In Corr v. Metropolitan Washington Airports Authority, Virginia residents who used the Dulles Toll Road sued the MWAA on behalf of a class, alleging that toll increases since 2005 to fund Metrorail construction amounted to taxes imposed by an unelected interstate compact entity in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clauses, the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, and the Virginia Constitution's provisions on independent government and taxation without representation. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the tolls and recover excess amounts collected. The court granted MWAA's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim and dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It concluded that the charges were legitimate user fees tied to road use rather than taxes, that MWAA's rate-setting authority under its federal and state authorizing legislation raised no valid delegation or republican-form-of-government issues, and that the complaint failed to state any constitutional claim.
The case involved a dispute between ATCS International LLC and Jefferson Contracting Corp. over a subcontract for preparing Composite Shop Drawings (CSDs) for a construction project in Qatar. After their relationship ended, ATCS registered copyrights for the CSDs and sued Jefferson for copyright infringement, breach of contract, and unjust enrichment, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Jefferson from using the drawings. The court denied the motion, finding that ATCS failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits because the CSDs consisted of compilations of preexisting non-copyrighted technical drawings with insufficient originality or protectable creative expression for copyright protection under 17 U.S.C. § 102(b). The court also concluded that ATCS did not demonstrate likely irreparable harm, as the core dispute centered on unpaid fees that could be addressed through monetary damages, and that the balance of equities and public interest did not favor an injunction due to potential impacts on third parties involved in the project.
The case involved Volvo companies seeking to transfer ownership of the domain name volvospares.com from registrant Ken White under the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, alleging unauthorized use of their VOLVO trademark on a site selling Volvo parts. The court granted summary judgment in favor of Volvo, ordering the domain to be transferred to Volvo Trademark Holding AB. The decision was based on undisputed facts showing that the domain was confusingly similar to the well-known VOLVO mark, registered in bad faith with intent to profit, and used in competition with Volvo's authorized dealers, despite a disclaimer added later. White's submissions did not raise any genuine issues of material fact.
In McCune v. National City Bank, homeowners sued their bank after it refused, under a 2008 policy, to subordinate its second mortgage lien so they could refinance their first mortgage with another lender. The plaintiffs claimed violations of the Bank Holding Company Act’s anti-tying rules, the Truth in Lending Act, and Ohio’s implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. On the bank’s motion to dismiss, the court denied the motion as to the federal anti-tying count but granted it as to the TILA and state-law counts. The court applied the Rule 12(b)(6) standard, finding the complaint stated a plausible claim under the Bank Holding Company Act while concluding that TILA did not cover the bank’s refusal to alter lien priority and that Ohio law did not recognize the asserted contractual duty on these facts.
This case arose from a 2005 car accident in Virginia between Thompson and Brown, who was operating a tractor-trailer owned by Eagle Valley and attached to a trailer owned by Milligan; Thompson obtained a $1.7 million judgment against Brown and Eagle Valley, then sought to collect from Sentry under an insurance policy Sentry had issued to Milligan. Sentry filed for declaratory judgment that it had no duty to indemnify or pay any portion of the judgment, while Thompson counterclaimed seeking coverage, primarily under the policy's MCS-90 endorsement for motor carrier public liability. The court granted summary judgment to Sentry and denied Thompson's motion, holding that neither Brown nor Eagle Valley qualified as an "insured" under the policy or the MCS-90. The core reasoning was that the MCS-90 must be interpreted according to federal regulations defining "insured" as the motor carrier named in the policy (here, Milligan), the accident vehicles were not listed in the policy, and the endorsement did not extend coverage beyond that named insured to satisfy the judgment.
The case involves Peter Paul Mitrano's appeal from the Bankruptcy Court's dismissal of his Chapter 13 petition for failing to comply with the credit counseling requirement under 11 U.S.C. § 109(h). Mitrano had filed the petition to avert an imminent foreclosure but submitted a statement that did not certify a timely request for approved counseling services or qualify for a deferral. The District Court affirmed the dismissal orders, concluding that the statutory prerequisites for a waiver were not met on the face of the filing, that the bankruptcy court had no discretion to overlook noncompliance regardless of exigent circumstances like foreclosure, and that the eligibility rules could be enforced sua sponte even if non-jurisdictional. The court noted Mitrano could refile after obtaining counseling but rejected equitable excuses in this instance.