The case concerned utility companies supplying electricity and gas to Iowa cities under franchise ordinances that set maximum rates for a fixed term of 20 or 25 years. The companies sued to block enforcement of those rates, arguing they had become so low as to be confiscatory in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court upheld the rates on the theory that the ordinances constituted binding contracts. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Iowa Code §725 and state supreme court precedent prohibit municipalities from contracting away their authority to regulate rates, so the ordinances created no enforceable contract obligation that could override the constitutional prohibition on confiscatory rates.
The case concerned whether the City of San Antonio could enforce a five-cent streetcar fare against the San Antonio Public Service Company under an 1899 ordinance. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decree enjoining enforcement, ruling that the city possessed no contractual right to impose the rate and that enforcement would amount to confiscation of the company's property in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion reviewed the history of municipal ordinances, a 1903 half-fare law, prior litigation in the Altgelt case, and the 1917 consolidation ordinance; it concluded that state constitutional limits and subsequent regulatory actions had eliminated any contract-based restriction on rate regulation while preserving the prohibition on confiscatory rates. The Court found that the parties' conduct after Altgelt demonstrated reliance on regulatory power rather than contract, and that the consolidation ordinance expressly preserved the city's rate-making authority without creating new contractual fare limits.
The case involved a California company that hired a state resident to work at a cannery in Alaska; the worker was injured there and sought compensation from California's Industrial Accident Commission under a statute covering out-of-state injuries when the employment contract was formed in California. The Commission awarded benefits, but the company argued the statute was unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause because it appeared to favor California residents over non-residents. The California Supreme Court interpreted the law to apply uniformly to citizens of all states, thereby avoiding any discrimination, and upheld the award. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that it could not second-guess the state court's construction of its own statute and that the federal constitutional question had become frivolous once that construction was accepted.
The case involved the United States seeking to cancel 18 patents for coal lands in Wyoming granted 14 to 20 years earlier, along with related deeds to the Diamond Coal & Coke Company, and to recover the value of coal extracted, alleging a conspiracy in which the company used nominal entrymen who falsely swore the purchases were for their own benefit. The District Court dismissed the suit on motion, concluding it was barred by the six-year statute of limitations in the Act of March 3, 1891, and that the alleged facts did not show sufficient concealment to toll the limitations period or avoid imputing knowledge to the government. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the bill's averments of fraud, false affidavits, and concealment were adequate to potentially suspend the statute until discovery and that the case should proceed to hearing and proof rather than being resolved on the pleadings alone.
This case involved an indictment and conviction for violating the Reed Amendment, a federal law prohibiting the transportation of intoxicating liquor in interstate commerce into any state whose laws banned its manufacture or sale for beverage purposes. The defendant directly appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the statute violated the constitutional prohibition on commerce regulations that give preference to the ports of one state over those of another. Citing its prior decisions in Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co. and United States v. Hill, which had upheld the constitutionality of the related Webb-Kenyon Law on grounds that Congress could adapt interstate commerce rules to varying state regulations on intoxicants, the Court held that the Reed Amendment was a valid exercise of federal authority and affirmed the conviction.
The case concerned whether Section 4 of the Lever Act, as reenacted in 1919, validly criminalized willfully making unjust or unreasonable rates or charges in dealing with necessaries such as sugar. The defendant grocery company was indicted for selling sugar at prices the government deemed excessive, and it challenged the statute on grounds that it was unconstitutionally vague. The district court quashed the indictment, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the provision failed to define the prohibited conduct with sufficient certainty. The Court reasoned that the terms left the standard of guilt to the varying views of different judges and juries, thereby delegating legislative power in violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments and depriving defendants of notice of the accusation. The Court rejected arguments that the statute did not cover sales prices or that wartime conditions altered the constitutional analysis.
