In United States v. Brophil, the defendant was subject to a civil forfeiture proceeding under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) for property used in marijuana cultivation, which resulted in forfeiture of his residence and barn in 1991 while he was a fugitive; he was later apprehended, pleaded guilty, and was sentenced in a criminal case for the same conduct. The court reconsidered its prior denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds and held that the criminal prosecution was barred by the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The reasoning was that the civil forfeiture constituted punishment for the offense, jeopardy attached in that proceeding regardless of the defendant's absence, and the constitutional bar on multiple punishments applies irrespective of whether the civil or criminal action occurs first.
This case concerns the denial of health insurance benefits to Gerald Grimo and his wife by Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Vermont under a policy obtained through Twin State Typewriters, Inc. Plaintiff filed state law claims in Vermont superior court, which Blue Cross removed to federal district court asserting ERISA preemption and federal jurisdiction. The court analyzes whether the insurance arrangement qualifies as an ERISA plan by reviewing the employer's involvement in administration, funding, and employee eligibility to determine if federal question jurisdiction exists and whether to remand the case.
The case involved defendant Brian Brophil, who faced both criminal charges and civil forfeiture proceedings arising from a 1990 marijuana growing operation discovered at his Vermont property. After pleading guilty, Brophil was sentenced to 151 months in prison, but he moved to dismiss the criminal case on double jeopardy grounds, claiming the prior civil forfeiture of his land under 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7) counted as punishment for the same conduct. The court examined Fifth Amendment protections against multiple punishments, Supreme Court rulings in Halper and Austin treating certain forfeitures as punitive, and conflicting circuit precedents on whether civil and criminal actions constitute separate proceedings. Relying on Second Circuit authority that Halper does not apply to forfeiture claims and that the actions here did not violate double jeopardy, the court denied the motion.
In Conway v. Sorrell, two division directors in the Vermont Agency of Transportation challenged a 1994 legislative amendment that reclassified their positions from classified to exempt status, thereby eliminating job tenure protections under the state's merit-based personnel system. The plaintiffs claimed this action impaired contractual rights under the Contract Clause and violated due process, takings, and equal protection guarantees by depriving them of continued employment absent just cause. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment and concluded that the personnel regulations expressly permitted legislative modification, that no contractual relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the state, and that the reclassification did not impair any protected property interest. It reasoned that the classified system was always subject to change by the legislature and that extended benefits from collective bargaining agreements were temporary and did not create enforceable contracts for non-union employees.
This case arose after the Vermont Supreme Court invalidated 'take-or-pay' power sales agreements that Vermont utilities had entered with MMWEC for shares of Seabrook nuclear plant capacity, ruling the contracts ultra vires and a violation of nondelegation principles. Various Vermont utilities and MMWEC then sued the law firms and attorneys who had provided opinion letters affirming the participants' authority to enter the agreements, asserting claims including negligent misrepresentation and breach of warranty. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted summary judgment to the defendant law firms on all remaining claims. The core reasoning was that the opinion letters either contained standard disclaimers limiting their scope to enforceability or accurately described existing law without misrepresenting facts about the utilities' authority.
The case involved the estate of Goodwin E. Crosby seeking a refund of $10,000 submitted to the IRS along with an application for an extension to file its 1988 fiduciary income tax return. The IRS denied the refund claim as untimely under IRC §6511, treating the remittance as a tax payment rather than a deposit. After a bench trial, the court held that the remittance was a deposit, making the simultaneous filing of the return and refund request on February 11, 1993, timely within the three-year limitations period (plus extension). The core reasoning applied a facts-and-circumstances test that weighed the absence of any tax liability or assessment, the taxpayers' intent to submit the funds as a cash bond held in a separate account, and the IRS's own treatment of the money until after the limitations period had run.