Allyne R. Ross

The case is a civil forfeiture action under 21 U.S.C. § 881 in which the government sought to seize real property and vehicles owned by Ronald Young, a Jamaican citizen previously deported for a drug conviction and later convicted of illegal reentry. Young, proceeding pro se, moved for summary judgment on the ground that evidence obtained during his October 2005 warrantless arrest must be suppressed under the Fourth Amendment, while the government cross-moved, arguing the properties were traceable to or used to facilitate controlled-substance violations. The court held that the arrest violated the Fourth Amendment because agents lacked a warrant for Young and no exigent circumstances justified the entry, requiring suppression of all derivative evidence. After excluding that evidence, the court concluded that a genuine issue of material fact remained as to whether the admissible evidence satisfied the government's burden for forfeiture and therefore denied both summary-judgment motions.

criminal lawcivil rightsproperty

The case involves a father and grandparents suing federal officials including Attorney General Holder, the DOJ, and others to disclose the location of their child/grandchild who was placed in the Witness Security Program with his mother, who allegedly denies court-ordered custody and visitation rights, while also seeking enforcement of state custody orders and damages. The court partially granted the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, dismissing the grandparents as plaintiffs and several defendants including McCarthy, Baker, and the DOJ, but allowing the father's claims against the mother under 18 U.S.C. § 3524(d)(5) and against Holder for mandamus to proceed. Core reasoning addressed the Witness Security Program Statute's specific provisions for child custody and visitation obligations, sovereign immunity, the domestic relations exception to jurisdiction, and the availability of mandamus for certain notification and service duties under the statute.

criminal lawfamily lawfederal powerprocedure

This case involves an appeal by the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), which administers the FCC's universal service fund, from a bankruptcy court's denial of its motion to reconsider an order reducing its unsecured claim against debtor PT-1 Communications from over $5.7 million to about $2.5 million. The debtor had objected to the claim in 2002, and USAC failed to respond, attributing the failure to a change in its claims agent and notice address that was allegedly not properly updated. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings, finding that USAC had received adequate notice of the objection, that any neglect was not excusable under Pioneer Investment Services standards, and that USAC's later motions under Bankruptcy Rules 3008 and 9024 and Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) were untimely. The court rejected arguments that the docket entries were deficient or that relief was available under Rule 60(b)(6).

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved the estate of Kevin Cerbelli suing the New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation and several doctors for alleged negligence in prematurely discharging Cerbelli from psychiatric inpatient care in 1998 and failing to provide adequate outpatient treatment, which the plaintiff claimed contributed to his death when police officers shot him inside a precinct while he was emotionally disturbed, armed, and under the influence of cocaine. The district court reviewed the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, found no clear error on the face of the record, and adopted it in full. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment in all respects, determining there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether the providers breached applicable standards of care or proximately caused the death.

healthcaretorts & liability

The case involved an attorney's application under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) for $10,203.50 in fees, equal to 25 percent of past-due SSDI benefits awarded to the client after a federal court remand for further proceedings. The court denied the application, filed nine months after the notice of award, as untimely. The core reasoning was that although § 406(b) contains no explicit filing deadline and no local rule applied, the unexplained delay was excessive and the application therefore failed to meet the requirement of prompt submission following an administrative award of benefits.

procedurefederal power

The case involved a pro se petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Nicholas Zimmerman challenging his New York state conviction for threatening a woman with a handgun. Zimmerman raised five main claims: ineffective assistance of trial counsel for waiving pretrial motions and failing to properly present an alibi defense, violation of his right to compulsory process when the trial court excluded alibi witnesses, improper bolstering of the victim's identification testimony, prosecutorial use of perjured testimony, and ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. The court denied the petition in full, reasoning that counsel's strategic choices were not deficient, any errors in witness exclusion or evidentiary rulings were harmless, the prosecution claims lacked factual support, and other arguments were either unexhausted or procedurally barred.

criminal law

In United States v. Marcus, the defendant was convicted by a jury of sex trafficking and forced labor under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act based on evidence that he used force and coercion to prevent the complaining witness from leaving a BDSM relationship, during which she maintained his website and engaged in BDSM activities that were photographed and posted online. The defendant renewed his motion for judgment of acquittal, arguing that the statutes did not apply to intimate or consensual BDSM relationships, that revenue from photographic depictions did not qualify as a commercial sex act, and that the evidence failed to show a sufficient nexus between coercion and the required elements of the offenses; he alternatively sought a new trial with modified jury instructions. The court denied the motions, holding that the statutes applied to the conduct, that the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions, and that no additional instructions were required.

criminal law

In this case, pro se plaintiff Tunde Adeyi, convicted of heroin importation and possession, sought return of personal property seized at his arrest, later requesting damages after learning the items had been administratively forfeited and destroyed by the government. The court denied Adeyi's motion for judgment on the pleadings and granted in part the government's motion to dismiss, holding that sovereign immunity barred claims under Rule 41(g) equitable jurisdiction, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the Federal Tort Claims Act. The court construed the motion instead as one to set aside forfeiture under 18 U.S.C. § 983(e) due to inadequate notice and directed the government to submit evidence on its notification efforts and the forfeiture date, with Adeyi to respond thereafter.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case involved claims by U2 Home Entertainment, Inc. that defendants Fu Shun Wang, Lam Ming Zhong, and two corporations doing business as Gai Fat Rentals violated the Copyright Act and Lanham Act by unlawfully duplicating and selling unauthorized copies of the plaintiff's copyrighted Asian-language television programs and movies bearing its trademarks. After the defendants failed to answer the complaint, defaults were entered against them. The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, entering default judgment against the defendants jointly and severally for $383,250 in statutory damages and permanently enjoining them from further infringement of the plaintiff's existing or future copyrights and trademarks. Liability was established because the well-pleaded allegations in the complaint were deemed admitted upon default, and damages were calculated based on the number of infringed episodes and the plaintiff's election of statutory remedies.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a pro se plaintiff seeking judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Social Security Administration's denial of Supplemental Security Income benefits for the period prior to August 1, 1994, after a lengthy administrative process including multiple hearings, remands, and disputes over the disability onset date. The court denied the Commissioner's motion for judgment on the pleadings, reversed the agency's finding that the plaintiff was ineligible for benefits from April 1, 1993 to July 31, 1994, and remanded solely for calculation of benefits. The core reasoning was that medical evidence from treating physicians, including reports from 1994 and earlier, supported an earlier onset of disability consistent with the plaintiff's 1993 application, and that prior administrative decisions had improperly limited the review period or overlooked relevant records. The court rejected the plaintiff's additional claims for punitive or compensatory damages, finding no legal basis under the Social Security Act or Constitution.

federal powerhealthcareprocedure

The case involves plaintiffs Thomas Small, an individual wheelchair user, and Disabled in Action, a disability advocacy organization, suing GNC for alleged violations of Title III of the ADA and New York City Human Rights Law at its New York City stores. Plaintiffs claimed that architectural barriers like steps at store entrances and movable product displays blocking aisles made the stores inaccessible to wheelchair users, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief on behalf of themselves and a class of similarly situated individuals. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss DIA's claims for both organizational and associational standing, granted in part and denied in part the motion as to Small's individual standing, and deferred ruling on class certification. The core reasoning centered on Article III standing requirements, including the need to demonstrate a concrete, particularized injury in fact that is actual or imminent, with the court finding that DIA failed to meet these thresholds and that Small's standing was limited to stores where he alleged specific, imminent injury.

civil rightsprocedure

The case involves a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed by Oswald O’Brian Clavis, a Guyanese citizen and lawful permanent resident convicted of narcotics offenses, challenging his mandatory detention by the INS without bond and the denial of his application for a waiver of deportation under former Section 212(c) of the INA. The court held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of New York and denied the petition, vacating the stay on deportation. It reasoned that the petitioner's continued detention pending removal did not violate substantive due process, that the immigration judge's refusal to allow a 212(c) application did not violate equal protection or procedural due process because the petitioner was ineligible for such relief even under pre-IIRIRA law due to his aggravated felony conviction and time served, and that equitable estoppel did not apply to bar the government's actions based on delay alone.

immigrationcriminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involves Roy Swaby, a lawful permanent resident convicted after a jury trial of burglary in the second degree and marijuana possession, who was ordered removed as an aggravated felon and sought habeas corpus relief to obtain a discretionary waiver of deportation under the repealed § 212(c) of the INA. The court denied the petition, holding that Swaby was ineligible for such relief. The core reasoning was that the Supreme Court's decision in INS v. St. Cyr, which preserved § 212(c) eligibility for certain pre-IIRIRA guilty pleas, does not extend to convictions after trial, as affirmed by Second Circuit precedents like Rankine v. Reno; the court found no basis for detrimental reliance on the availability of the waiver when rejecting a plea offer, distinguishing trial convictions from plea-based ones under the 1996 repeal.

immigrationcriminal law

This case is a consolidated class action securities lawsuit brought by purchasers of KeySpan Corporation stock against the company and its senior officers and directors. Plaintiffs alleged violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, claiming that defendants made materially false and misleading statements about the benefits of KeySpan's acquisitions of Eastern Enterprises and Roy Kay while concealing regulatory risks under PUHCA and operational problems at Roy Kay, and that individual defendants engaged in insider trading. The court granted defendants' motion to dismiss under Rules 8, 9(b), 12(b)(6), and the PSLRA, finding that the alleged statements were not materially false or misleading, that plaintiffs failed to plead particularized facts supporting a strong inference of scienter, and that the insider trading allegations were insufficient. The dismissal was without prejudice to repleading. The core reasoning focused on the absence of affirmative misrepresentations about specific regulatory outcomes, lack of evidence that defendants possessed contrary information at the time of statements, and failure to show unusual or suspicious trading motives beyond generic incentives.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In Cohanim v. New York City Board of Education, a Queens voter and parent sued the Board, alleging that its selection method—two members appointed by the mayor and one by each borough president—violated the Equal Protection Clause and the one-person-one-vote principle because the boroughs have unequal populations. The plaintiff sought a preliminary injunction, while the Board moved to dismiss. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Supreme Court precedent in Sailors v. Board of Education and subsequent cases establish that the one-person-one-vote requirement applies only to elected officials and does not govern appointed bodies such as the Board. The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that Sailors left the issue open for appointed legislative bodies, finding that the distinction drawn in the case and its progeny turned on appointment versus election rather than the functions performed.

electionscivil rights

In Sevencan v. Herbert, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 after his state court conviction on drug conspiracy and related charges, arguing that the trial court improperly excluded his wife from portions of the trial during testimony by undercover officers. The court addressed whether evidence outside the trial record could be considered on habeas review to justify the closure and whether an officer's ongoing undercover work and related threats could support excluding a family member. The district court denied the petition, finding that the closure was justified to protect officer safety and ongoing investigations, that any procedural shortcomings did not warrant relief, and that other claims regarding informants and evidence were without merit. A certificate of appealability was granted solely on the family member exclusion issue.

criminal lawprocedurecivil rights

The case involved the Towns of Huntington and Babylon suing under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a declaration that their prior purchases of electricity from LILCO created property or contract rights to capital gains and excess deferred taxes arising from LIPA's acquisition of LILCO, along with restitution of certain executive compensation paid by LILCO. The action stemmed from the 1980s-1990s regulatory efforts to resolve LILCO's financial issues tied to the Shoreham nuclear plant, including a settlement creating a ratepayer-funded Financial Resource Asset and LIPA's later takeover of LILCO assets under state law. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss all claims. The core reasoning was that the plaintiffs' claims effectively challenged the reasonableness of filed utility rates and were therefore barred by the filed rate doctrine, and that no cognizable property or contract rights existed to support the requested relief.

business & regulatorypropertycivil rights

In United States v. Deglomini, defendants faced a federal indictment for conspiring to understate income and inflate business deductions on tax returns for two plumbing companies between 1989 and 1991, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371. The indictment was returned and sealed in September 1998, shortly before the six-year statute of limitations would have expired, but remained sealed for fourteen months until the defendants were arrested in November 1999. The court considered whether an unreasonable delay in unsealing tolled the limitations period and concluded that no showing of actual prejudice by the defendants was required; because the government offered only a general explanation of caseload and lack of expediency without demonstrating a proper prosecutorial purpose, the indictment was deemed untimely and dismissed.

criminal lawtaxesprocedure

This case concerns whether Dunkin' Donuts, as a franchisor, could be held vicariously or directly liable under New York law for a violent attack on Wendy Hong Wu, an employee of its franchisee Turnway Donuts, at a Queens store in 1995. Wu sued Dunkin' Donuts for negligence in failing to provide adequate security, among other claims, after two assailants raped and assaulted her while she worked alone overnight. The court granted Dunkin' Donuts' motion for summary judgment, finding no evidence that the franchisor exercised actual control over the franchisee's security decisions or that Wu relied on any representations or actions by Dunkin' Donuts. The court reasoned that merely providing security recommendations through newsletters and consultants does not create a legal duty or establish vicarious liability under New York franchisor-franchisee law, as the franchise agreement left day-to-day operations and security to the franchisee.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The plaintiff sought judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her disability benefits application based on diabetes and related conditions. After the Commissioner moved to remand the case for further proceedings due to errors by the administrative law judge, the plaintiff opposed the motion and filed a cross-motion seeking a remand solely for calculation of benefits along with specific directives. The court granted the Commissioner's remand motion and denied the cross-motion, finding the record did not support an outright award of benefits. In the subsequent fee application under the Equal Access to Justice Act, the court awarded reduced attorneys' fees, excluding time spent on the opposition to remand because that motion lacked a reasonable chance of success and the time expended was therefore excessive.

federal powerprocedurehealthcare