Dunnet Bay Construction Company, owned by two white males, sued the Illinois Department of Transportation and its officials, alleging that IDOT's Disadvantaged Business Enterprise program for federally assisted highway contracts discriminates on the basis of race in violation of equal protection. The program requires bidders to meet goals for participation by businesses owned by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals, with a rebuttable presumption that women and racial minorities qualify, and allows contract awards based on demonstrated good-faith efforts to meet those goals. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that Dunnet Bay lacked standing to bring the equal protection challenge and that the program complied with constitutional and regulatory requirements. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment, upholding the standing determination and the conclusion that the DBE program survived the challenges.
This case involved contribution claims under CERCLA for costs to clean up polychlorinated biphenyls and other hazardous waste in Sauget Area 1 along Dead Creek in Illinois. Rogers Cartage Company, after settling related claims with other potentially responsible parties including Monsanto and Solutia, filed a new third-party complaint seeking further contribution, which the district court dismissed as barred by the prior settlement agreement. The court also imposed sanctions on Rogers Cartage for filing the precluded claims. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding the settlement unambiguous, and upheld the sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 after determining substantial compliance with its safe-harbor requirements. The court rejected reliance on inherent authority or 28 U.S.C. § 1927 for the sanctions order.
Earl Sidney Davis, a civil detainee under Illinois's Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act at a high-security facility, sued security guards Seth Wessel and George Lay under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. He alleged that the guards refused to remove his hand restraints in a courthouse restroom despite a judicial order, forced him to struggle to use the toilet while they watched and laughed, and caused him physical pain, humiliation, and the need to hold his need to defecate for hours. A jury awarded Davis $1,000 in compensatory damages, but the guards appealed the denial of their motion for judgment as a matter of law and challenged the jury instructions on the applicable constitutional standard. The Seventh Circuit held that the evidence was sufficient to support a finding that the guards violated clearly established law by using restraints for punitive or humiliating purposes without penological justification, but it vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial because the district court's jury instructions were erroneous.
This case concerns a former Des Plaines police officer, Dick Lalowski, who was discharged after two confrontations with abortion clinic demonstrators on May 20, 2006—one while on duty and one shortly after his shift ended—leading the police chief to bring charges before the Board of Fire and Police Commissioners, which sustained the charges and terminated his employment. Lalowski sued the city, the board, and the chief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for protected speech, and separately sought judicial review of the termination under Illinois administrative law. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment on the First Amendment claim, holding that the record did not support a retaliation finding, but vacated the judgment on the state-law administrative review claim because the district court had improperly granted summary judgment without prior notice or an opportunity for the parties to brief the issue as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f), and remanded for further proceedings.
In United States v. Srinivasa Erramilli, the defendant was convicted of abusive sexual contact for touching a woman's thigh on an airplane, with the government introducing evidence of two prior similar incidents under Federal Rule of Evidence 413. Erramilli appealed, arguing that the prior acts evidence should have been excluded and that the jury instruction on its use was improper. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, reasoning that Rule 413 allows prior sexual assault evidence to be considered on any relevant matter and that the district court's instruction identifying specific purposes such as motive, intent, and propensity did not constitute an abuse of discretion.
Myron Mintz, an African American manufacturing engineer at Caterpillar Inc., sued his employer alleging race discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII after receiving negative performance evaluations and other adverse actions related to his handling of production issues like grief and change orders. The district court granted Caterpillar's motion for summary judgment after Mintz failed to file a timely response, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that judgment on appeal. The court held that Mintz failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not show he was meeting legitimate job expectations or that similarly situated employees were treated more favorably, and he offered no evidence of pretext. For the retaliation claim, the court found no causal connection between Mintz's protected activity and the adverse actions, citing the nine-month gap in timing and lack of corroborating evidence under both direct and indirect methods of proof.
