AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
PurposivismTextualism
Opinions consistently apply plain statutory language and require clear congressional statement before finding expansive agency or state authority, as seen in the Transportation Act analysis limiting the ICC and the FELA preemption ruling. Interstate Commerce Commission v… ↗ Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co. v.… ↗
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
Decisions adhere closely to established precedents such as Charles River Bridge for narrow construction of grants and multiple Washington and federal cases requiring affirmative proof of negligence rather than inference. Larson v. South Dakota ↗ General Insurance Co. of America… ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
The Court exercises restraint by dismissing an improperly filed appeal under a special jurisdictional statute and by holding that federal banking law does not override state probate appointment requirements. Colgate v. United States ↗ Ex Parte Worcester County Nation… ↗
WH
William Howard Taft
Born 1857 · Cincinnati, OH
Reconsideration watch
Decisions resting on authority a higher court later overturned
The case concerned whether the Interstate Commerce Commission possessed authority under the Transportation Act of 1920 to order three railroads to construct and use a new interstate union passenger station in Los Angeles following a petition by the city and related applications. The Supreme Court held that the Commission lacked power to require such construction in an adverse proceeding and reversed the Court of Appeals judgment that had directed further mandamus proceedings. The core reasoning was that the Act's limited provisions addressing track relocations, abandonments, and local connections did not encompass compelling carriers to build large-scale union stations involving major capital investment and land acquisition, and that Congress would have spoken more clearly if it intended to grant such authority; prior references in Railroad Commission of California v. Southern Pacific Co. did not resolve this issue.
This case involved an insurance company that paid out on fire policies covering wool stored in a Washington warehouse and then sued the Northern Pacific Railway Company under subrogation rights, alleging the fire was caused by the railway's negligent operation of a passing freight train. The district court granted a non-suit and dismissed the case after the plaintiff presented its evidence, finding insufficient proof of negligence or causation, and the circuit court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court upheld the dismissal, reasoning that the evidence showed only the sequence of a train passing and a fire starting minutes later, with no testimony establishing sparks from the engine, any negligent acts by railway employees, or other facts linking the train to the fire. The Court noted that both Washington and federal precedents required affirmative proof of causation and negligence rather than mere presumption from the train's passage, and that the burden remained on the plaintiff to show the railway failed to exercise ordinary care. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed.
The case involved a patent infringement claim by the estate of Clinton G. Colgate against the United States, which Congress referred to the Court of Claims for an advisory report and later, under a 1927 special jurisdictional act, for a judgment. The Court of Claims ruled for the government based on an 1851 abandonment of the patent application. The administrator sought review in the Supreme Court by appeal under the special act, which allowed appeal from conclusions of law or judgments 'from which appeals now lie in other cases.' The Court held that the 1925 Act had replaced appeals from the Court of Claims with petitions for certiorari as the uniform method of review, so the special act must be construed to require certiorari rather than a technical appeal; it therefore dismissed the appeal.
This case concerned whether payments by the American Woolen Company of its president William M. Wood's federal income taxes, made pursuant to corporate resolutions to ensure he received full compensation without tax deductions, constituted additional taxable income to him for 1919 and 1920. The Supreme Court answered yes to the certified question, holding that the employer's direct payment of the employee's assessable income taxes was additional compensation includible in gross income. The core reasoning was that these payments, even if voluntary, were made in connection with services rendered and thus qualified as taxable income under the Revenue Act, without needing to address potential cascading tax effects as that issue was not presented.
This case involved the Boston & Maine Railroad, which had leased property from the Fitchburg Railroad Company under an agreement requiring it to pay all taxes assessed against Fitchburg, including federal income taxes. After Boston & Maine paid Fitchburg's 1917 income taxes directly to the government as required by the lease, the IRS treated those payments as additional taxable income to Fitchburg and assessed an extra tax of $3,920.55, which Boston & Maine also paid before seeking a refund. The Supreme Court, following its decision in the related Old Colony case, ruled that the lessee's payment of the lessor's taxes constituted additional taxable income to the lessor. The core reasoning was that the payments functioned as a form of rent under the lease terms, discharging the lessor's legal obligation in a manner equivalent to direct income, consistent with long-standing Treasury regulations and departmental practice treating such discharges as taxable to the recipient.
This case involved a 15-year-old Kentucky boy employed as a section hand on an interstate railroad who was injured when a train moved while he was passing under its cars; he sued the railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act (FELA) for damages. The trial court instructed the jury that the railroad’s violation of a Kentucky statute prohibiting employment of children under 16 on railroads made the employer liable without any need to prove negligence related to the boy’s age, and the Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed a $17,500 verdict. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the state child-labor statute has no bearing on civil liability under FELA. The Court reasoned that FELA recovery requires proof of negligence, that federal law occupies the field of employer liability for injuries to employees in interstate rail commerce, and that state statutes cannot enlarge or alter the federal standard of liability.