This case concerns Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings involving debtors who proposed plans with non-standard language purporting to fix the value of secured creditors' claims and liens through plan confirmation, with res judicata effect if no objection was filed. The bankruptcy court approved this language and confirmed the plans, holding that confirmation could bind creditors and override aspects of the claims process under the Bankruptcy Code and Rules. On appeal, the district court reversed those orders, concluding that the proper procedure for determining the value and treatment of secured claims is the claims process established in the Code rather than plan confirmation. The court reasoned that the claims procedure may not be supplanted by plan language and adopted the analysis from a conflicting bankruptcy court decision reaching the same result. The cases were remanded for entry of new confirmation orders consistent with this holding.
This case involved a defamation claim brought by Spacecon Specialty Contractors, LLC against Richard Bensinger over statements in his film 'Looking the Other Way: Benefitting from Misc.y,' which discussed alleged mistreatment, underpayment, misclassification, and trafficking of immigrant construction workers by labor broker Leno and its clients, including Spacecon. The court granted Bensinger's motion for summary judgment, ruling that Spacecon could not prevail on its claim. The core reasoning was that the film's statements addressed matters of public concern, requiring Spacecon to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Bensinger acted with actual malice—either knowing the statements were false or with reckless disregard for their truth—which Spacecon failed to demonstrate with sufficient evidence. The court applied Colorado substantive law and federal procedural standards in a diversity jurisdiction case.
This case involves plaintiff Bouchard suing Denver police officers Whetstone and Jimenez under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of constitutional rights, along with related claims, and suing the City of Denver under Monell for failure to train or supervise its officers. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity for the officers. The court denied summary judgment to the individual officers, finding that Bouchard had presented sufficient evidence to show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right, thereby overcoming qualified immunity at this stage. The court granted summary judgment to the City of Denver on the Monell claim, as Bouchard failed to cite any evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding inadequate training or supervision. The case proceeds against the officers only, with the city dismissed as a defendant.
In United States v. Strandlof, the defendant was charged under the Stolen Valor Act of 2005 with falsely claiming to have received military decorations including the Purple Heart and Silver Star. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the information, holding that the statute is unconstitutional. The core reasoning was that the Act imposes a content-based restriction on speech by criminalizing false statements about military honors, and such speech is protected by the First Amendment unless it falls into narrow unprotected categories like fraud or defamation. The court rejected the government's argument that false statements lacking political or public concern value receive no protection, citing Supreme Court precedent in United States v. Stevens that speech cannot be excluded based on a balancing of its perceived value.
This case involved an insurance coverage dispute in which Arkansas Valley Drilling claimed that damage to its building's concrete slab from an underground water pipe rupture should be covered under a policy issued by Continental Western Insurance Company. The plaintiff theorized that the underground rupture resulted from saturation and freezing/thawing caused by an earlier covered loss from a frozen indoor pipe, but the insurer denied the second claim based on policy exclusions for earth movement and water damage. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the policy's concurrent or sequential cause provision and specific exclusions barred coverage for losses involving earth movement regardless of any contributing covered event. Under Colorado law, the court enforced the plain language of the policy and found no genuine issues of material fact that would allow the plaintiff's claims for declaratory judgment, breach of contract, or bad faith to proceed.
This case involved plaintiffs Erica Hoffman and her parents suing Ford Motor Company after Erica suffered severe injuries, including tetraplegia, in a rollover car accident, with claims of strict liability and negligence against Ford as the vehicle manufacturer. A jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, awarding substantial damages and apportioning 25% fault to Ford (with the rest to the driver and plaintiff). The court addressed the form of the judgment, specifically whether non-economic damages could exceed Colorado's statutory cap beyond Ford's pro rata share of liability. The court ruled that while clear and convincing evidence justified exceeding the cap due to the exceptional circumstances of Erica's injuries, the award for non-economic damages against Ford was limited to its 25% pro rata share, resulting in $375,000. This conclusion followed from the interplay between Colorado's pro rata liability statute and the non-economic damages cap, as interpreted in General Electric Co. v. Niemet, ensuring no defendant pays more than its apportioned fault even when the cap is lifted.