This case involved a bankruptcy trustee suing a jewelry dealer for allegedly fraudulent transfers and unlawful preferences under the Bankruptcy Act after an insolvent jeweler transferred items to the defendant at prices below their claimed cost. The jury awarded the trustee $7,700 on the fraudulent transfer claim and $5,300 on the preference claim, and the district court entered judgment accordingly. The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment in full, holding that the evidence of inadequate consideration and the defendant's knowledge of insolvency was sufficient to support the verdicts, but modified it to add interest on the preference recovery because that amount was fixed and ascertainable. The court reasoned that fair consideration under the statute requires a good-faith exchange of equivalent value and that interest was warranted on the preference portion as a matter of law given its certainty.
This case involved an appeal from a district court order denying any fee allowance to attorney T. Roland Berner for his representation of shareholders in the corporate reorganization of Equitable Office Building Corporation under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act. The district court had denied the allowance, possibly relying on § 249 of the Act or general equitable principles due to concerns over share purchases and potential conflicts. The Second Circuit held that the evidence did not establish conduct automatically forfeiting all rights to compensation under § 249, but that Berner's actions warranted a discretionary reduction in the allowance, which could potentially reach zero, and remanded for the district court to determine the proper amount after considering the relevant conduct and disclosures.
The case involved an alien who entered the US illegally in 1926, was deported to Germany in 1946 after living here for years, and then sought reentry in 1947 aboard a ship but was excluded by immigration authorities for lacking a visa, passport, and permission to reapply after prior deportation. He filed a habeas corpus petition arguing that his 1946 deportation was invalid because it should have been to Danzig rather than Germany, so his return did not constitute an 'entry' allowing exclusion. The court affirmed the dismissal of the writ, holding that even if the prior deportation was irregular, the alien had no lawful right to reenter without complying with immigration laws requiring documentation. It also ruled that the denial of an extension for voluntary departure was a discretionary matter not subject to judicial review, and any appeal regarding bail became moot.
The case concerned whether payments received by the taxpayer from her ex-husband in 1943 under a 1938 contract were includible in her gross income under Section 22(k) of the Revenue Act of 1942, and whether she qualified for a personal exemption as head of a family under Section 25. The court reversed the Tax Court on the first issue, holding the payments taxable because the taxpayer did not prove they exceeded the amounts required by the 1934 divorce decree that incorporated the original separation agreement, and affirmed on the exemption because she substantially contributed to her son's support. The reasoning was that the 1938 contract was not incident to the divorce decree, leaving only the decree's incorporated obligations as the relevant legal duties, while accepting the Tax Court's longstanding substantial-contribution standard for the head-of-family regulation.
The case involved Ecco High Frequency Corp., a manufacturer of electrical high frequency heating equipment, appealing Tax Court rulings on its 1941 tax deductions for officer compensation and legal fees. The issues were the allowable deduction under IRC section 23(a) for services by its president and sole salaried officer Emil Capita, whom the company sought to compensate at $56,000 based on a percentage of gross sales, and whether the company could deduct all attorney fees or only the portion attributable to corporate rather than personal services for Capita. The court affirmed the Tax Court's allowance of a $40,000 deduction for Capita's compensation as reasonable under the circumstances and its disallowance of part of the legal fees as personal obligations of Capita. The core reasoning was that the reasonable value of services is a factual determination based on the particular facts of the case, including Capita's control of the corporation and how compensation was set, rather than trade customs, and that the taxpayer did not meet its burden to show the Commissioner's fee apportionment was erroneous.
This case involved a radio station owner suing four major broadcasting networks under the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging a conspiracy through exclusive contracts and pricing practices that excluded the station from network advertising opportunities, and seeking a preliminary injunction to compel continued program access from two networks. The district court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the appeals court affirmed that decision. The court found no persuasive evidence of unlawful concerted action to boycott the plaintiff, noting that each network had canceled its agreements in accordance with their terms and had the right as non-common carriers to select affiliates and set business arrangements independently. It further reasoned that the Federal Communications Commission had reviewed and sanctioned key aspects of the affiliation contracts, and compelling the networks to maintain the prior relationships would interfere with their new affiliations and standard operations.
