The case involved former voluntary mental patient Janet Gotkin and her husband Paul, who sought access to her records from multiple hospitals where she had been treated between 1962 and 1970, in order to verify facts for a book they were writing; the hospitals refused the requests. The plaintiffs sued state and hospital officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that the denials violated their rights under the First, Fourth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, and sought class certification, declaratory relief, and injunctions to establish a general right of access for former patients. Paul Gotkin was dismissed as a plaintiff for lack of standing. The court granted summary judgment to the state defendants and dismissed claims against the private hospital directors, concluding that no constitutional right to inspect one's own mental health records exists, that the hospitals' policies did not deprive plaintiffs of any protected interest, and that access is not required absent a pending malpractice suit or court order.
The case involved a challenge by the surviving wife and children of a deceased Social Security beneficiary to the reduction of their survivors’ benefits to accommodate claims by the decedent’s alleged illegitimate children. The reduction was implemented by the Social Security Administration without providing the plaintiffs an opportunity for a hearing prior to the reduction, although post-reduction review was available. The court determined that the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause requires a pre-reduction evidentiary hearing because the recipients have a protected interest in the benefits and the risk of erroneous deprivation outweighs the government’s interest in summary action, applying a balancing test from Goldberg v. Kelly.
This case arose from a 1971 car accident in New York involving a government vehicle driven by federal employee Robert Cooper with passenger Robert Sheridan, both FDA workers, and another vehicle driven by Gasper DiGiorgio. After Sheridan sued the private defendants in state court, they filed third-party claims against Cooper and Sheridan for contribution under Dole v. Dow, leading to removal to federal court where the United States was substituted as a party. The government moved to dismiss the third-party claims, arguing that the Federal Employees Compensation Act (FECA) provided the exclusive remedy. The court granted the dismissal, holding that FECA's exclusivity provision, 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c), bars third-party actions for contribution or indemnity against the United States when the injured party is a federal employee, and that federal rather than state law controls the scope of this immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
In Candarini v. Attorney General, multiple inmates at a federal prison challenged the U.S. Board of Parole's release procedures as violating Fifth Amendment due process, seeking writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, and certiorari. The court denied habeas relief because the petitioners were not contesting their sentences and jurisdiction was lacking under relevant statutes, while also dismissing claims against the Bureau of Prisons and related federal entities since Congress had vested exclusive parole authority in the Board. However, the court found subject-matter jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act to review agency actions for abuse of discretion, determined venue was proper, and retained the case to address the applicability of due process to parole decisions despite prior circuit precedent holding that minimum procedural protections do not attach at the release stage.
The case involved a motion to remand a lawsuit from federal district court back to New York state court. Plaintiff Wham-O Manufacturing Co. had sued defendants in state court for breach of a 1973 agreement in which defendants acknowledged the validity of Wham-O's patent on plastic hoops and agreed not to manufacture or sell certain large hoops; the complaint sought repayment of $5,500 plus damages for alleged violations. Defendants removed the case to federal court, asserting exclusive federal jurisdiction under patent laws because the dispute concerned patent validity and infringement. The court granted the remand, holding that the claims arose under general contract law rather than federal patent statutes, since resolution required interpreting the parties' agreement and any patent issues would arise only as defenses.
The case concerned Robert and Carolyn Matherson, who were charged with multiple violations of federal regulations (36 C.F.R. § 7.20) for operating motor vehicles without permits and during restricted hours within the Fire Island National Seashore. The defendants moved to declare the regulations unconstitutional or to dismiss the charges and enter acquittals, arguing improper subdelegation of authority to local towns. The court denied all motions, upheld the regulations, and found both defendants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on the stipulated facts. The core reasoning was that Congress holds plenary power over federal lands under the Property Clause, which it delegated to the Secretary of the Interior and ultimately the Seashore Superintendent; the permit requirement reflected valid cooperation with local authorities to prevent erosion rather than an abdication of federal control, as the Superintendent retained final decision-making authority.