wife after knee-replacement surgery and subsequent complications including seizures, kidney failure, and a pseudomonas infection, resulting in a $1.2 million judgment against the remaining defendants. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed the judgment and remanded for a new trial, holding that the verdict directors given to the jury improperly assumed the disputed fact that the decedent had a pseudomonas urinary tract infection from September 26 onward. The court reasoned that this assumption was prejudicial because the existence of the infection and its role in causing death were contested issues supported by conflicting expert testimony, as evidenced by the jury's question during deliberations, and that the instructions failed to require the jury to find all necessary ultimate facts. The court also addressed but did not resolve the separate challenge to proof of "but for" causation on the record presented.
torts & liabilityprocedure
In Re Marriage of Woodson
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2003-01-14 · cited 28×
This case concerned the division of marital property in a Missouri dissolution of marriage, specifically whether the husband's spouse's teacher retirement benefits accrued during the marriage could be divided by the court. The husband argued that section 169.572 RSMo, which treats such benefits as non-divisible like social security, violated his rights to substantive due process and equal protection under the U.S. and Missouri Constitutions. The court held that no fundamental right to equitable division of retirement benefits exists, as such divisions were not recognized under traditional Missouri divorce law until recent decades, so the statute is subject only to rational-basis review and is rationally related to the legitimate interest of attracting and retaining teachers. The court also affirmed the trial court's overall property division, which awarded the husband 60% of the net marital assets after considering the non-divisible retirement benefits as a factor under section 452.330.1(3).
family lawproperty
State Ex Rel. Beggs v. Dormire
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2002-12-24 · cited 8×
The case involved petitioner Shane Beggs, who had been sentenced to imprisonment under Missouri's substance abuse addiction program in multiple counties and successfully completed it. After the Board of Probation and Parole recommended probation in all cases, judges in Greene and Jasper Counties granted it, but the Polk County judge denied it on grounds that it would be an abuse of discretion given Beggs's prior record. Beggs sought habeas corpus relief, which the court treated as a petition for mandamus. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus ordering the Polk County Circuit Court to place Beggs on probation, reasoning that the statute requires following the Board's recommendation unless the offender is shown to be unfit based on post-sentencing evidence, and no such evidence existed here.
criminal lawprocedure
State Ex Rel. Vee-Jay Contracting Co. v. Neill
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2002-11-26 · cited 18×
The case involved a personal injury lawsuit filed by Florida Murray after she slipped and fell in a parking lot at Lambert International Airport while working as a driver. Murray initially sued the City of St. Louis and Vee-Jay Contracting Company; after dismissing the City, she added Vee-Jay as a defendant. Vee-Jay moved to transfer venue out of the City of St. Louis, alleging it was improper because no evidence showed any corporate defendant had an office or agent there, but Murray filed no reply. The trial judge overruled the motion, prompting Vee-Jay to seek a writ of mandamus. The court held that under Supreme Court Rule 51.045, the failure to reply to a timely motion alleging improper venue requires automatic transfer to a proper venue, as the word "shall" is mandatory and failure to answer admits the motion's allegations.
procedure
State v. Marlowe
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2002-11-26 · cited 54×
In State v. Marlowe, the defendant appealed his felony convictions for resisting arrest and unlawful use of a weapon, alleging that the prosecution's peremptory strike of the sole African American venireperson violated Batson v. Kentucky. The trial court permitted the strike after accepting the prosecutor's explanation that the venireperson had indicated possible involvement in a class action lawsuit, even though other non-Black venirepersons gave similar responses and the defendant was Caucasian. The Missouri Supreme Court reversed those convictions and remanded for a new trial, holding that the prosecutor did not sufficiently distinguish the struck juror from similarly situated white jurors, leaving the evidence of pretext unrefuted under the three-stage Batson analysis from State v. Parker.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Keisker v. Farmer
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2002-11-26 · cited 36×
In this insurance dispute, Trinity Universal Insurance paid its policyholder Super Sandwich Shop over $141,000 for building, personal property, and business-income losses after a vehicle crash, then intervened in the Shop's lawsuit against the City and drivers seeking an interpled $100,000 statutory fund, asserting that policy language created an assignment of the Shop's claims. The circuit court awarded Trinity the entire fund based on an assignment, but the Missouri Supreme Court reversed, holding that the policy instead created only a right of subrogation because its language was ambiguous about transferring rights and permitted the Shop to waive claims in certain circumstances. The court reasoned that no clear intent to assign legal title appeared, the "to the extent of our payment" limit and waiver provisions were inconsistent with full assignment, and the Shop's suit for lost profits alone did not unjustly enrich it beyond the amounts already received from Trinity and another driver. On remand, Trinity may recover via subrogation but must share litigation expenses proportionally, and the Shop may claim the remaining interpled amounts if it proves sufficient lost profits.
business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability
Knese v. State
Supreme Court of Missouri · 2002-10-22 · cited 33×
In Knese v. State, a jury had convicted Randall Knese of first-degree murder and attempted forcible rape and recommended a death sentence, which was affirmed on direct appeal; Knese then sought post-conviction relief under Rule 29.15 claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. The motion court denied relief, but on appeal the Missouri Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and guilt-phase proceedings while reversing the penalty phase. The core reasoning was that trial counsel's failure to review and strike two biased jurors whose questionnaires expressed strong pro-death-penalty views constituted deficient performance that prejudiced the sentencing determination, whereas counsel's decisions on self-defense strategy, minimizing drug-use evidence, and forgoing a no-adverse-inference instruction were reasonable trial strategy that did not render the guilt phase unreliable.
criminal lawprocedure