Stephen S. Trott

This case concerns a former inmate's civil rights lawsuit against Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca, alleging that Baca's failure to address prior incidents of inmate violence violated the Eighth Amendment by allowing correctional officers to facilitate an assault on the plaintiff. The Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court's dismissal of the claim against Baca in his supervisory capacity, and a majority of active judges declined to rehear the case en banc. The core reasoning, as set out in the published order and dissent, centers on whether the complaint's allegations of unrelated prior violence incidents meet the plausibility pleading standard from Twombly and Iqbal and establish a causal link to the specific incident rather than supporting vicarious liability.

civil rightsprocedure

In this case, inmate Dion Starr sued Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca in his individual capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Baca was deliberately indifferent to dangerous conditions in the county jail in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Starr claimed that jail deputies allowed other inmates to attack him and then further abused him, and that Baca knew or should have known of the risks based on prior incidents but failed to act. The district court dismissed the supervisory liability claim against Baca for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the complaint's factual allegations of Baca's knowledge and inaction were sufficient to plead a causal connection under the pleading standards of Ashcroft v. Iqbal and circuit precedent on supervisory liability. The court remanded for further proceedings, while a dissent argued that the allegations were too conclusory to establish personal involvement by Baca.

civil rightscriminal law

The case involved two Mexican nationals charged with illegal entry into the United States who participated in a group plea hearing under the District of Arizona's Operation Streamline program, where a magistrate judge explained rights and took guilty pleas from dozens of defendants at once. The defendants appealed, arguing that the collective nature of the hearing violated their Fifth Amendment due process rights by failing to ensure their pleas were knowing and voluntary as required by Boykin v. Alabama. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, holding that the record sufficiently demonstrated the pleas were voluntary and intelligent because the defendants had access to counsel, were advised of their rights collectively, and had opportunities to ask questions or request trials individually. The court reasoned that Boykin does not mandate individualized waivers but only requires affirmative evidence of a knowing plea on the record, which was present here, and the defendants failed to show any plain error affecting their substantial rights.

immigrationcriminal law

The case involved Ameyalli Escamilla-Rojas, a Mexican citizen charged with illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325, who participated in a group plea hearing under the District of Arizona's Operation Streamline program alongside 66 other defendants. She appealed her conviction after pleading guilty, arguing that the en masse advisements and individual colloquies violated Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 as well as her Fifth Amendment due process rights and Sixth Amendment right to counsel, including claims that she could not silently waive rights by not standing and that she was separated from her attorney. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the plea and sentence, holding that the magistrate judge's collective explanation of rights, charges, and penalties followed by individualized questioning satisfied Rule 11 and constitutional requirements by confirming each defendant's understanding and voluntary waiver. The court further reasoned that any temporary separation from counsel during the group portion had no probable effect on the fairness or outcome of the proceeding, as counsel met with her beforehand, stood with her during the individual plea, and raised no further objections.

criminal lawimmigrationprocedurecivil rights

The case involved a lawsuit by the Freedom from Religion Foundation challenging the constitutionality of federal and state parsonage tax exemptions for ministers' housing allowances under the Establishment Clause. Pastor Michael Rodgers, who claimed the exemptions, sought to intervene as a defendant, both as of right and permissively, but the district court denied the motion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of intervention as of right because existing parties adequately represented Rodgers's interests and his stake was not impaired. It vacated and remanded the denial of permissive intervention, ruling that the district court applied the wrong legal standard by requiring independent jurisdictional grounds, which does not apply to intervenors raising no new claims in federal-question cases.

religious libertytaxesprocedure

The case involved David Nosal, who was indicted for violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act after former colleagues at Korn/Ferry used their authorized access to the company's confidential database to obtain proprietary information for Nosal's competing business. The district court dismissed several counts, relying on prior precedent to hold that employees do not exceed authorized access when they obtain information they are permitted to view, even if for an improper purpose. The Ninth Circuit reversed, interpreting the CFAA to cover accessing information for a purpose that violates an employer's restrictions on use, provided there is intent to defraud and the conduct furthers a fraud while obtaining something of value. The court reasoned that the statute's specific intent and causation elements limit its application to non-innocuous violations and align with congressional goals regarding computer-related crimes.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a federal habeas petition filed by Steve Houston, who challenged his state conviction for conspiracy to commit murder on the ground that his trial counsel had a conflict of interest. Counsel belonged to the same public defender's office that had previously represented a key prosecution witness, though counsel had not personally handled that earlier matter. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found no adverse effect on counsel's performance, and the Ninth Circuit reviewed that determination de novo while reviewing factual findings for clear error. The court affirmed the denial of relief, holding that any potential conflict did not actually impair counsel's cross-examination or other strategic decisions and that Houston had not shown resulting prejudice.

criminal lawprocedure

In this case, inmate Dion Starr brought a § 1983 claim against Los Angeles County Sheriff Leroy Baca in his individual capacity, alleging that Baca's deliberate indifference to dangerous conditions in the county jail violated Starr's Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights when deputies failed to protect him from a violent inmate attack and then mistreated him afterward. The district court dismissed the supervisory liability claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to sufficiently allege a causal connection between Baca's conduct and the incident. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, holding that Starr's detailed allegations of prior incidents and Baca's knowledge or constructive knowledge of systemic risks were adequate to state a claim for individual supervisory liability under the deliberate indifference standard. The court reasoned that these facts provided the required plausible causal link without relying on mere conclusory assertions.

civil rightscriminal law

Deborah Hooper sued San Diego County officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 after a sheriff's deputy’s police dog bit her scalp during an arrest, alleging excessive force; she had previously pled guilty to resisting a peace officer under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) but did not challenge the lawfulness of the arrest itself. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants, ruling that her § 1983 claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey because success on the excessive-force claim would imply the invalidity of her conviction. The Ninth Circuit reversed that ruling, concluding that Heck does not apply when the conviction and the § 1983 claim rest on different actions within one continuous transaction. The court also vacated the dismissal of Hooper’s analogous state-law claims for reconsideration and affirmed summary judgment in favor of Sheriff Kolender in his individual capacity.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

Bradford Coleman filed a class action in California state court against Estes Express Lines, Inc. and Estes West alleging violations of state wage and hour statutes on behalf of himself and other employees. Estes Express removed the case to federal district court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), but the district court remanded it to state court under the local controversy exception to CAFA jurisdiction. Estes Express petitioned for leave to appeal the remand order under 28 U.S.C. § 1453(c)(1). The Ninth Circuit granted leave to appeal after setting out criteria for exercising discretion to review CAFA remand orders and determining that the case raised an important, unsettled question about whether courts may look beyond the pleadings to apply the local controversy exception.

procedurelabor & employmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved California-based employees of Chinese Daily News, Inc. suing their employer under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act and California labor laws for unpaid overtime, denial of meal and rest breaks, and related wage violations. The district court certified the federal claims as a collective action and the state claims as a class action, granted partial summary judgment to the plaintiffs, conducted trials, and entered judgment awarding damages and fees to the employees. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings on class certification under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(2) and (b)(3), the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state claims, the invalidation of opt-outs, and the final judgment. The court reasoned that the certifications were appropriate, supplemental jurisdiction was properly exercised given the related claims and judicial economy, and other procedural decisions were within the district court's discretion.

labor & employment

The case involved Juan Soria Vega's petition for review of a Board of Immigration Appeals decision denying his motion to reopen removal proceedings as untimely. Soria Vega had conceded removability, received voluntary departure, and seen the BIA affirm the immigration judge's order in May 2004 as the final agency determination; after the BIA denied his motion to reconsider and later reissued that denial, he filed a motion to reopen in July 2005 based on changed family circumstances. The court held that the motion was untimely because it was not filed within 90 days of the May 2004 final order, as required by 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). The court reasoned that a motion to reopen must target the initial merits determination with new evidence unavailable earlier, and that the BIA's interpretation of the statute—clarified by regulation—was reasonable under Chevron principles, as allowing later timing would permit undue delay.

immigrationprocedure

This case involved the Retired Employees Association of Orange County suing the County of Orange over its 2007 decision to split the pool of active and retired employees when calculating health insurance premiums, which increased costs for retirees. The retirees claimed that the county's long-standing practice of pooling created an implied contract granting them vested lifetime rights to the subsidized premiums. The district court ruled that the county could not be bound by implied contracts and dismissed the claims. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit did not decide the merits but instead certified a question to the California Supreme Court asking whether, under California law, a county and its employees can form an implied contract conferring vested health benefits on retirees.

labor & employmenthealthcare

The case concerned a 2002 contract between the Guidiville Band of Pomo Indians and NGV Gaming to develop a gaming facility on land the Tribe planned to acquire and have placed in federal trust. After the Tribe later entered a similar deal with Harrah's Operating Company, NGV sued Harrah's for tortious interference with its contract. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that the NGV contract was invalid because it lacked required approval from the Secretary of the Interior under 25 U.S.C. § 81. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, ruling that Section 81 applies only to contracts that encumber lands already held in trust by the United States. The court based this holding on the statute's plain language defining Indian lands as those whose title "is held" in trust, reinforced by related statutes, legislative history, and the contract's own terms.

business & regulatoryfederal powerproperty

The case concerned whether Perfumebay.com's use of various forms of the mark 'Perfumebay,' including conjoined versions like 'perfumebay' and 'PerfumeBay,' infringed eBay's trademark under the Lanham Act, along with related claims of dilution and breach of contract arising from failed settlement negotiations. After a bench trial, the district court found a likelihood of initial interest confusion for the conjoined marks, issued a permanent injunction against their use, and denied eBay's dilution and contract claims as well as Perfumebay's request for attorneys' fees. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the infringement ruling and injunction based on the similarity of the marks, the strength of eBay's mark, and evidence of consumer confusion through search engine results, but affirmed the denial of the dilution claim due to insufficient similarity of the non-conjoined marks and upheld the rejection of the contract claim for lack of mutual assent.

business & regulatory