The case involves a Medicare-certified hospice provider challenging the validity of a federal regulation, 42 C.F.R. § 418.309(b), used by the Department of Health and Human Services to calculate annual aggregate caps on Medicare reimbursements for hospice services. The provider sought expedited judicial review after the Provider Reimbursement Review Board determined it lacked authority to resolve the legal question, following demands for repayment based on the regulation for fiscal years 2005 through 2007. The court first rejected the government's arguments on standing and exhaustion of remedies, finding that the plaintiff had standing as a directly regulated entity and that expedited review permitted the court to address the merits. On the merits, the court held the regulation invalid because it conflicts with the plain language of the governing statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1395f(i)(2)(C), by using a different calculation method, and accordingly entered judgment for the plaintiff with an injunction against the regulation's use.
In this case, the plaintiff sued her insurer after a motor vehicle accident, alleging negligence, breach of contract, and bad faith for an initial denial of uninsured motorist coverage and a six-month delay in paying policy limits. The defendant moved to dismiss the negligence and breach of contract claims. The court granted dismissal of the negligence claim, holding that Oklahoma law recognizes only contract and bad faith tort claims arising from insurance policies, not a separate negligence action based solely on contractual duties. The court denied dismissal of the breach of contract claim, finding that payment of policy limits before suit does not necessarily preclude recovery of interest or other damages under the contract.
This case involved a plaintiff who sued her insurer in Oklahoma state court for breach of contract, negligence, and bad faith arising from an automobile accident, seeking damages in excess of $10,000 per claim. The defendant removed the action to federal court under diversity jurisdiction after the plaintiff denied in discovery responses that her total damages did not exceed $75,000, and after noting that her medical bills exceeded that threshold. The plaintiff moved to remand, arguing that neither the petition nor the notice of removal sufficiently established the amount in controversy and that removal was untimely. The court denied the motion, holding that the plaintiff's denial in her response to the request for admission constituted an "other paper" under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) that first made removability ascertainable, rendering the notice timely, and that the amount in controversy was established by a preponderance of the evidence including the denial and medical bills. The court further noted that evasive answers on the amount of damages would be construed against the responding party.
This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Patrick Dwayne Murphy, who was convicted in Oklahoma state court of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. Murphy raised claims that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction because the crime occurred in Indian country, that his mental retardation claim received unequal treatment violating equal protection and other constitutional rights, and that the state's lethal injection protocol constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The district court reviewed the full state court records, transcripts, and prior appellate decisions, adopted the historical facts found by the state courts, and concluded that no additional evidentiary hearing was required to resolve the petition.
This case involved a plaintiff who sued a shopping center operator under the Americans with Disabilities Act alleging multiple accessibility violations at the property, including inadequate parking signage and slopes, improper door handles, and obstructed public telephones. After the parties reached a settlement and filed a joint notice of dismissal, the court considered the plaintiff's motion for attorney's fees, expert fees, and costs as the prevailing party. The court granted the motion in part under 42 U.S.C. § 12205, applying the lodestar method to calculate reasonable fees while making specific reductions for excessive hours, unreasonable rates, block billing, and other deficiencies, resulting in a total award of $6,616.89. The decision rested on the determination that the settlement materially altered the legal relationship between the parties in the plaintiff's favor, entitling him to recover reasonable fees and expenses despite objections from the defendant.
The case concerned a lawsuit brought by James W. Green and the ACLU of Oklahoma against the Haskell County Board of Commissioners seeking removal of a Ten Commandments monument from the front lawn of the county courthouse in Stigler, Oklahoma. The court held a trial to examine the monument's history, its placement among other privately donated monuments on public property, and the county's unwritten policy for approving such displays. The core reasoning involved assessing whether the display had a primarily secular purpose and effect under Establishment Clause precedents such as McCreary County v. ACLU, reviewing the context of the monument's addition, the county's knowledge and approval process, and the absence of excessive government entanglement with religion.