The case involved charges by the National Labor Relations Board that Pittsburgh Steamship Co. committed unfair labor practices by interfering with a union organizing campaign among its seamen and discharging an employee for union activity, leading to the union's defeat in a Board election. The trial examiner found violations of the Wagner Act and recommended remedies, which the Board adopted in full. The Court of Appeals refused to enforce the order, concluding that the examiner's consistent crediting of union witnesses and rejection of company witnesses demonstrated pervasive bias invalidating the findings. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that uniform resolution of factual conflicts in favor of one party does not by itself establish bias or require reversal, as long as the credited testimony is not inherently incredible. The Court remanded the case for the Court of Appeals to review the evidence under the proper standard.
Brinegar was convicted of illegally importing liquor into Oklahoma from Missouri, with the conviction resting in part on liquor seized from his car during a warrantless stop and search on a public highway. He moved to suppress the evidence, arguing the search violated the Fourth Amendment due to lack of probable cause. The district court and court of appeals upheld admission of the evidence, finding that Brinegar's post-stop admission supplied probable cause even if the initial chase did not. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address whether probable cause existed under precedents like Carroll v. United States, which permits warrantless vehicle searches on public roads when facts known to officers would warrant a prudent person in believing contraband is present. The Court examined the officers' prior knowledge of Brinegar's liquor-hauling activities, the car's heavily loaded appearance, and his evasive behavior as supporting probable cause for the arrest and seizure.
This case concerns a plan filed by Engineers Public Service Company under section 11(e) of the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 to dissolve after complying with SEC divestiture orders regarding its utility subsidiaries. The plan called for retiring three series of cumulative preferred stock at their call prices ($105 or $110 per share) plus accrued dividends rather than the $100 per share involuntary liquidation preference, with remaining assets going to common stockholders. The SEC approved the call-price payments as satisfying the statutory "fair and equitable" standard based on asset coverage, earnings history, and investment value, but the district court and court of appeals sided with common stockholders and limited recovery to the $100 preference. The Supreme Court opinion addresses both the correctness of the SEC's application of the standard and whether its determination, rather than the lower courts', should govern.
The case Urie v. Thompson involved a railroad fireman who developed silicosis from prolonged inhalation of silica dust while working on locomotives and sued the railroad trustee under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and Boiler Inspection Act. The Missouri Supreme Court ruled that these statutes applied only to accidental injuries, not occupational diseases, and reversed a jury verdict for the plaintiff. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the acts cover such diseases, reasoning that their broad language prohibits use of locomotives creating unnecessary peril to life or limb from unsafe conditions or parts, including gradual exposure to harmful dust, and that the three-year statute of limitations accrues upon manifestation of the injury.
The case involved a personal injury claim from a 1943 highway accident in Kansas, brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. The plaintiff filed the complaint within the two-year statute of limitations but served the summons after it expired. The Supreme Court held that the claim was time-barred because Kansas law requires service of summons to commence the action for limitations purposes, and federal courts must apply that rule under the Erie doctrine to ensure the same outcome as in state court. The reasoning emphasized that the state statute of limitations, including its tolling provisions, defines the scope of the state-created cause of action and must be followed to prevent forum shopping.
The case concerned whether the Fifth Amendment's due process clause requires the FCC to provide oral argument on a licensed radio station's petition alleging potential interference from a new station's construction permit. WJR, a Class I-A station, sought reconsideration and a hearing after the FCC granted Coastal Plains a permit for a Class II station on the same frequency, claiming objectionable interference outside WJR's normally protected contours; the FCC denied the petition in writing without oral argument, finding the allegations legally insufficient under its rules. The Court of Appeals ruled that due process mandates oral argument on all questions of law before administrative tribunals. The Supreme Court held that the Constitution does not require oral argument in this context, where the petition presented no factual dispute and failed as a matter of law, and that the Communications Act's provision for a reasonable opportunity to show cause allows the agency discretion over the form of hearing.
