Donald James Porter

This case concerns whether utility reimbursements provided under the Housing Act to low-income tenants should be treated as income when calculating eligibility and benefit amounts for food stamps under the Food Stamp Act. Plaintiffs, including state officials and individual recipients, challenged the Secretary of Agriculture's policy of including these payments as income, arguing that they qualify for statutory exclusions under 7 U.S.C. §§ 2014(d)(1) and 2014(d)(11) as non-cash benefits or energy assistance, and also raised Fifth Amendment due process claims. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, ruling that the Secretary's policy was impermissible. The core reasoning was that utility reimbursements defray energy costs that can be separated from other expenses, fall within the plain meaning and legislative history of the energy assistance exclusion, and that the policy frustrates congressional intent even under deferential review; the court also noted a subsequent clarifying statute but focused on the prior framework.

federal power

This case involves petitioner James F. Shaw, Sr.'s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 1986 conviction and 25-year sentence for seven counts of carnal knowledge of his eleven-year-old foster daughter. Shaw claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to include arguments in pre-trial Rule 412 motions about the victim's venereal disease and constitutional requirements for admitting evidence of her past sexual behavior with others to explain physical findings. The court denied the motion, holding that the venereal disease issue had already been resolved on direct appeal and thus could not be relitigated, and that counsel's performance was not deficient because the evidence was not constitutionally required and the failure to raise a meritless argument did not fall below an objective standard of reasonableness under Strickland.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a long-term employee suing his former employer for promised retirement benefits after nearly 25 years of work at an auto repair shop. The employer had orally promised a lump-sum payment at age 62 based on years of service, with conditions like no moonlighting and continued employment until retirement, but later canceled the arrangement. The court determined that the promise qualified as an ERISA employee pension benefit plan, making it enforceable under federal law. It reasoned that the informal, unwritten commitment still met ERISA criteria because a reasonable person could identify the benefits, beneficiaries, funding source, and procedures, and the employer had effectively established the plan by communicating it to employees. The court awarded the plaintiff either the present value of benefits with interest or a future payment at age 62.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case concerns efforts to provide child support enforcement services under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act to Native American children with absent parents living on reservations in South Dakota. The court had previously directed the Department of Health and Human Services to negotiate directly with the tribes regarding potential Tribal Plans, but on reconsideration it modified that directive to instead require federal and state defendants to assist in negotiating cooperative agreements between the state and tribes for delivery of the services. The court reasoned that the statute and regulations contemplated only state plans and agreements with state courts and did not account for semi-sovereign tribal entities, so the agreements could ensure federal compliance without requiring tribes to alter their own laws. It denied the state defendants' separate motion to dismiss the case in light of the Supreme Court's Suter decision, viewing that issue as appropriate for appellate review.

family lawcivil rightsfederal power

In Dykes v. United States, the plaintiff, as administratrix of the estate of Ian Knife, brought a Federal Tort Claims Act action alleging that federal officials negligently failed to prevent Knife's suicide while in custody at the Hughes County Jail. The defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the initial administrative claim filed with the U.S. Marshals Service was submitted in Naomi Dykes' individual capacity rather than as estate administratrix, violating 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(c). The court denied the motion, holding that the jurisdictional notice requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) were satisfied because the claim provided sufficient information for investigation and a sum certain for damages, and that the regulation's capacity requirement affects only settlement opportunities, not the right to sue in federal court.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filed by debtors Michael and Shirley Cook, in which the Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) held the largest claim, split into secured portions on real estate and chattels plus a large undersecured portion, and had made an election under 11 U.S.C. § 1111(b) to treat its entire claim as secured. After the debtors prepaid the secured chattel debt in full and sought to discharge the associated liens, the FmHA argued that its § 1111(b) election prevented lien release until all plan payments, including on the undersecured claim, were complete. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision to discharge the chattel liens upon full payment of that secured claim but reversed its ruling on the undersecured claim payments. The core reasoning was that the § 1111(b) election did not block discharge of liens securing a fully paid allowed secured claim, while the plan's terms made the undersecured payments premature because real property payments had not yet been completed.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedurefederal power

Gulch Gaming, Inc. challenged the constitutionality of SDCL 42-7B-25 after its application for a gaming operator license in Deadwood was denied solely because two-thirds of its ownership was held by non-South Dakota residents. The company argued that the majority-ownership residency requirement violated the Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause. South Dakota defended the statute on the grounds that a gaming license is not a fundamental right and that the state had legitimate local purposes supporting the requirement. On cross-motions for summary judgment with no material facts in dispute, the court analyzed each constitutional claim separately, applying standards that prohibit state discrimination against out-of-state commerce without a non-origin-based reason and that require rational basis review for non-suspect classifications.

business & regulatorycivil rights

The case concerned a dispute over the scope of liability insurance coverage and the insurer's duty to defend the South Dakota State Cement Plant Commission in a Wyoming lawsuit; after the insurer removed the matter from state court under diversity jurisdiction, the Commission moved to remand, contending it was not a citizen of South Dakota for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. The court addressed whether subject-matter jurisdiction existed, noting that a state or its alter ego is not a citizen under the diversity statute and that removal is proper only if the action could have been filed originally in federal court. Applying factors drawn from Moor v. County of Alameda and Board of Regents v. Hoops—including the agency's management autonomy, power to hold property and sue, financial dependence on the state, and treatment in state decisions—the court examined the Commission's statutory authority under South Dakota law to determine whether it functioned as an independent commercial entity or an arm of the state.

federal powerprocedure

In this case, defendant Terrance Provost was convicted by a jury in 1987 of aggravated sexual abuse of his ten-year-old half-sister under federal law, a conviction affirmed on appeal in 1989. In 1991, he moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 based on newly discovered evidence consisting of the victim's recantation of her trial testimony and letters implicating her step-brother instead. The court denied the motion, first holding it untimely because it was filed more than two years after the appellate mandate affirming the conviction, which starts the Rule 33 clock. Even assuming timeliness, the court further reasoned that the defendant failed to exercise due diligence, as the record showed prior unsuccessful attempts to shift blame to the step-brother during trial, and the recantation evidence therefore did not qualify as newly discovered.

criminal lawprocedure

The case was a class action brought by custodial parents in South Dakota who receive AFDC benefits and whose children's absent parents live on Indian reservations within the state. The plaintiffs sued state and federal officials responsible for Title IV-D child support enforcement, claiming denial of required paternity establishment and support collection services under the Social Security Act, along with violations of equal protection and due process. After trial, the court held that the state must provide these services to the plaintiffs and similarly situated families, that federal regulations or policies deterring such assistance were unreasonable and inconsistent with the statute, and that the state's lack of direct jurisdiction over reservation residents did not excuse compliance because cooperation with tribal courts or other mechanisms could fulfill the obligations. The decision rested on the statutory mandate that Title IV-D services apply regardless of circumstances or location, combined with the requirement that states operate compliant child support programs to receive federal funding.

family lawcivil rightsfederal power

The case involved city employees, specifically firemen, challenging the City of Aberdeen's "Media Contacts" ordinance, which required prior approval from department heads before employees could speak to media or comment on internal business decisions while on or off duty. The court decided that both parts of the ordinance were unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment and permanently enjoined the city from enforcing them. The reasoning centered on the Pickering balancing test, finding that the ordinance restricted employees' speech on matters of public concern, such as fire department policies, without being narrowly tailored to prevent substantial interference with job duties, thus chilling protected expression. The court noted that while public employers can limit speech in some cases, this broad prior restraint went too far.

free speechlabor & employment

The case involved a defendant convicted by jury on two counts of assault with a dangerous weapon under federal statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1152 and 1153) that establish jurisdiction based on whether the defendant and victim are Indians, with the same act charged under both provisions leading to potentially inconsistent jury findings on the defendant's Indian status. The defendant moved for acquittal or a new trial, arguing the verdicts could not stand due to the inconsistency. The court granted acquittal on the relevant counts, holding that the evidence was insufficient to prove the defendant was an Indian under the two-part test requiring some degree of Indian blood and recognition as an Indian by a tribe or the federal government, as the defendant had Indian ancestry but was never enrolled in a tribe and received minimal government assistance tied to Indian status. The court reasoned that without sufficient proof of Indian status, federal jurisdiction under the statutes did not exist.

criminal lawfederal power

In United States v. Young, the defendant was charged with aggravated sexual assault and sexual assault under federal law after a minor victim identified him as the father of her fetus, which was aborted following the alleged incidents on an Indian reservation. The government sought to introduce DNA evidence obtained via RFLP testing from the fetus, the victim, and the defendant to establish paternity and thus sexual contact. After conducting a Frye hearing, the court applied the five-factor test from United States v. Two Bulls to evaluate the evidence's admissibility, finding that DNA profiling is generally accepted in the scientific community, the testing procedures are reliable when properly performed, the tests were correctly conducted here, the evidence is more probative than prejudicial under Rule 403, and the statistical probability of a random match (one in four million) could be presented after the defense withdrew its objection. The court therefore denied the defendant's motion to exclude the DNA evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved borrowers who conveyed property to farm credit institutions under a bankruptcy settlement and later sued to enforce their statutory right of first refusal under the Agriculture Credit Act of 1987 when the institutions planned to sell the land. The bankruptcy court granted the borrowers injunctive relief and summary judgment, finding an implied private right of action in the Act. On appeal, the district court reversed, holding that no implied private right of action exists to enforce any provisions of the 1987 Act. The court reasoned that Eighth Circuit precedent in Zajac II applied to the entire statute, not merely its debt-restructuring sections, and was reinforced by Congress's deletion of an express private right of action from the bill and the assignment of enforcement authority to a federal agency.

business & regulatoryproperty

In this bankruptcy appeal, debtors Harold and Merlyn Parmely, operating as H & M Parmely Farms, challenged a bankruptcy court order that denied their motion to enforce the terms of their confirmed Chapter 11 reorganization plan and instead extended the Farmers Home Administration's (FmHA) § 1111(b)(2) election to cover both real estate and chattel collateral. The district court affirmed, holding that FmHA's blanket election applied to its entire claim secured by liens on both types of property, that the debtors had not established grounds like estoppel to limit its effect, and that the election entitled FmHA to apply sale proceeds from chattels (such as livestock and equipment) against the full remaining claim. The core reasoning centered on the statutory scope of the § 1111(b)(2) election under the Bankruptcy Code, which preserves the creditor's lien on the full allowed claim and its proceeds in the event of post-confirmation sales, combined with findings that the plan confirmation and election filings did not support the debtors' narrower interpretation of the classes.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The Hursts sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for flood damage to their property allegedly caused by the Army Corps of Engineers' negligent failure to enforce its own regulations by issuing a prohibitory order when a permittee violated terms while building jetties in a river channel. After the Eighth Circuit ruled that the discretionary function exception did not apply and remanded the case, the district court applied South Dakota negligence law and determined that the Corps' violation of mandatory regulations created a statutory duty of care supporting negligence per se, as well as a common-law duty based on the Corps' knowledge and control over the project. The court found that the Corps breached this duty and that the breach proximately caused the plaintiffs' damages, rendering the United States liable under the FTCA.

torts & liabilitypropertyfederal power

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court's order imposing sanctions under Bankruptcy Rule 9011 against farm corporation debtors and their counsel for filing a Chapter 12 petition after a confirmed Chapter 11 plan, which the lower court found was done in bad faith to delay enforcement of a stipulation and surrender order favoring Livestock State Bank. The district court reviewed the facts of the successive bankruptcy filings, the "drop dead" clause in the parties' agreement, and the bank's incurred expenses from moving livestock. It held that the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by sanctioning both the debtors and their attorney, because the debtors could reasonably rely on counsel for the legal questions about multiple filings and the attorney alone should bear responsibility for any improper purpose. The core reasoning centered on the division of responsibility between clients and attorneys under Rule 9011 and the lack of evidence that the debtors themselves acted improperly.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Harlan Jacobsen sued the mayor and city of Pierre, South Dakota, after city officials removed his coin-operated newspaper vending machine from a public sidewalk, claiming violations of his First Amendment rights to free speech and press, equal protection, and due process. The city justified the removal under two content-neutral municipal ordinances that prohibit obstructions on streets and sidewalks to protect pedestrian and vehicular traffic, without any standards explicitly written into the ordinances for their application. The court analyzed whether these ordinances, as applied to newsracks, constituted valid time, place, and manner restrictions that are narrowly tailored to significant government interests and leave open ample alternative channels for communication, while also considering due process protections against deprivation of property.

free speechcivil rights

This case involves a Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding where the debtors, owners of a 388-acre farm, appealed the Bankruptcy Court's valuation of their agricultural land under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) for purposes of determining a creditor's secured claim. The Bankruptcy Court valued 301 acres as Class II cropland at $200 per acre, including 107 acres that the debtors proposed to use as pasture, resulting in a total farm value of $71,150. The District Court affirmed this valuation on appeal, holding that while the debtors' proposed use should be considered, the Bankruptcy Court's determination was not clearly erroneous and was consistent with the property's characteristics and prior use. The court reasoned that valuations under § 506(a) require flexibility and should not be strictly limited to the debtor's proposed disposition if it is inconsistent with the land's design or intended use.

propertyprocedure

The case concerned the Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribe's operation of a blackjack gaming enterprise on its reservation in South Dakota, which had expanded in scope and betting limits after May 1, 1988. The court held that the enterprise violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) because the expansion removed it from the grandfather clause that might have classified it as class II gaming, making it class III gaming that required an unrequested tribal-state compact; alternatively, even if treated as class II, the tribe's betting limits exceeded the $5 maximum permitted under South Dakota law for non-Indian gaming. The court reasoned that federal law incorporates state gambling regulations in Indian country and that the tribe's operation therefore did not comply with IGRA's requirements for lawful gaming. It granted declaratory and injunctive relief to the United States.

criminal lawfederal powerbusiness & regulatory