Henry Travillion Wingate

The case involved plaintiffs Asbury MS Gray-Daniels, L.L.C. and Asbury Automotive Arkansas, L.L.C., who purchased a car dealership from sellers including defendant Noel E. Daniels under an Asset Purchase Agreement containing a non-competition clause restricting Daniels from working for competitors within a 50-mile radius for up to five years after the closing or one year after his employment ended. Daniels left his employment with the plaintiffs and began working for a competing dealership in the restricted area shortly thereafter, prompting the plaintiffs to sue for breach of contract and related claims and to seek injunctive relief. The court granted the preliminary injunction after finding that the plaintiffs established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, a substantial threat of irreparable injury, that the balance of harms favored them, and that the injunction would not disserve the public interest, applying New York law to uphold the reasonableness of the covenant's time and geographic limits without modification. The decision was based on undisputed facts showing Daniels' employment violated the clause's terms and on the agreement's provisions treating breach as causing irreparable harm.

business & regulatory

This case concerns challenges by Nevada Partners Fund, LLC (and related LLCs) and their owners to IRS final partnership administrative adjustments for the 2001 tax year, made after James Kelley Williams purchased the entities. The IRS applied Treasury Regulation § 1.701-2, the partnership anti-abuse rule, to recast the transactions on the ground that they were used principally to reduce the aggregate federal tax liability in a manner inconsistent with Subchapter K. The plaintiffs brought suit under 26 U.S.C. § 6226(a) in the district where the partnerships' principal place of business is located, seeking to overturn the adjustments. After a bench trial, the court sets forth findings of fact and conclusions of law on whether the anti-abuse rule was properly invoked and the resulting tax consequences.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case concerned the City of Jackson's closure of J & B Entertainment's adult entertainment club, Babe’s Show Club, for 24 days in 2006 based on an alleged lack of a valid sexually oriented business license. The court had previously ruled that the closure violated the plaintiff's procedural and substantive due process rights under the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, allowing the business to reopen and directing it to submit a license application; the defendants did not appeal that ruling and later conceded liability. After a bench trial on damages, the court evaluated competing calculations of lost profits and consequential damages for the closure period and the subsequent four months, applying standards that require objective evidence of revenue patterns adjusted for variable and fixed costs. The opinion sets forth the factual background of the city's shifting licensing practices and the legal framework for awarding compensatory damages in civil rights cases involving business losses.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatoryfree speech

This case involves plaintiffs suing NBC Universal in state court after a Dateline broadcast revealed private details about one plaintiff's past drug use and financial status without consent, allegedly causing distress to her and her minor children; the claims included misrepresentation, fraud, and loss of consortium, with an ad damnum of $75,000 plus requests for punitive damages, attorney's fees, and other relief. NBC removed the case to federal court under diversity jurisdiction, prompting plaintiffs to move for remand on the ground that the amount in controversy did not exceed $75,000. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that the complaint's open-ended prayer for punitive damages (which are aggregated across plaintiffs under Mississippi law) meant the plaintiffs had not shown to a legal certainty that recovery would stay at or below the jurisdictional threshold.

proceduretorts & liability

In Hill v. Aetna Life Insurance, the plaintiff, administrator of the estate of William Frank Hill, sued Clorox and Aetna to recover death benefits under an ERISA-governed group supplemental accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy after Hill died in a single-vehicle accident. Toxicology results showed Hill's blood alcohol level was 0.22 g/100ml, more than double the legal limit, and Aetna denied the claim pursuant to a policy exclusion for deaths caused or contributed to by alcohol use, while paying benefits under the separate life insurance policy. The plaintiff argued that conflicting language in the summary plan description created an ambiguity that should allow recovery. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, concluding that Aetna did not abuse its discretion in denying the claim under the plan terms and that Clorox was not a proper party defendant.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a dispute between Shelter Mutual Insurance Company and its policyholders, the Simmonses, over whether damage to their driveway from Hurricane Katrina was covered under the "dwelling" section of their homeowner's insurance policy or only under the "other structures" section, which had lower limits already exhausted. The insurance company had paid under "other structures" and sought a declaratory judgment that no further coverage applied under "dwelling." The court, applying Mississippi law in this diversity action, granted summary judgment to the insurer, reasoning that the driveway did not qualify as a "dwelling" or "building structure" attached to the dwelling under the policy's plain language, as it provided no shelter or habitation.

propertyprocedure

This case involves Earl Stephen Dean's challenge to the Mississippi Board of Bar Admissions' denial of his application to the state bar, which was based on the Committee on Character and Fitness's findings that he lacked sufficient character and fitness due to dishonesty, irresponsibility, unauthorized practice of law, and emotional instability. The state chancery court affirmed the denial in 2006, and Dean did not appeal that ruling; instead, he had already filed this federal lawsuit in 2005 seeking injunctive and declaratory relief for alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendant moved to dismiss on multiple grounds, including Younger abstention, res judicata, collateral estoppel, mootness, and lack of standing for the constitutional claims. The court dismissed the action after reviewing the submissions, concluding that the doctrines of abstention and claim preclusion applied in light of the completed state proceedings.

civil rightsprocedure

This case involved a dispute between Dr. Rich Ellison and Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Mississippi over whether Ellison's health insurance plan covered medical expenses from complications following gastric bypass surgery. Ellison filed state-law claims for breach of contract, breach of good faith and fair dealing, and bad faith after the insurer denied coverage for corrective surgery. Blue Cross moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims were preempted by ERISA and that the plan explicitly excluded coverage for obesity-related surgeries and complications. The court granted summary judgment to Blue Cross, holding that ERISA preempts the state claims and that the plan's terms clearly barred coverage for the procedures.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

In this case, First Colony Life Insurance Company filed a declaratory judgment action against Bobby L. Sanford seeking a determination of whether it was obligated to pay death benefits under a $100,000 life insurance policy on Emmanuel Morris, with Sanford named as beneficiary. Sanford had become involved with the minor Morris, applied for guardianship in chancery court, represented himself as legal guardian to obtain an emergency order for Social Security benefits and then the insurance policy, but never took the required oath or received letters of guardianship. The court granted First Colony's motion for summary judgment, holding that Sanford lacked an insurable interest in Morris's life under state law because he was not the legal guardian, making the policy void ab initio, and ordered return of the premiums paid; Sanford's counterclaims were denied. The ruling was based on the absence of a valid legal relationship and the undisputed facts regarding the incomplete guardianship process.

business & regulatoryfamily lawprocedure

The case involved plaintiff Robert Earl Pierce suing the Department of the Air Force under the Privacy Act of 1974, alleging that the agency improperly released a Summary Report of Investigation (SROI) from an internal probe into misconduct at an Air National Guard unit, which enabled local newspapers to publicly identify him by name and detail specific allegations against him. Pierce claimed this disclosure caused him public embarrassment and violated the Act's protections against releasing records from a system of records without consent. The court granted the Air Force's motion for summary judgment and denied Pierce's partial summary judgment motion, concluding there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding a Privacy Act violation. The core reasoning was that the SROI identified individuals only by duty titles rather than names or other personal identifiers, and thus did not itself disclose protected information that would allow direct identification of Pierce without additional external details.

procedurefederal power

In this case, plaintiff Chan-drashekhar Lakshman sued Jackson State University and its president Ronald Mason, claiming that JSU breached an employment contract by failing to raise his salary from $57,500 to $65,500 after he earned his doctorate and that President Mason violated his due process rights in property by not honoring a promised salary adjustment. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) or for summary judgment, contending that the Eleventh Amendment barred the claim against the state university, qualified immunity shielded the president, and the claims were not viable under state contract law because the salary increase was never included in the signed contract. The court granted the motion, holding that JSU, as a state institution, was immune under the Eleventh Amendment, the president was protected by qualified immunity, and the contract claims failed because the final agreement omitted any salary adjustment and the plaintiff accepted it without revision.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfederal power

Mary McCornell sued the City of Jackson under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming violations of her Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights along with a state false arrest claim after she was arrested on a felony false pretense charge. The charge arose when her employer, after issuing an erroneous overpayment that McCornell spent, reported the matter to police, signed an affidavit, and obtained a warrant; McCornell surrendered voluntarily, was arrested and released on bond, and the charges were later dismissed by the district attorney. The district court granted the City's motion for summary judgment, concluding that McCornell failed to establish the elements required for any of her claims against the City.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involves a lawsuit filed by the Mississippi Attorney General on behalf of the state and its citizens against Microsoft in state court, alleging violations of state antitrust and consumer protection laws arising from overcharges on software purchases, and seeking damages, penalties, and injunctive relief. Microsoft removed the action to federal court on diversity jurisdiction grounds and moved to stay proceedings pending potential transfer to multidistrict litigation in another district. The court denied the stay motion and granted the remand motion, returning the case to state court. The core reasoning was that the suit is a parens patriae action by the state itself, precluding diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, with no independent basis for original federal jurisdiction to support a stay or supplemental jurisdiction.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs Phillip and Sylvia King suing medical device manufacturer Synthes after a humeral nail implanted in Mr. King's arm allegedly broke, leading to infection and additional surgeries; the Kings claimed the device was defective in design, manufacture, labeling, and testing under Mississippi product liability law. The court granted the defendant's motion to exclude the testimony of the plaintiffs' only expert, Dr. Edward Reese, finding him unqualified under Daubert because his background lacked relevant expertise in the specific medical devices or rigorous scientific methodology. Without admissible expert evidence to prove defect, causation, or breach of warranty, the court concluded the plaintiffs could not meet their burden and therefore granted Synthes summary judgment, mooting the remaining motions.

torts & liabilityprocedure

In Floyd v. Communications Workers of America, the plaintiff, a temporary part-time organizer for the International Union of Electrical Workers, sued the union and its successor after a 2000 merger, alleging race-based denial of permanent employment, unequal pay, and sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of race discrimination because she was replaced by another African-American employee and that her sexual harassment claim had not been administratively exhausted with the EEOC. The court noted that the plaintiff failed to respond to the motion and that the defendants' personnel decisions were driven by budget shortfalls and a reduction in force following the merger. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants, holding that the plaintiff could not make out a prima facie Title VII claim and that the unexhausted harassment allegation fell outside the scope of any EEOC investigation.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involved a pro se plaintiff, Lester Washington, who sued Jackson State University, its Board, and various administrators and faculty after receiving failing grades in multiple courses, having a grievance denied, being dismissed from the doctoral program in Clinical Psychology, and having his acceptance into another program rescinded, all allegedly due to discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with a due process claim for not being allowed to appear personally before grievance committees. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims were barred by the statute of limitations or not legally cognizable, and that individual defendants had qualified immunity. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the university followed its grading and grievance policies, no evidence supported discrimination or retaliation, and the due process claim failed as the procedures did not require personal appearances.

civil rightsprocedure

In Bates v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., the plaintiff sued Wal-Mart for negligence after she was abducted from the store's parking lot, claiming the store breached its duty to keep the premises safe for her as a business invitee. The court had previously denied summary judgment but later considered newly discovered evidence showing the plaintiff had been convicted of shoplifting at another Wal-Mart, signed a notification barring her from all Wal-Mart property, and was therefore a trespasser at the time of the incident. Applying Mississippi law under diversity jurisdiction, the court granted Wal-Mart's amended motion for summary judgment, finding no material facts in dispute and that the plaintiff, as a trespasser, assumed the risk of injury with the store immune from civil liability under state trespass statutes. The ruling rested on the plaintiff's failure to establish any duty owed by Wal-Mart to a trespasser.

torts & liabilitypropertyprocedurecriminal law

This case involves New South Federal Savings Bank seeking to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act of claims brought by Mississippi resident defendants in related state court proceedings concerning their assigned mortgage loans. The court granted the motion to compel, holding that the parties had entered into valid arbitration agreements via Deed of Trust Riders that covered disputes relating to the promissory notes and loan transactions. Exercising diversity jurisdiction and applying Mississippi substantive law, the court found the agreements enforceable under the FAA, rejecting arguments of unconscionability or inapplicability to the claims. The core reasoning was that federal policy requires courts to enforce privately negotiated arbitration contracts according to their terms when the parties have agreed to arbitrate.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involves plaintiffs suing Capital One Bank in Mississippi state court over various state-law claims related to credit card accounts, including breach of contract, deceptive advertising, and violations of consumer protection laws. The defendant removed the case to federal court asserting both diversity and federal question jurisdiction based on the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDA). The court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand, determining that diversity jurisdiction was absent due to an insufficient amount in controversy and that federal question jurisdiction did not exist because DIDA does not completely preempt the plaintiffs' non-usury state claims. The reasoning centered on the limited nature of federal jurisdiction and the inapplicability of complete preemption under DIDA as established in relevant Supreme Court precedent.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved property owners in Mississippi suing the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and Department of the Army over alleged erosion and bank damage to their land bordering Bayou Pierre, which they attributed to a 2002 federal project altering the waterway's flow in connection with an easement for bridge access. The plaintiffs asserted claims for breach of contract, negligence, due process violations, and conversion. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and (6), and alternatively for summary judgment under Rule 56, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiffs failed to establish essential elements or satisfy jurisdictional prerequisites such as those under the Tucker Act and Federal Tort Claims Act. All other motions, including to strike the jury demand, were rendered moot as a result.

propertytorts & liabilityfederal powerprocedure