The case involved the conviction of Beard for unlawfully transporting intoxicating liquor in violation of the National Prohibition Act, resulting in a 90-day jail sentence and a $300 fine. Beard appealed, arguing that the trial court wrongly excluded evidence supporting defenses of entrapment and agency, claiming he was induced by an informer named Mallory. The court affirmed the conviction, reasoning that entrapment requires inducement by government officers or agents, and there was no evidence that Mallory was acting for the government, as he was merely an informer not shown to be an agent. Additionally, acting as an agent for the buyer does not provide a defense to the charge of unlawful transportation.
This case involved an appeal from a district court order in bankruptcy proceedings disallowing a $4,000 secured claim filed by a creditor against the estate of C. T. Morgan, who had filed a voluntary petition in March 1931. The claim was based on a promissory note and chattel mortgage on store fixtures and livestock executed four months before the bankruptcy filing. Both the referee and the district court denied the claim after finding the testimony about the loan's delivery and circumstances not credible, due to factors such as the familial relationship between the parties, inconsistent accounts of the cash transaction, the bankrupt's dire finances, and the lack of investigation by the experienced creditor. The appeals court affirmed, holding that the credibility findings by the lower courts were entitled to deference absent clear legal or factual error.
This case involved a dispute over federal estate tax deductions for bequests in the will of George Warren Brown, who died in 1921. The executors sought to deduct a conditional bequest of stock to a church under article 6 of the will and the residue placed in a trust fund under article 13 for benevolent purposes as a memorial. The Board of Tax Appeals had disallowed both deductions, leading to a deficiency assessment. The court affirmed the disallowance for the article 6 bequest due to its conditional nature but reversed for article 13, holding that the trust qualified as an exclusively charitable bequest under section 403(a)(3) of the Revenue Act of 1921 because its terms limited distributions to religious, charitable, or educational uses without private benefit. The court remanded for redetermination consistent with allowing the article 13 deduction.
The case concerned bankruptcy proceedings for Schulte-United, Inc. and its affiliate Miller's, Inc., where the Irving Trust Company, appointed trustee by the New York district court, sought to end ancillary receiverships in Missouri districts and obtain the assets after proper accounting and fee determinations. The Missouri district court had appointed George A. Nelson as ancillary receiver, extended the receivership to Miller's assets, referred supervision to a special master, and approved reports and allowances to the receiver and attorneys. The Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed four appeals and affirmed the lower court's orders on the continuation of the ancillary receivership and most fee awards, reasoning that the Bankruptcy Act's limits on fees and notice requirements were satisfied or waived and that factual assessments of reasonable compensation were for the special master and district court absent clear abuse. It reversed only the inclusion of a $500 additional allowance to the petitioning creditors' attorneys in the final report.
This case involved a claim by the beneficiary of a war risk insurance policy issued to Emil Eggen, who served in the U.S. Army from 1917 to 1919. The policy lapsed for nonpayment of premiums in October 1919, and Eggen died of tuberculosis in 1926; his mother sued the government, asserting that he had been totally and permanently disabled before the lapse, causing the policy to mature. The district court directed a verdict for the government at the close of evidence, and the appeals court affirmed. The court reasoned that the plaintiff bore the burden of proving both total and permanent disability prior to lapse, but the evidence of symptoms and intermittent work was consistent with either a permanent or non-permanent condition at the relevant time and therefore failed to make a prima facie case.
The case involved an appeal by J.T. Ayers from a conviction under the National Prohibition Act for maintaining a common nuisance at a filling station, following acquittal on two counts of illegal liquor possession. The trial court had denied a motion for directed verdict and sentenced Ayers to six months in jail. On appeal, the Circuit Court held that the assignments of error were procedurally insufficient to challenge the evidence's adequacy, but even considering the merits, the proof showed only possession without any showing that the liquor was kept for sale or commercial purposes as required to prove a nuisance under the statute. The court therefore reversed the conviction and remanded the case.