The case concerned a group of farmers and their businesses who sued their health insurer, Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Montana, after experiencing large premium increases that they alleged violated Montana’s little HIPAA statute prohibiting different premiums for similarly situated individuals based on health status-related factors, as well as a separate state unfair insurance practices law. The Ninth Circuit addressed whether federal HIPAA and ERISA preempted the state claims, both for purposes of federal jurisdiction and on the merits. The court held that the federal law completely preempted the Montana little HIPAA provision because the state statute was identical to and expressly relied on federal law, thereby conferring federal jurisdiction and defeating that claim. However, it determined that the separate state unfair insurance practices statute was not preempted, as the two laws were not identical in scope, and remanded that claim along with a related breach of contract claim for further proceedings in the district court.
This case involved a challenge by a Wiccan volunteer chaplain, Patrick McCollum, and several California prison inmates to the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's paid chaplaincy program, which employs clergy only from Protestant, Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, and Native American faiths while using volunteers for other religions. The plaintiffs claimed the program violated inmates' religious exercise rights under the First Amendment, RLUIPA, and related state laws. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants. Inmate claims were rejected for failure to exhaust administrative remedies or because they were untimely, while McCollum's claims failed because RLUIPA protects only confined persons and he presented insufficient evidence of retaliation. The court applied established standards requiring reasonable religious accommodations consistent with prison security and operations.
The case involved Merced Melchor-Meceno, who pleaded guilty to illegal re-entry into the United States after prior deportations in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. The district court applied a 16-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 based on his prior Colorado felony menacing conviction, treating it as a crime of violence, and imposed a 75-month prison term. On appeal, Melchor-Meceno argued that the menacing conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that Colorado's felony menacing statute is categorically a crime of violence because it requires knowingly using or threatening a deadly weapon to place another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury, which satisfies the elements of active violent force and intent under the guidelines. The court did not need to reach the modified categorical approach.
This case involved a lawsuit by Northstar Financial Advisors against Schwab Investments and its management company, alleging that Schwab violated section 13(a) of the Investment Company Act by changing its investment policies without obtaining shareholder approval. The district court held that investors have a private right to sue under this provision, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision. The appeals court reasoned that neither the language of the statute, its structure, nor its legislative history—including later amendments—shows any congressional intent to create a private cause of action, leaving enforcement solely to the Securities and Exchange Commission. The court followed precedents from the Supreme Court and the Second Circuit requiring clear evidence of such intent for implied private rights.
In United States v. Reyes-Bosque, Emilio Reyes-Bosque and Jose Luis Ramirez-Esqueda were convicted of multiple federal offenses involving the smuggling, transportation, and harboring of illegal aliens, including violations of 8 U.S.C. §§ 1324 and 1327, and they appealed the district court's denial of their motions to suppress evidence obtained from searches of two residential units used as stash houses. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, holding that the defendants lacked standing to challenge certain searches and that the agents' entries and investigations were supported by consent, exigent circumstances, and plain-view observations following tips from escaped aliens. The court also rejected Reyes-Bosque's additional challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, admission of hearsay, and denial of his request for new counsel, finding no error in the district court's rulings. The core reasoning centered on Fourth Amendment standards for warrantless entries in immigration enforcement contexts and the corroboration of witness testimony with physical evidence like ledgers and phone records.
Nadeem Hassan, a Pakistani citizen present in the United States, applied for adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident under 8 U.S.C. § 1255; while the application was pending he obtained advance parole to travel abroad, but the government denied the adjustment application on national security grounds, revoked the parole, and removed him upon his attempted return. Hassan amended his pending mandamus complaint to challenge the denial and revocation. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal, holding that 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)-(ii) expressly bars judicial review of discretionary decisions regarding adjustment of status and parole, and that Hassan had not raised a colorable constitutional due-process claim because he had been questioned about his associations and given an opportunity to respond.
