This case concerned a patent infringement lawsuit brought by American Lecithin Company against Warfield Company, alleging unauthorized use of a patented process for adding lecithin to chocolate to prevent graying or blooming. The plaintiff sold lecithin without formal licenses and permitted use of the patent only when the material was purchased from it. The court dismissed the suit, ruling that the plaintiff could not enforce the patent. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff's method of business effectively conditioned the practice of the patented process on buying an unpatented article from it, thereby extending the patent monopoly beyond its proper scope in contravention of Supreme Court precedents such as Leitch Manufacturing Co. v. Barber Co. and Carbice Corp. v. American Patents Development Corp.
The case involved a meatpacking company's suits against a tax collector to recover over $11 million in processing taxes paid under the Agricultural Adjustment Act before its invalidation by the Supreme Court in United States v. Butler. The plaintiff had filed refund claims and equity actions, but after the Revenue Act of 1936 imposed new conditions for refunds—including proving the taxpayer bore the economic burden of the tax—the collector moved to dismiss. The court held that the 1936 Act applied to pending cases, withdrew the government's consent to be sued in the prior manner, and converted any judgment against the collector into one against the United States that could not proceed without compliance with the new statutory requirements. It therefore dismissed the suits for lack of jurisdiction, rejecting arguments that the legislation unconstitutionally deprived the plaintiff of vested rights.
The case involved a Chicago jewelry manufacturer seeking a temporary injunction to block enforcement proceedings under the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 by the National Labor Relations Board, after the company was accused of unfair labor practices including discharging employees for union activity and refusing to bargain collectively. The plaintiff argued the Act was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment and other provisions and that the administrative process would cause irreparable harm through expense, business disruption, and publicity. The court denied the motion, holding that an injunction against federal administrative proceedings requires a showing of direct, imminent injury not adequately remedied otherwise, that the alleged harms were too remote and speculative, and that constitutional challenges and judicial review could be pursued through the Act's procedures or later court proceedings.
This case concerns a challenge by Illinois Bell Telephone Co. to an order of the Illinois Commerce Commission setting telephone rates in Chicago, which the company argued were confiscatory under the Constitution by failing to provide a fair return on the value of property devoted to intrastate service. Following a Supreme Court remand requiring specific findings on the separation of intrastate and interstate operations, property valuation, revenues, expenses, and rates of return for each year since 1923, the court made detailed allocations of property, revenues, and expenses based on actual use, determined reproduction costs and other valuation elements, allowed reasonable depreciation charges, and calculated the rates of return realized and that would have been realized under the prescribed rates. The court concluded that the Commission's rates would produce returns below the levels necessary to avoid confiscation for the relevant years, applying a fair rate of return ranging from 7.5% to 5.5% depending on economic conditions. The core reasoning centered on ensuring that intrastate service bears only its proper share of costs and receives adequate compensation based on the property actually employed in that business.
The case involved plaintiffs Bausch & Lomb Optical Co. and Riggs Optical Company seeking to enforce a non-compete agreement against former employee Roy M. Wahlgren and to stop alleged conspiracies by defendants to harm their optical instruments business through false statements, employee interference, and misuse of customer information. The court decided to make the temporary injunction permanent by affirming the master's report. The core reasoning was that sufficient evidence showed a conspiracy to injure the plaintiffs' business, the restrictive covenant was valid and enforceable as it was separable and not against public policy, and the acts could be enjoined as part of the wrongful scheme.
The case concerned a dispute between Lincoln Motor Co. and Lincoln Automobile Co. over the latter's use of the name 'Lincoln Automobile Company' in its business operations. The court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, issuing a permanent injunction that barred the defendant from using the name 'Lincoln,' 'Lincoln Automobile Company,' or any similar designation in signs, advertisements, telephone listings, or other materials, and required immediate removal of such names from its premises and supplies. The court also awarded costs to the plaintiffs. The decision rested on the findings that the court had jurisdiction, the equities favored the plaintiffs, and the material allegations of the complaint had been proven true.