This case concerned challenges by the San Joaquin River Group Authority to the National Marine Fisheries Service's 2011 approval of Pacific Fishery Management Council measures allowing commercial and recreational fishing for Sacramento River fall-run Chinook salmon. The plaintiff alleged violations of the Magnuson-Stevens Act and APA due to inadequate accounting for scientific uncertainty and bias in abundance estimates, as well as NEPA violations for failing to assess compliance with environmental laws and consider a reasonable range of alternatives in the environmental assessment; standing was asserted based on potential future regulatory burdens from reduced fish escapement. The court applied the APA's arbitrary and capricious standard, emphasizing deference to agency expertise on scientific and technical matters unless the agency failed to consider essential factors or offered an explanation contrary to the evidence. The opinion reasoned that the agency had considered and adjusted for uncertainty and bias in its decision-making process, and that this satisfied legal requirements without needing further analysis.
This case is a patent infringement action in which Duhn Oil Tool sued Cooper Cameron for infringing its '925 Patent on a wellhead isolation tool (frac mandrel) compatible with existing wellhead components using dual lock screws. A jury found Cameron liable for infringement and contributory infringement but determined that several patent claims were invalid, and it returned an advisory verdict on Cameron's inequitable conduct counterclaim. The court addressed post-trial motions for entry of judgment and judgment as a matter of law, focusing on the scope and consistency of the jury's special verdicts regarding anticipation by prior art, the effect of the added 'wherein clause' in claim 1, and whether the findings could be reconciled without a new trial. The decision analyzes the jury instructions, verdict form, and evidence on obviousness and anticipation under patent law standards to determine the appropriate judgment.
This case involves a multi-phase toxic tort lawsuit brought by over 2,000 plaintiffs against former owners of a closed cooling tower manufacturing facility and related public entities, alleging property damage and health effects from hexavalent chromium and arsenic contamination released via long-term discharges and an April 2006 flood. In Phase 1, the jury addressed general exposure issues, including whether contaminants reached locations where plaintiffs could have been exposed through surface water, air, or flood pathways. Following the verdicts, the BAC Defendants moved for judgment as a matter of law or a new trial, arguing insufficient evidence on exposure pathways and corporate liability. The court granted the motion in part, entering judgment for defendants on the surface water pathway via the El Capitan canal from 1992 to 2006, because plaintiffs presented no evidence of hexavalent chromium in the canal after 1991 and relied only on total chromium measurements or pre-1991 data, while denying the motion on other pathways and issues.
This case involves a challenge by the Coalition for a Sustainable Delta and Kern County Water Agency to FEMA's administration of the National Flood Insurance Program in the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta, claiming that actions such as certifying community eligibility, issuing Letters of Map Changes, enforcing floodplain management criteria, and providing flood insurance incentivize development that harms listed species including Chinook salmon and delta smelt, thereby requiring consultation under Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act. FEMA moved for partial summary judgment on grounds including statute of limitations barring challenges to minimum criteria, lack of any effect on species from LOMCs, exclusive statutory review procedures for map changes, and the non-discretionary nature of issuing insurance policies under the precedent of National Association of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife. The court reviewed evidentiary objections to public records, noted plaintiffs' concessions that regulatory amendment authority alone does not trigger consultation, and examined whether FEMA retains sufficient discretion in ongoing implementation to require ESA consultation, distinguishing conditional and final map revisions.
This case arose from a fatal collision between an Amtrak train and a vehicle driven by the plaintiff's wife, resulting in the deaths of the wife and two children; the plaintiff sued Amtrak, BNSF, the State of California, and others for negligence and related claims. After a jury trial, the jury found Amtrak negligent (causing the harm), attributed 50% comparative fault to the driver, awarded economic and non-economic damages, and the County of Stanislaus had settled earlier for $800,000. On post-trial motions, the court addressed the proper amount of judgment under California Code of Civil Procedure § 877 and Civil Code § 1431.2 (Proposition 51), which separates joint-and-several liability for economic damages from several liability for non-economic damages, and considered whether punitive damages were supported. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for judgment in part and denied it in part, and denied Amtrak's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on punitive damages, reasoning that the evidence of the engineer's conduct permitted an inference of conscious disregard sufficient to submit the issue to the jury.
The case involves Maria Escriba suing her employer Foster Poultry Farms after her termination in December 2007, alleging interference with her rights under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), the California Family Rights Act (CFRA), and related claims under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) and wrongful termination in violation of public policy. Escriba sought leave to travel to Guatemala to care for her ailing father, using two weeks of vacation time, but disputed facts center on whether her father had a serious medical condition, the adequacy and timeliness of her notice to the employer, and whether she properly invoked FMLA-protected leave or complied with company rules. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on the interference claims and the employer's affirmative defenses, evaluating evidence such as medical records, conversations with supervisors, and whether the plaintiff's declaration created genuine issues of material fact without being a sham affidavit. Core reasoning focused on the standards for FMLA eligibility, notice requirements, distinctions between interference and discrimination claims, and the admissibility of conflicting testimony under evidence rules.